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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is the conclusion of doctoral research that pursued to examine whether 
indigenous peoples’ demands for access to their cultural practices can be accommodated 
within criminal law. In a globalised context in which states become increasingly 
multicultural this question raises fear of social fragmentation and the anxiety for achieving 
unity. Certainly, Rwanda and Kosovo evidence that claims to access culturally diverse 
practices may lead to war or even genocide. The context of the thesis is a more benign 
form of response to these claims: accommodation. While accommodation in general has 
received great attention from scholars (Kymlicka 1989, Gutmann et al 1994, Tully 1995), 
within criminal law the only focus has been cultural defences (Renteln 2004, Kymlicka et 
al 2014). However, little research has been conducted to understand the broader 
implications of this phenomenon for both the accommodated and the accommodating. The 
research aims to shed light on these broader implications of accommodation by exploring it 
within criminal law. Certainly, the simplicity and individualised nature of cultural defence 
conceals what is at stake for both the accommodated and the accommodating. Specifically, 
it conceals how criminal law cannot be responsive to the claims of minorities because it 
seeks to maintain the practices of the constitutional order of which criminal law is part. 
The result is that the claims of indigenous peoples cannot be accommodated. In order to 
uncover these implications, the research employs social holism (Pettit 1998) to develop a 
broader understanding of criminal law as a socio-cultural practice, which enables an 
adequate description and assessment of the diversity of claims to recognition that 
minorities make to the state of which they are part. In broadening the view the claims of 
minorities become linked to their position within the constitutional order (Tully 1995), and 
then the question arises as to whether minorities have been unjustly excluded or included 
(Lindahl 2013) in that order, which may lead to recognise a new plurality of responses that 
the state and its criminal law should provide to them. By broadening the understanding of 
criminal law it is enabled an adequate framework for the assessment of the phenomenon of 
accommodation. Certainly, this is necessary for claims to access diverse cultural and social 
practices to be met with justice, for the state’s responses need to be sensitive to the 
diversity of claims put forward by minorities, without overlooking that the state as well 
need to access its particular social and cultural practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in an increasingly multicultural world, in which the diversity of values and 
conceptions of “the good” are becoming challenges to traditional forms of democratic 
legitimacy. Multiculturalism, as a broad social phenomenon, makes explicit a diversity of 
values which dispute the claim that democracy protects and fosters “shared goods.” This is 
indeed a multicultural turn in society’s self-description. Far from being an isolated 
phenomenon experienced by only a few countries, all societies across the world are either 
becoming multicultural due to increasing immigration or realising that they already were 
multicultural. Within this context, the grounds for asserting that there is a shared 
conception of the good and the right become unclear, with implications that go far beyond 
the mere assertion of difference. Certainly, they extend to the very foundations of state and 
society, sometimes ingraining claims which engender division and hostility. Cultural 
diversity buttresses some of the most violent conflicts of the last 50 years, some of which 
have evolved into secession, whilst others have descended into war and genocide. The 
cases of the Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo and the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda 
illustrate how deeply these conflicts of diversity can cut through societies. In so doing, 
diversity threatens not only which views of the good should be fostered, but also 
potentially fragments modern states and the unity of their legal systems. 
An alternative to elimination, genocide or war, one which falls short of secession, has been 
put to work: the accommodation of culturally-diverse practices. This alternative promises 
to reconcile diversity with unity. States not only describe themselves as multicultural, but 
also claim to value the diversity that accompanies this. Moreover, in some areas 
accommodating culturally-diverse practices is considered a matter of justice, and thus, 
permissible and sometimes required. It is significant that the reconciliatory alternative has 
not abandoned the idea of unity; on the contrary, it seeks accommodation as a way of 
defending its unity. It is within this context of multiculturalism that the research takes 
place: the seemingly benevolent version of the modern state that accommodates culturally-
diverse practices. Whilst there has been extensive research concerning the accommodation 
of minorities within the legal system by political and social philosophers1, political 
                                                
1 The discussion ranges from the morality of group rights to the limits of accommodation in terms of 
achieving social justice; see, among the most influential writers, the following: Amy Gutmann (ed.), 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press 1994), Chandran 
Kukathas (ed.), Multicultural Citizens: The Philosophy and Politics of Identity (Centre for Independent 
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scientists2 and legal scholars3, this topic has received considerably less attention in 
criminal law4, where the focal point - if not the exclusive focus - has been “cultural 
defences”. However, scholars have paid little attention to the broader implications of this 
phenomenon for both majorities and minorities, and how these claims are connected 
internally to the social practices both regard as fundamental. The present thesis adopts a 
broader understanding of the phenomenon and seeks to develop a framework that allows 
for assessing and identifying the limits of accommodation, specifically, within criminal 
law. 
The general purpose is to explore the challenges posed by culturally-diverse practices to 
the legal system, yet the enquiry is directed to tackle a specific issue. The specific purpose 
is exploring how the process of accommodation within criminal law impacts on indigenous 
peoples. Thus, while the general aim is to contribute to the wider debate concerning the 
implications of accommodating the legal system in a context of multiculturalism, the 
                                                                                                                                              
Studies 1993), Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (OUP 1995), Ian Shapiro and Will 
Kymlicka (ed.), Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York University Press 1997), Christian Joppke and Steven 
Lukes (eds), Multicultural Questions (OUP 2002), Bruce Haddock and Peter Sutch (eds.), Multiculturalism, 
Identity and Rights (Routledge 2003), Anthony Laden and David Owen (ed.), Multiculturalism and Political 
Theory (CUP 2007), Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Identities, Affiliations, Allegiances (CUP 2007), Michel Seymur 
(ed.), The Plural States of Recognition (Routledge 2010). 
2 Political scientists have focused more on the conditions of social cohesion, nationalism and the existence of 
sub-state autonomies; see, among the most influential writers, the following: Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka 
(eds.), Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York University Press 1997), Alain Gagnon and James Tully (eds.) 
Multinational Democracies (CUP 2001), Stephen May, Tariq Modood and Judith Squires (ed.), Ethnicity, 
Nationalism and Minority Rights (CUP 2005), Stephen Tierney (ed.), Accommodating Cultural Diversity 
(Ashgate 2007), Alain Gagnon and Michael Keating (eds.), Political Autonomy and Divided Societies: 
Imagining Democratic Alternatives in Complex Settings (Routledge 2012), Raymond Taras (ed.) Challenging 
Multiculturalism: European Models of Diversity, Jaime Luch (ed), Constitutionalism and the Politics of 
Accommodation in Multinational Democracies (Routledge 2014). 
3 Legal scholars have focused their attention on many topics, ranging from ethnic and sexual discrimination 
to minority rights, and many others. On collective rights, see Judith Baker (ed.), Group Rights (University of 
Toronto 1994), Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York University 
Press 1997), Duncan Ivison et al (eds.), Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (CUP 2000). 
On other topics, see Richard Shweder et al (eds.), Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in 
Liberal Democracies (SAGE 2002), Rachel Sieder (ed.), Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous 
Rights, Diversity and Democracy (Routledge 2002), Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev (eds.), 
Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity (CUP 2004), Barbara Arneil et al (eds.), Sexual 
Justice/Cultural Justice: Critical Perspectives in Political Theory and Practice (Routledge 2006), Omid 
Payrow Shabani (ed.), Multiculturalism and Law: A Critical Debate (University of Wales Press 2007), 
Gideon Calder and Magali Bessone and Federico Zuolo (eds.), How Groups Matter: Challenges of 
Toleration in Pluralistic Societies (Routledge 2014). 
4 See note 3; also Alison Renteln, The Cultural Defense (OUP 2004), Marie-Clarie Foblets and Alison 
Renteln (eds.), Multicultural Jurisprudence: Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense (Hart 
Publishing 2009), Will Kymlicka et al (eds.), Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity (OUP 2014). 
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specific contribution concerns the accommodation of indigenous peoples within criminal 
law. More specifically, the research question consists in whether criminal law can 
accommodate indigenous peoples’ demands for access to their cultural practices. The 
hypothesis is that criminal law cannot achieve such accommodation. In the explication of 
this failure, it is nonetheless considered the conditions that would be necessary to achieve 
not accommodation, but equality. The key condition to be explored consists in furthering 
equality through the suspension of criminal law. The reason why accommodating 
indigenous peoples’ demands fails is that the legal system’s standard response to those 
who demand recognition of their practices simply cannot go further than the cultural 
defences. Let us first begin with an example to illustrate the problem. 
Assume that some cultural rights can protect important collective dimensions of the 
cultural life of a group. This can be so, for cultural rights, loosely understood, can assist 
the protection of a group’s cultural practices. If recognised constitutionally or legally, these 
cultural rights may conflict with criminal law. In the clearest case, the exercise of cultural 
rights may involve the commission of a crime. In 2012, in the Valparaiso Region, Chile, a 
group of Rapa-Nui indigenous people, were criminally investigated for exercising their 
cultural rights. Though they were initially prosecuted, the indictment was later dismissed. 
Nevertheless, the police were deployed and the offenders were brought to jail and indicted, 
causing social unrest and fear in the population that they could be criminalised for 
practising their traditions. The events took place on Rapa-Nui Island (Easter Island). While 
today, the island is Chilean territory, it was formerly part of the independent nation, Rapa-
Nui. The facts were as follows: a group of Rapa-Nui were fishing inside a cave, in 
conformity with their traditional practices, implicating the exercise of their cultural rights. 
However, they were prosecuted for allegedly having caused damage to the cave, which 
was under protection by the Law of National Natural Monuments. From the point of view 
of the prosecutor, the law explicitly aimed at protecting natural monuments, in this case the 
cave, by forbidding all types of access. Damages caused to the cave and mere trespassing 
were criminal. From the point of view of the Rapa-Nui, this was a criminalisation of their 
cultural practices, achieved by the criminalisation of their cultural rights5 to fish in the 
cave. 
                                                
5 In Chile, the ILO Convention 169 has the status of law and aims to protect these practices as an expression 
of indigenous peoples’ cultural rights. 
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In relation to the aim of this thesis, the case illustrates that there are two different points of 
view concerning accommodation within criminal law: one for which access to the cave 
should be forbidden, because of the value of preserving national monuments; and the other 
for which access should be permitted because of the value of engaging in traditional 
practices. While these points of view are normally quite visible, the connection between 
these values and the groups that give them authority is rarely recognised. Indeed, it is 
seldom recognised that both make a claim to what they regard as valuable, and that part of 
what explains that worth derives from the recognition of a group having authority over its 
members. From this point of view, the conflict would be misdescribed if reduced merely to 
cultural conflict. An adequate understanding requires considering the connection between 
both: the cultural - the values some seek to preserve - and the political - who is entitled to 
set those values as ends.  
The interconnection between these components is rarely taken into consideration when 
describing the process of accommodation6, and the thesis argues that this is the key for 
understanding the phenomenon and its implications. An appropriate understanding should 
include the observation that accommodation has implications for both the group that seeks 
accommodation, as well as the group that makes the accommodation. Certainly, by 
observing the connection between the cultural and the political, it is possible to establish 
that the social practices of both indigenous peoples7 and the state are at stake, and thus, so 
too are the meanings which guide their interactions as participants in them. What is 
peculiar about this phenomenon is that it occurs between two groups that can legitimately 
claim to be regarded as self-determined. Accordingly, the thesis will attempt to show that 
indigenous peoples’ demands are qualitatively different with regards to the treatment 
criminal law might dispense to other minorities when they call for their practices to be 
accommodated. 
                                                
6 There have been valuable efforts that reveal the connection between culture and politics. However, this 
thesis aims to go further by proposing a framework that uncovers the broader implications and how they 
relate each other specifically in the case of minorities seeking accommodation within criminal law; see David 
Schneiderman, ‘Theorists of Difference and the Interpretation of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights’ (1996) 14 
International Journal of Canadian Studies 35-52, and also Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the 
Constitution of Canada (Toronto University Press 2001). 
7 The thesis adopts a general view, which seeks to capture the central components of the demands made by 
most indigenous peoples of the states they live within. On the diversity of understandings of “indigenous”, 
see Jeff Corntassel, ‘Who is Indigenous? Peoplehood and Ethnonationalist Approaches to Rearticulating 
Indigenous Identity’ (2003) 9 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 75-100. 
 
11 
Method 
In building a framework that captures the interconnection between cultural and political 
components, it is employed and developed a particular method throughout the research: 
social holism 8. Social holism is a method for examining social events from a broader point 
of view, while simultaneously seeking to understand them within their own context. More 
specifically, social holism understands social events in terms of a mutual relationship 
between social practices and meaning. According to social holism, social events, like 
individual actions, beliefs, intentions and choices, have meaning to the extent that they are 
located within a particular context of social practices. It takes the position that social 
events are autonomous, in the sense that insofar as social practices are constitutive of 
meaning9, they cannot be reduced to something located outside of those practices. 
Accordingly, it holds that understanding meaning and social practices requires inquiring 
from “within”, placing the participant’s point of view at the centre10. 
Many anthropologists and social theorists have adopted this approach, to varying degrees: 
Clifford Geertz, Marshall Sahlins and Sherry Ortner in anthropology; Pierre Bourdieu, 
Anthony Giddens, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jurgen Habermas in social theory; all in 
some way or another rely on social practices for understanding social interactions and 
meaning. Social holism places the emphasis on public performances more than individual 
attitudes for understanding social events. While social actions may be explained by the 
intentions, beliefs, and desires of those who engage in social practices, the latter are taken 
to be prior to the former11. Social performances are taken as meaningful in their own right, 
and individual attitudes are explained in terms of those practices. This, as this thesis will 
                                                
8 While this idea differs from other accounts in that it emphasises meanings in terms of a practical mastery, it 
has many affinities with those who seek to vindicate “social causation’ through social holism; see Philip 
Pettit, ‘Defining and Defending Social Holism’ (1998) 1(3) Philosophical Explorations 169-184; Keith 
Sawyer, ‘Non-reductive individualism I -Supervenience and Wild Disjunction’ (2002) 32 Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 537-559; Raimo Tuomela, ‘Holistic Social Causation and Explanation’ in Dieks et al (eds.), 
Explanations, Prediction, and Confirmation (Springer 2010) 305-317; Christian List and Kai Spiekerman, 
‘Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science, A Reconciliation” (2013) 107 American 
Political Science Review 629-643. 
9  John Gunnell, Social Inquiry After Wittgenstein and Kuhn: Leaving Everything as It Is (Columbia 
University Press 2014) 62. 
10 This, of course, focuses attention on the particularity and relativity of social phenomena, Gunnell, Social 
Inquiry (n 5) 153. 
11 See Roger Trigg, ‘Wittgenstein and Social Science’ (1990) 28 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 
209-222; Sebastian Rodl, ‘Practice and the Unity of Action’ in George Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and 
Collective Intentionality (Dr. Hansel-Hohenhausen 2002) 323-342. 
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show, bridges social theory and the philosophy of language. As Barbara Fultner has 
argued, both are naturally interconnected12. Although both take communicative meaningful 
social events as their object, they nonetheless emphasise different aspects: whilst social 
theory focuses more on the role of communication, philosophy of language addresses the 
role of meaning13. Yet it is obvious that a theory of meaning matters for a theory of 
communication, for communication assumes the transmission of meaningful expressions14. 
Nevertheless, meaning also depends on communication, for participants communicate 
when interacting through social practices. Chapter 1 develops a framework that links both 
for an adequate understanding of socio-cultural practices. 
The thesis will draw substantially on the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, to support a 
view of meaning that unites both the points of view of social theory and the philosophy of 
language. Social holism aims to synthesise these disciplines, emphasising that meaning is 
part of participants’ practical mastery of the practices they engage in15. While this is not 
specifically a “legal method”, it can be applied in a fruitful way to reveal how the law in 
general, and criminal law in particular, depend on broader contexts of social practices. In 
so doing, it clarifies what state criminal law is doing when it criminalises the demands of 
indigenous peoples who claim access to their social practices. Generally speaking, it 
advances an understanding that what the Rapa-Nui seek by accessing the cave is access to 
their own social practices, and thus access to their own meanings, which is just what state 
criminal law aims to do. Social holism demonstrates how underlying the conflict, there is a 
continuous recreation of social practices of self-determination on both sides. This makes 
salient a further conclusion: that the conflict is a political conflict for self-determination. 
                                                
12 Of course, not all philosophers of language suit this task, especially those who emphasise semantics over 
pragmatics, like Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Harvard University Press 1989) and Stephen 
Schiffer, Meaning (Clarendon Press 1972). For a critical examination, see Joseph Rouse, ‘Practice theory’ in 
Stephen Turner and Mark Risjord (eds.), Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology (Elsevier 2007) 639-683 
13 Barbara Fultner, ‘Do Social Philosophers Need a Theory of Meaning? Social Theory and Semantics after 
the Pragmatic Turn’ in William Regh and James Bohman (eds.), Pluralism and the Pragmatic Turn: The 
Transformation of Critical Theory Essays in honor of Thomas McCarthy (MIT Press 2001) 145. 
14 Fultner, ‘Do Social Philosophers’ (n 13) 145. 
15 Not, of course in those interpretations that see in Wittgenstein a form of linguistic idealism according to 
which “words” constitute meaning. For such misguided, yet quite common, understandings see Ian Jarvie, 
‘Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences: Paradigms, Methodology, and Ontology’ in Ian Jarvie and 
Jesus Zamora-Bonilla (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of The Philosophy of Social Sciences 1-36; Frank 
Hindriks, ‘Language and Society’ in Ian Jarvie and Jesus Zamora-Bonilla (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of The 
Philosophy of Social Sciences 137-152. 
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Finally, and more specifically as regards criminal law, by employing social holism the 
thesis may be situated within a recent trend in criminal law theory that seeks to understand 
criminalisation as a historical and institutional phenomenon16, instead of a primarily moral 
or philosophical enquiry into its “nature”. The general purpose is to develop further this 
line of research by theorising about criminal law in terms of social and cultural processes, 
how they can be distinguished, the role they play and how they operate in an interrelated 
manner. To this end, social holism introduces many different kinds of materials, cases, 
statutes and different methods, spanning not only legal disciplines, but also social history, 
social theory and more generally philosophical methods17. Finally, while the thesis does 
not include empirical research, it aims to be empirically informed. 
Outline of the Chapters 
Chapter 1 aims to contextualise criminal law within a broader context of social and cultural 
practices, and thus seeks to provide a framework for understanding criminal law as a socio-
cultural practice. To accomplish this, the chapter first examines how the legal literature 
understands the relationship between culture and law. Second, it turns to social theory and 
social philosophy to develop from the previous examination a framework with which to 
understand criminal law as a socio-cultural practice. With the framework in place, it 
investigates to what extent criminal law can be extended to accommodate minorities’ 
demands to access their cultural practices. Chapter 2 changes the focus to political 
philosophy and multiculturalism, in aiming to elucidate the problem that accommodation 
addresses, and how the solution is conceived of in terms of individual inequality. The 
chapter proposes a broader understanding of accommodation within criminal law, in terms 
of how both phenomena take part in a more general process of the social construction of 
reality. Chapter 3 explores the political components of accommodation, by examining the 
constitutional order. The chapter provides an historical interpretation of the origins of the 
state-form, upon which the constitutional order emerges, and details how this process 
involved the formation of a “constitutional identity”. It develops a theory of constitutional 
                                                
16 Alan Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice: A Relational Critique (OUP 2000); Marcus Dubber, 
Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government (Columbia University Press 2005); 
Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalisation and Civil Order (OUP 2016), Nicola 
Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions (OUP 2016). 
17 Philosophical or conceptual methods are important for they are part of social practices and thus may 
provide insights about them; see John Gunnell, Political Theory and Social Science: Cutting Against the 
Grain (Routledge 2011) 100. 
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identity, accounting for processes of the exclusion and inclusion of minorities, and then 
explores the significance of criminal law within this identity through the lens of on-going 
debate in EU law. It raises scepticism regarding the potential of constitutional dialogue as a 
way of making the legal system more responsive to cultural diversity. It concludes by 
proposing a principled distinction for the differentiated treatment the state should provide 
to the claims of different minorities. 
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between criminal law and the constitutional order, and 
specifies further how criminal law secures meanings within the identity of the 
constitutional order. Finally, it examines how criminal law handles the challenges offered 
by one type of minority through what are standardly designated  “cultural defences”. 
Lastly, Chapter 5 explores how criminal law responds to the challenges advanced by 
indigenous peoples. It starts by drawing on the relationships between citizenship and 
criminal law, in order to identify how criminal law shapes and constructs membership of 
the political community. The chapter includes two Canadian cases to illustrate how 
criminal law assists integration into the political community to which it belongs, and 
concludes with the impossibility of accommodating indigenous peoples’ claims. The 
chapter ends by remarking upon the reasons for this, and proposes what is required to treat 
indigenous peoples equally: reinstating them with self-determination. Additionally, it also 
specifies a basic condition for attaining self-determination, which requires that indigenous 
peoples have an independent penal practice; independent, that is, from the state of which 
they have been forced to be part. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CRIMINAL LAW: CULTURE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to describe the socio-cultural components of the process of 
accommodation by examining criminal law through social holism. Specifically, the chapter 
starts from two implications of social holism and uses them progressively to uncover those 
components. Recall social holism, the view that holds that individual actions and choices 
have meaning within a context of social practices. This applies to cultural practices as well, 
which given that they involve individual actions and choices, require a context of social 
practices in order to have meaning. Thus, the claim is that criminal law is a socio-cultural 
practice and so depends on a broader context of socio-cultural practices. This is the first 
implication: the meaning of criminal law depends on socio-cultural practices. The second 
implication is linked to the first: criminal law itself achieves meaning through its 
contribution to the meaning of those practices. This is the second implication: criminal law 
contributes to the meaning of socio-cultural practices. The holistic method enables an 
understanding of criminal law in terms of a two-way feedback relation; it has meaning by 
virtue of being part of a broader context of social practices, yet it contributes to those 
practices having meaning. 
Stating that criminal law depends on broader contexts of social practices and that they 
depend in turn on criminal law re-describes in a richer way the fact that criminal law is 
state law18. The purpose of social holism is to show that criminal law cannot be explained 
only within state dynamics, for the state itself is a social practice. That is, the state also 
depends on broader contexts of social practices. Understanding criminal law as a socio-
cultural practice shifts the focus to the multiple ways in which human social interactions 
make criminal law intelligible. Thus, social holism does not reduce the meaning of 
criminal law to the state of which it is part. Social holism understands criminal law by 
widening the point of view to include the broader social practices that give it meaning and 
how in turn criminal law impacts on the meaning of the practices on which it depends. To 
                                                
18 See in general Christopher Tomlins, ‘How Autonomous is Law’ (2007) 3 Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science 45-68. 
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understand criminal law as a two-way, socio-cultural practice involves considering it as a 
pervasive relationship. One may overlook it, but then, while no less pervasive, it becomes 
invisible. The focus in this chapter is mainly on how criminal law contributes to socio-
cultural practices, without overlooking how socio-cultural practices contribute to criminal 
law. 
Let us examine two prominent legal theorists’ views about the accommodation of diversity 
within criminal law and how the aforementioned relationship becomes invisible in them, 
which has an important implication. To the extent that the relationship remains invisible, 
they become unable to see the connection between the cultural and political claims that 
underlie the demand to access cultural practices. Because the connection remains unclear, 
the individualisation of the demands of indigenous peoples appears natural. Let us see how 
this happens. The first theorist is Nicola Lacey, who develops her views on diversity and 
criminal law in her essay “Community, Culture, and Criminalization”19. In this essay, 
Lacey adopts Anthony Duff’s communicative view of criminal law in order to suggest how 
diversity might be accommodated. According to Lacey, criminal law adopts an evaluative 
stance towards the values that criminal conduct expresses. I will designate this stance as 
the “critical function” of criminal law. When criminal law applies, it reaffirms the validity 
of shared values by criticising conducts that depart from them. It also reaffirms that those 
values are shared by the political community.  
Lacey places the critical function as a fundamental component of criminal law, and to this 
end she employs Duff’s theory of communicative criminal law. Duff understands criminal 
law as fundamentally involving the capacity to question and sanction wrongdoings 
committed against the political community. This generalises the types of standards that can 
be questioned. Thus, the political community can challenge any pre-existing cultural 
standards through criminal law. It appears then that the critical function is at the core of 
criminal law. Certainly, it is democratically legitimated and expresses which values are 
shared by the political community. In so doing, it also determines the space for the 
recognition of practices and standards that depart from those shared values. Indeed, the 
position of the critical function entails that the level of recognition of cultural practices 
                                                
19 Nicola Lacey, ‘Community, Culture, and Criminalization’ in Rowan Cruft et al (eds.), Crime, Punishment, 
and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (OUP 2011) 294. 
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depends on whether they undercut the communicative function of criminal law20. That is, 
the space afforded to cultural diversity ends where the maintenance of the communicative 
function of criminal law begins.  
Lacey proposes as an example a case in which a young man rapes a woman, yet is 
acquitted because he is considered to have a reasonable belief that when the woman said 
“no”, she was saying “yes”21. Holding this belief is supposed to be related to the man’s 
cultural upbringing22. That is, the man’s cultural background is the source of the standard 
that motivated him to act. Thus, a practical problem appears in recognising cultural 
diversity. If the court bases a defence upon this person’s subjective belief, which is 
grounded in his particular cultural background, there would be no objective standard 
guiding the critical function. The critical function would be undermined. According to 
Lacey, this cannot be right. Laws are democratically legitimated. They express the position 
of the political community in which values are shared and, more importantly, through the 
critical function evaluate which standards of conduct are reasonable and unreasonable, and 
thus criminal. Now, underlying this account, the unit to which criminal law applies is the 
individual, understood as having a capacity to act23 and a particular character24. Thus 
criminal law evaluates “…the ‘reality’ of the defendant's choice, the ‘fairness’ of his or her 
opportunity to conform; the ‘reasonableness’ of his or her perceptions”25. Finally, the same 
is true of what can limit criminal law, for these limitations that refer to the system’s 
efficacy need to be balanced with treating its basic unit, the individual, with fairness26. 
Both the unit that justifies criminal law and that which limits it are defined in terms of 
individuals having certain characteristics. 
The second theorist is Jeremy Waldron. Waldron frames the question around 
accommodation within the values of the rule of law. In particular, he considers that in 
principle recognising diversity within criminal law may undermine the ideal of equal 
                                                
20 Lacey, ‘Community, Culture’ (n 19) 296. 
21 Ibid 295. 
22 Ibid 295. 
23 Ibid 298. 
24 Ibid 299. 
25 Ibid 303. 
26 Ibid 308. 
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application of the law27. Indeed, to the extent that only the members of a cultural minority 
are awarded with a defence, this would make the law unequal: it then becomes the case 
that not all individuals are subjected in the same way to criminal law. Though Waldron is 
sceptical of admitting this kind of defence in order to make the legal system more 
responsive to diversity28, he considers other grounds for accommodation. What Waldron 
seeks to defend is a ground compatible with the values of the rule of law. In contrast to 
Lacey, Waldron is more explicit in expanding the horizon of considerations that may come 
to bear on the acceptance of such a defence. Waldron holds that defences that only 
minorities can enjoy may express the values of the rule of law because they may actually 
help to realise such values, and so they should be permitted. 
Waldron considers as a ground for accommodating cultural diversity the existence of other 
“agencies”, aside from the state, with authority over persons for deciding how they ought 
to live.29 Although Waldron is not entirely clear as to what he means by “agencies”, it 
seems they are some form of association or group. Criminal law might endanger members’ 
allegiances to these groups when it criminalises their cultural practices. Members would be 
unfairly placed in a moral dilemma; they would be “torn”30 between respecting the law and 
respecting their group. This cannot be fair and the rule of law requires fairness in criminal 
law. For this reason, in these cases exemptions may be accepted31. However, Waldron 
agrees with Lacey that these exemptions are limited. Waldron also believes that criminal 
law has a “critical function”. Criminal law can therefore seek to change cultural standards, 
like cultural norms concerning domestic violence. Moreover, exemptions cannot be 
granted where the laws are right-based. Norms concerning homicide are right-based. They 
impose deontological constraints on actions and are exemption-less. However, other 
norms, such as the prohibition of hunting, only appeal to utilitarian considerations and are 
susceptible to exemptions. Thus, Waldron, like Lacey, frames where diversity cannot be 
accommodated by criminal law: individual rights. Accordingly, only individual interests 
                                                
27 Jeremy Waldron, ‘One Law for All? The logic of cultural accommodation’ (2002) 59 Washington Law 
Review 3. For a defence of this view, see Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of 
Multiculturalism (Polity Press 2001). 
28 Waldron, ‘One Law’ (n 27) 12. 
29 Ibid 15. 
30 Ibid 24. 
31 Ibid 17. 
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can become the ground for limiting criminal law, for the justification for the exemption 
owes to the fact that there is an individual with conflicting allegiances32. 
As regards understanding criminal law as a two-way feedback relation, both Lacey and 
Waldron consider criminal law’s contribution to the meaning of social practices. After all, 
this is what the critical function is all about. This evaluative function aims to reproduce or 
transform the standards individuals use as guidance for their actions. Nonetheless, neither 
of them pay much attention to how criminal law is informed by broader contexts of social 
practices. In truth, they consider some aspects of this relation insofar as they refer to values 
such as fairness and freedom, not just as constraints on what can be achieved, but as values 
that inform criminal law. Yet the connection remains underdeveloped. Notably, while both 
agree these values have authority by virtue of expressing, democratically, the views of a 
group, neither draws the connection between these cultural values and the group that 
values them. There are two connections here: between the values shared by a group, and 
these values having democratic authority. Now, if a group shares values, and the group has 
some form of political authority, this leads one to wonder why the individual cultural 
values of freedom and fairness should have authority for this group. This seems to be the 
case for indigenous peoples. It seems that if they are entitled to choose which values have 
authority for them, then they can legitimately question the values which the larger group 
claims have authority for them. Neither Lacey nor Waldron consider this. The reason 
seems to be that they have in mind non-self-determined groups facing criminal law. 
However, once self-determined groups like indigenous peoples are taken into 
consideration, things become less simple than whether they may enjoy an exemption or 
not. 
As can be observed, identifying the connection between cultural and political claims was 
facilitated by understanding criminal law as a two-way feedback relation. Both Lacey and 
Waldron implicitly grasp another feature of how criminal law is informed by social 
practices that is relevant here. They consider that criminal law is not culturally neutral. 
According to Lacey, the law is marked by “cultural assumptions”33, and according to 
Waldron, knowing the law implies the individual is “culturally equipped” to that end. 
                                                
32 Waldron, ‘One Law (n 27) 27. 
33 Lacey, ‘Community, culture’ (n 19) 307. 
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However, it is unclear how to understand the status of these “cultural assumptions”; that is, 
whether they are necessary for understanding the practice or whether they can be dispensed 
with. One might hold that cultural assumptions are at work in the critical function only 
when it seeks to challenge cultural practices. For instance, if it seeks to change individuals’ 
views on the preservation of national monuments, then in other cases those cultural 
assumptions could be considered dispensable. This seems not to be the position of Lacey 
and Waldron. They seem to hold that those cultural assumptions are always at work in 
criminal law and that more often than not, they might place minorities at a disadvantage. 
Certainly this is what accommodation in the form of exemptions is supposed to remedy. 
However, this commits them to sustaining that, notwithstanding those cultural 
assumptions, indigenous peoples can be treated equally by criminal law. More specifically, 
if all there is to their claims is avoiding discrimination or reverting to what is thought to be 
the application of non-neutral laws, then their claims become individualised. It results that 
collective claims to self-determination are reduced to individual claims to equal treatment, 
and thus to defences and exemptions. Chapter 1 and 2 seek to contest both this conclusion 
and its premise. 
Essentially, the argument is that if partial defences are the solution to indigenous peoples 
inequality in criminal law, then it is unclear how imposing punishment can be regarded as 
an appropriate response. Furthermore, if the alternative is some form of justification, then 
it is unclear how relief from punishment can be regarded as an appropriate response by 
those making the accommodation. It seems that it is necessary, first of all, to achieve some 
clarity on the role played by cultural assumptions before assuming that equality can be 
achieved; and second, if they generate disadvantage, whether any group can be entitled to 
any form of relief. In other words, it is necessary to unpack the understanding of criminal 
law as a socio-cultural practice if the aim is to avoid joining Lacey and Waldron in 
construing equality in the narrow terms of defences and exemptions. Once that 
understanding has been unpacked, it will appear, first, that the claims of indigenous 
peoples should be distinguished from the claims of other minorities. Second, that the 
former cannot be treated equally if the solution is conceived of individualistically. To 
begin, it is provided a general understanding of criminal law as a socio-cultural practice. 
Basically, this considers criminal law as taking part in a process of the socio-cultural 
construction of reality, whereby it reproduces and transforms pre-existing cultural 
meanings and social structures. Once fully clarified and developed, the proposal will 
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provide a novel way for understanding the implications that accommodation in criminal 
law represents for both the accommodated and the accommodating. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1.1 examines the legal literature, in 
order to outline different positions for obtaining the basic elements to understand criminal 
law as a socio-cultural practice. Section 1.2 goes beyond the legal domain and adopts a 
view of cultural dynamics from social theory and social philosophy. From this, it develops 
an understanding of criminal law as a socio-cultural practice. Drawing on the previous 
sections, Section 1.3 considers what would constitute a strong form of accommodation in 
criminal law and how this would be limited by the critical function. The chapter concludes 
with scepticism that accommodating indigenous peoples can be accomplished through 
defences in criminal law. 
1.1 First Step in Understanding Criminal Law as a Socio-Cultural Practice: Law and 
Culture 
This section examines the legal literature in order to gather the basic materials to 
understand criminal law as a socio-cultural practice. Two positions are examined, which 
effectively span most of the literature. One is presented by Roger Cotterrell in “The 
Struggle For Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality”34, and the other by Naomi Mezey 
in “Law and Culture”35. Whilst neither of these positions consider criminal law as a socio-
cultural practice, their general approaches to the topic develop many important ways for 
accomplishing such an understanding. More importantly, they allow for broadening the 
traditional focus that understands culture and diversity within criminal law in terms of 
defences and exemptions. Expanding the focus provides a richer account of the place of 
culture in criminal law, and establishes the bases for starting to unpack criminal law as a 
socio-cultural practice.  
                                                
34 Roger Cotterrell, ‘The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality’ (2008) 4 International 
Journal of Law in Context 373-384. 
35 Naomi Mezey, ‘Law and Culture’ (2001) 13 Yale Journal of Law and Humanities 35-67. 
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1.1.1 The Critical Function and Criminal Law 
According to Roger Cotterrell, legal theorists have not generally engaged with the idea of 
culture. Although there have been important works, these have only explored particular 
domains: legal culture, tribal law, cultural defences, cultural heritage, the experiences of 
minorities36 and others. This seems to be confirmed in the works of two of the most 
influential social and legal theorists, Niklas Luhmann37 and Jürgen Habermas38. Indeed, 
culture does not figure prominently in their theoretical work. Cotterrell proposes not to fill 
the gap, but to delineate a possible starting point for that endeavour. In particular, he 
proposes understanding law as a form of communication or dialogue39. In the context of 
cultural diversity, the focus becomes how the law addresses the challenges posed by 
diversity, by virtue of being a medium of communication. Cotterrell’s objective is to make 
the law more responsive to the experiences faced by minorities in the legal system, and 
believes that this can be accomplished because the law can facilitate communication40. 
Indeed, for Cotterrell, the law can be an open medium of communication. 
Before relating Cotterrell’s proposal to the preceding examination of Lacey and Waldron, 
it seems necessary to explain why the mere fact of diversity pulls the legal system towards 
accommodation. The pull in Waldron, as in Lacey, is explained by the need to respect the 
principle of equal treatment, in the sense of the equal application of laws41 or in terms of 
fairness42. Cotterrell, on the other hand, claims that the legal system should be more 
responsive because this would improve the likelihood of achieving the benefits of mutual 
co-existence43. All of these values facilitate the view that minorities may be in a situation 
of disadvantage, and therefore, that they require some form of accommodation, to either 
                                                
36 Cotterrell, ‘The Struggle’ (n 34) 374. 
37 In Luhmann, culture figures as the memory of the social system. See Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems 
(Stanford University Press 1995) 163, 293, and Theory of Society, Volume 1 (Stanford University Press 
2012) 354-355. 
38 Habermas identifies culture with the lifeworld; Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 
Volume I, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Beacon Press 1984) 45, and Theory of Communicative 
Action, Volume II, Lifeworld and System, A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Beacon Press 1987) 134.  
39 Cotterrell, ‘The Struggle’ (n 34) 380. 
40 Cotterrell, ‘The Struggle’ (n 34) 381. 
41 Waldron, ‘One Law (n 27) 3. 
42 Lacey, ‘Community, culture’ (n 19) 308. 
43 Cotterrell, ‘The Struggle’ (n 34) 380. 
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realise equality or establish a framework for mutual advantage, broadly understood. One 
should note that these ends do not place considerable restrictions on accommodating the 
claims of minorities. However, Lacey and Waldron’s individualising strategy represents a 
considerable restriction to the repertoire of possible alternatives, at least in criminal law. 
Thus, a gap appears between equality and defences and exemptions. Certainly, more is 
needed to explain why equality demands accommodation only in terms of individual 
defences and exemptions.  
It appears that what seems to be limiting accommodation has to do with the importance 
Lacey and Waldron ascribe to the critical function. It is because they ascribe a fundamental 
importance to the critical function that they place it beyond the reach of accommodation. 
In effect, this is what reduces the latter to defences and exemptions; the aim is to defend 
the role played by the critical function. Now, notice that Cotterrell would agree on locating 
the critical function beyond the reach of accommodation. This is because Cotterrell 
defends the communicative features of law, and by defending those features he implicitly 
defends the critical function. This is the key point. If what is deemed important are the 
communicative features of criminal law, then so is the critical function. Certainly, there 
would be no point in defending the critical function, if it were not possible to communicate 
with the accused about the wrongs committed against the political community. In other 
words, the critical function entails the communicative features of law, for there cannot be a 
critical function without communication. 
Cotterrell’s endorsement of the House of Lords’ position in Shabina Begum’s case44 
illustrates the point; that is, that the critical function entails the communicative properties 
of law. For Cotterrell, this case is an example of successful legal communication. In 
Shabina, the House of Lords rejected the claim that the respondent’s right to freedom of 
religion was breached. Shabina was expelled from the school after insisting on wearing a 
jilbab in classes. For Cotterrell, what was important in the decision was the way in which 
the court addressed Shabina’s claim, which demonstrated that the court engaged in 
successful communication and thus dialogue: first, by addressing Shabina as an 
“individual”; and second, by considering her entitled to be recognised as autonomous and 
equal. Yet, as occurred with Lacey and Waldron, a gap emerges between the value of 
                                                
44 R (Shabina Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, [2004] EWHC 1389 (Admin), 
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mutual co-existence and the court’s ruling. Indeed, it is not clear why mutual co-existence 
is supposed to require rejecting Shabina’s claim. Nonetheless, Cotterrell has responded by 
making explicit the connection between the critical function and the communicative 
features of law. It is this particular form of communication that explicates the rejection of 
Shabina’s claim. 
Cotterrell accepts, as do Lacey and Waldron, that the law is not culturally neutral45. The 
law conveys many cultural assumptions about how to understand fairness, equality and 
mutual co-existence. Yet none of them link the role of those cultural assumptions to the 
communicative properties of law, and thus the reason why accommodation is limited 
remains in the dark. Once cultural assumptions are linked to the communicative features of 
law, it appears that communication cannot get started without them. It is not only that the 
way in which legal communication is effected embodies the cultural conceptions of the 
political community, but that communication itself is a social practice, and thus, in itself 
involves cultural assumptions without which the content of what is communicated would 
not be intelligible. More specifically, in most western liberal states, legal communication is 
geared towards constructing in a particular way the objects on which it predicates respect, 
equality and autonomy. The law does this because it is structured to construct its object in 
a particular way: it constructs the legal subject as an “individual”, and criminal law does 
the same. Criminal law espouses an individualised understanding of the social world by 
expressing that only individuals can commit crimes, that only individual interests can be 
wronged and harmed, and that only individuals can be punished. It appears then that the 
communicative features of criminal law are part of a broader context of social practices. 
Surely, they are directed to provide an individualised understanding of the social, by 
specifying who can be the object of legal concern and how they should be characterised. It 
is this process that neither Shabina nor the Rapa-Nui can reach because they are 
accommodated, that is, because accommodation is part of that process of individualisation. 
Now, the reason why Lacey and Waldron reduce accommodation to defences and 
exemptions becomes clear: because they defend the communicative properties of criminal 
law, the critical function. As highlighted above, criminal law contributes to the meaning of 
the social practices on which it depends. By defending the critical function, they defend the 
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social construction criminal law contributes to. Surely, this is an important task, for the 
socio-cultural practices criminal law contributes to allow individuals to engage in 
particular forms of social interaction. Thus, when a crime is committed the responsible 
would be necessarily one or more than one individual, and not a force of nature or another 
natural or supernatural event. Chapter 2 elaborates on this point. For now, it suffices to 
note that criminal law assists in defining who may have interests susceptible to being 
wronged and harmed, who may commit crimes and who may be punished. This is what the 
critical function achieves when it protects the values of the political community. 
Accommodation cannot reach the critical function, for if it could it would undermine the 
contribution of criminal law, that is, its contribution to the process of individualised social 
construction.  
Understanding criminal law as part of a process of social construction aims to make 
explicit that cultural assumptions are always at work because the critical function is 
continuously reconstructing the legal subject. In western states, amongst inheritors of 
European modernity, criminal law can be broadly understood as a socio-cultural practice 
that contributes to reproduce liberal social practices. Social holism has provided the 
starting point for examining criminal law as a cultural practice. However, more is needed 
in order to get clarity on the “social” and the “cultural” in criminal law, and thus, to be able 
to answer more specific questions concerning the accommodation of indigenous peoples. 
The framework needs to be further refined. A first step towards the response has been 
provided, for the critical function was identified as one essential aspect of criminal law that 
limits accommodation. Additionally, it was recognised that it takes part in a process of 
individualised social construction. Identifying both marks the first step towards a response. 
Now it is necessary to explore more closely the “cultural” and “social” aspects of criminal 
law. 
1.1.2 Unidirectional Understandings of Law and Culture 
According to Mezey, there are at least three ways to understand culture in law, which 
implicitly indicates three ways to understand the cultural aspects of criminal law. The first 
way considers exclusively the role of law, confining culture to a passive role in the 
configuration of the legal system. For this conception, it is the law that determines the 
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content of culture46. Importantly, the claim is not that law generates a legal culture, but 
that the operation of the legal system extends beyond its own domain and reaches 
individuals’ cultural self-understandings. According to Mezey, this is the position of some 
legal realists and critical legal scholars47. On this interpretation, law secures relations of 
power that in turn structure social relations. These can be relations of gender, social class 
or race; hence the law becomes primarily a tool for ideological use. In a different, albeit 
related way, this is also Ronald Dworkin’s conception of the law48. On this interpretation, 
the law embodies the ideal of individuals choosing autonomous lives, which are 
guaranteed through individual rights. Legal discourses about rights become part of how 
individuals define themselves and how they understand their relations with one another. 
All of these positions agree that the law structures how individuals understand themselves, 
and thus see the law playing a role in determining cultural meanings. In line with the basic 
dynamic in this depiction of the relationship between law and culture, this conception can 
be named the first uni-directional approach. 
The second conception considers exclusively the role of culture, and takes the relationship 
to be the other way around: it is culture that determines the content of law49. One way of 
thinking about this involves focusing on what the law needs in order to be minimally 
effective in social life. In order to regulate, modify or even confirm pre-existent patterns of 
social interaction, the law needs to at least address them in the proper way. Indeed, if the 
law aims to be minimally effective, then it needs to consider the cultural pre-
understandings of the addressees50. More to the point, to be effective the law needs to be 
informed by cultural standards, practices and norms51, in such a way that they determine 
                                                
46 Mezey, ‘Law and Culture’ (n 35) 48. 
47 Ibid 49-50. Mezey considers among these the work of Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Stakes of Law, or Hale and 
Foucault’ (1991) 15 Legal Studies Forum 327-366, but it is also possible to consider the position of Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, ‘Legal analysis as institutional imagination’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 1-23, for the 
idea of institutional imagination is supposed to effect legal change from the law itself as if it were 
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48  Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986), this is so to the extent it is 
predominantly legal rights which determine how individuals understand themselves as citizens of modern 
liberal states. 
49 Mezey, ‘Law and Culture’ (n 35) 51.  
50 Ibid 52. 
51 Whilst not specifically cultural, these accounts consider that there are forces at work that determine the 
content of law. If the force is the capitalist mode of production, then some Marxists legal scholars can be 
considered here insofar as they understand the law as a reflex of the capitalist mode of production, see Isaac 
 
27 
the content and operation of legal norms. These accounts share the common assumption 
that there is something external to the law that determines its content. Thus, whilst this 
conception also offers a unidirectional understanding of the relationship between law and 
culture, it reverses the relation. Whereas the first unidirectional conception considers that 
law determines culture, the second unidirectional conception holds that culture determines 
law. 
1.1.3 Bidirectional Understanding of Law and Culture 
Thus far, two conceptions for understanding the relationship between law and culture have 
been examined. According to the first, the law produces its own cultural meanings, 
whereas for the latter, the law merely registers cultural meanings that are produced 
elsewhere. Both conceptions involve different understandings of criminal law. The first 
reading suggests that criminal law determines cultural meanings by itself and conveys 
them outside the legal domain. If the law generates culture, then criminal law only protects 
the legal culture it has generated. This seems an implausible description of criminal law, 
for it would obscure what it seeks to accomplish outside itself and why it does so. 
Arguably, criminal law represents that the values of the political community are important, 
that is, values that lie outside of its own sphere of operation and that are not important just 
by dint of being part of criminal law. The second reading suggests that criminal law is 
determined from an extra-legal domain of considerations and it pursues ends completely 
external to criminal law. This also seems implausible. If these extra-legal domains 
determine culture, then criminal law could be reduced to economic interests, ideologies or 
                                                                                                                                              
Balbus, ‘Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the ‘Relative Autonomy’ of the Law’ (1977) 11 
Law & Society Review 571-588, also Csaba Varga, ‘Macrosociological Theories of Law, 43-76 and ‘Law as 
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1994), also Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 
(Verso 2014) Ch. 5, though not Evgeny Pashukanis, Law and Marxism A General Theory (Pluto Press 1978), 
since he regards law as a semi-autonomous field. If the force is based on an egoistic individual’s natural 
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set of incentives explained in terms of individual relations of expected utility, see Richard Nobles, 
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domain exhibiting certain of autonomy, see Steven G. Medema et al, ‘Institutional Law and Economics’ 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (2000) 418-455. 
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power relations; yet, it seems that criminal law achieves at least some degree of autonomy 
through its operation and following its own codes in constructing meaning.  
What seems fundamentally mistaken in both conceptions is that they deny the two-way 
feedback relation between criminal law and culture. Criminal law cannot be strictly 
autonomous, as the first conception suggests, nor strictly dependent, as per the second. 
Mezey proposes a third conception for understanding the cultural components in law. 
According to this view, both unidirectional approaches make a methodological mistake: 
both seek to reduce either culture to law or law to culture. The first overlooks the fact that 
law generates culture, because it is part of a broader social context in which the law 
achieves meaning. The second disregards the ways in which the law can generate 
autonomous legal meanings. By denying the dependency of law, one may overlook how 
relations of power, capitalist modes of production and ideologies do indeed contribute in 
defining the law. By denying the autonomy of the law, one may not pay attention to how 
the law generates particular and distinctive cultural meanings apart from what occurs in 
everyday life. Because both approaches illuminate different ways of constructing legal 
meanings, it seems necessary, according to Mezey, to adopt a view that retains both. 
Mezey aims to develop a view that retains what is valuable in both unidirectional 
approaches through what she calls a bidirectional approach to law and culture, which can 
be seen as a more developed form of the “constitutive approaches to law”52. This account 
has several elements. First, it adopts a conception of culture as a system of symbolic 
meaning53. More precisely, culture is “…any set of shared, signifying practices – practices 
by which meaning is produced, performed, contested, or transformed” 54 . Mezey 
emphasises that culture is a process by which meaning is produced and transformed, 
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Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition, 2015). Previous examples of this kind of approach include the 
following: Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Towards a Constitutive Theory of Law (Routledge 
1993), David M. Engel, ‘Law in the domains of everyday life: the construction of community and difference’ 
in Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns (eds.), Law in Everyday Life (University of Michigan Press 1993) 123-
170; Sally Falk Moore, ‘Law and social change: The semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate object 
of study’ (1972) 7 Law and Society Review 719-746; David Engel and Frank Munger, ‘Rights, 
Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of Difference’ (1996) 30 Law and Society Review 7-54; Ruth Fletcher, 
‘Legal forms and reproductive norms’ (2002) 12 Social and Legal Studies 217-24; Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Law as 
theory, constitutive thought in formation of (legal) practice’ (2009) 5 Socio-Legal Review 1-20. 
53 Mezey, ‘Law and Culture’ (n 35) 41. 
54 Ibid 42. 
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sustained and contested55, both consciously and non-consciously56. As this is a social 
process of production and contestation of meanings, culture includes inconsistencies and 
contradictions and so cannot be depicted as homogeneous57. Mezey adopts a post-
modernist conception of culture, in contrast with a structuralist58 interpretation that depicts 
it as a coherent, non-contested and homogeneous system of meaning. The post-modernist 
view of culture understands it as non-coherent, contested and heterogeneous. 
Second, it unifies both unidirectional approaches. According to the unifying account, both 
the force of law and the force of culture are equally fundamental. The relationship between 
law and culture is bidirectional: law influences culture as much as culture influences law. 
There is a relationship of mutual reinforcement 59  because culture and law are not 
independent domains of human experience. All legal interpretation involves cultural 
interpretations60, and so the law is a social field in which culture is sustained, contested and 
transformed. As such, law engages in producing and reproducing culture; it can liberate but 
also be coercive61. Mezey considers that the law cannot be thought of as an autonomous 
domain, but is embedded in a system of social practices62. The fact that law is not 
autonomous does not mean for Mezey that it is indistinguishable from other social fields, 
such as politics or economics. Law is distinguishable by dint of its own dynamic processes, 
but it is not autonomous in the sense that it is deeply connected with other social fields63. 
                                                
55 Ibid 42. 
56 Ibid 42. 
57 Ibid 43. In anthropology, see Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, ‘Beyond ‘Culture’: Space, Identity, and the 
Politics of Difference’ in Jonathan Javier Inda and Renato Rosaldo (eds.), The Anthropology of 
Globalization: A Reader (Blackwell 2002) 65-80. 
58 Presumably she has in mind the work of Levi-Strauss and Ferdinand Saussure, see Anthony Giddens, 
‘Structuralism, post-structuralism and the production of culture’ in Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and 
Modern Sociology (Stanford University Press 1987) 73-108. 
59 Mezey, ‘Law and Culture’ (n 35) 36. 
60 Ibid 58.  
61 Ibid 47. 
62 Ibid 47. 
63 For a similar account, see Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ 
(1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805-853. 
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Finally, Mezey stresses that there are three sites for understanding law in cultural terms64. 
The first is the law as a site of production. The second site encompasses what inspires the 
law and the practices that it targets. The third is the vital site for Mezey: this involves the 
“encounter of law and culture”, where meaning is contested and sustained, and so is the 
site where the bidirectional approach works best. This approach focuses on the “slippages 
of law”; the inconsistencies between legal meaning and cultural practices65. The slippages 
are the spaces of interaction between law and culture, and where they coordinate or clash66. 
Here, legal meanings might contest and overcome a practice in the way the court or the 
legislator intended them to. Yet, this is not always the case; practices may offer resistance 
and instead change intended legal meanings. An example would be the introduction of the 
Indian Gambling Regulatory Act in the USA. The Act was intended to strengthen tribal 
sovereignty by generating economic resources by providing the monopoly over gambling. 
According to Mezey, in some cases this was not accomplished, for belonging to a tribe 
became the condition for exercising this monopoly, thereby incentivising some to seek that 
status67. This changed the meanings of the law and also changed the meanings of the 
practice of seeking recognition as a tribe. 
1.1.4 First Problem For The Bidirectional Approach: It Neglects Legal Institutions 
Mezey’s approach has the merit of showing the pitfalls of understanding criminal law as 
strictly autonomous or strictly dependent. Furthermore, Mezey also underlines the 
usefulness of understanding criminal law bi-directionally. Her account comes closest to 
seeing criminal law as a two-way feedback relation. However, it seems insufficient to give 
a proper account of the structure and dynamics of such a relation. As a consequence, while 
it provides some important insights that should be retained, it fails to provide what is 
needed: clarifying the social and cultural aspects of criminal law. There are two main 
problems with Mezey’s account, which point to the conditions that must be met to develop 
an adequate framework. The first problem is that the bidirectional approach overlooks the 
role that institutions play in enabling meanings. In other words, how legal institutions 
                                                
64 Mezey, ‘Law and Culture’ (n 35) 61-62. 
65 Ibid 60. 
66 Ibid 58. 
67 Ibid 60. 
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frame and constrain the reproduction and transformation of meanings68. This is how the 
bidirectional proceeds. By focusing on the sites of the interaction between law and culture, 
it aims to show how legal and cultural meanings are reproduced and changed. In other 
words, the focus lies on the law being put into practice, enforced and applied by public 
officers (police, courts, legislators, etc.). However, by focusing on the concrete interactions 
of law and culture, the bidirectional approach looses sight of how legal institutions 
structure communication, engagement and dialogue.  
Mezey’s account is therefore too reductive while still illuminating, for it presses on some 
of the sites which law culturally constructs, and which cannot be left out in understanding 
the phenomena. The problem resides in reducing social construction to cultural 
construction, and thus, to slippages. Both should be, at least, analytically separated. 
Mezey’s reductionism might be explained because she has not yet developed how the 
“three sites” interact. However, by leaving this unresolved, the implication is that it 
portrays legal meanings as underdetermined and thus largely dependent on how individuals 
use them to reproduce or change cultural practices. Renato Rosaldo’s influence seems 
evident in Mezey’s emphasis on the proper site of the bidirectional approach69, for he has 
made the case for the creativity and agency of individuals embedded in different 
institutional contexts of society. However, the portrayal is mistaken. The institutional 
character of law pre-settles the amount of admissible individual creativity. Legal 
institutions establish how legal meaning is to be reproduced and transformed. In a highly 
institutionalized practice such as law, where one can assert that legal institutions dominate 
the struggle over meaning, how they set the stage and limit the significance of that struggle 
cannot be overlooked.  
                                                
68 David Garland, ‘Concepts of Culture in the Sociology of Punishment’ (2006) 10 Theoretical Criminology 
419-447. 
69 Mezey follows the anthropology of Renato Rosaldo and his critique of Clifford Geertz, and thus joins him 
in overlooking the constraining role of legal institutions, see Renato Rosaldo, ‘While making other plans’ 
(1994) 58 Southern California Law Review 19-28. The thesis follows Clifford Geertz who, along with 
Marshall Sahlins, agrees that culture is enabling but also constraining, see Geertz, ‘Thick Description: 
Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’ in Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books 1973) 3-
30, and Geertz, ‘Afterword: The Politics of Meaning’ in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia 
(Equinox 2007) 319-335; Marshall Sahlins, ‘Individual Experience and Cultural Order’ in Sahlins, Culture in 
Practice: Selected Essays (Zone Books 2000) 277-291, and Sahlins, ‘Two or Three Things I Know About 
Culture’ (1999) 5 The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 399-421. 
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Certainly, legal institutions like courts and legislatures, but also statutes and precedents, 
establish and structure concrete forms of interaction that control and define in legal terms 
the results of legal contestation. The law places limits upon individuals’ choices and thus 
what they can achieve. It limits the strategies available, the ends that may be pursued and 
provides a language of rights and duties with a specific legal and individual register. Legal 
institutions must be accounted for, especially in criminal law. The structure of the 
prosecution and its prerogatives, the position of the defence and the rights of the defendant, 
instances of bargaining, the structure of fact-finding and the legal procedures in lower and 
appellate courts are all designed to advance specific social and cultural ends. Neglecting 
the role of legal institutions in the construction and control of meaning mischaracterises 
what can be achieved through law and, therefore, what can be accommodated within 
criminal law.  
Now it is possible to begin characterising more precisely criminal law as a socio-cultural 
practice. First, one must recognise the centrality of the critical function in general, and for 
the process of accommodation in particular. Second, one must acknowledge the “social” in 
criminal law, namely, its institutional nature. It follows that the communicative features of 
criminal law are also institutional, as is the critical function. Below, section 1.2.4 details 
what it means to say that criminal law is institutional. For now, it suffices to say that it 
involves defusing the potential re-articulation of meaning generated by criminal behaviour, 
by defining and treating its object in a specific way70. Legal institutions pre-regulate the 
way in which social and legal interactions unfold, and so determine the amount of 
contingency that can be registered. They structure the struggle over legal meaning. This in 
no way denies that outcomes are contingent and that agents might display a characteristic 
creativity, but it nonetheless accords legal institutions a fundamental role in structuring that 
space. 
1.1.5 Second Problem for the Bidirectional Approach: it is Biased Against Groups 
The second problem of the bidirectional approach is that it is normatively biased to the 
detriment of groups. As was argued above, the basic units through which the legal system 
operates are individuals and their interests. It follows that the meaning the legal system 
                                                
70 Paul Bohannan, ‘The Differing Realms of the Law’ (1965) 67 American Anthropologist 33-42; Niklas 
Luhmann, Law as Social System (OUP 2004) 143. 
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construes takes only individuals as reference, and thus excludes groups. Groups are 
described as aggregations of individuals. To prevent this bias, another component is 
necessary: analytical objectivity between individuals and groups. This component is 
necessary: firstly, to prevent a descriptive explanatory deficiency, that is, to avoid 
describing social practices as a mere aggregation of individual actions71. This is explained 
below, in Section 1.2.3. Secondly, analytical objectivity makes explicit an unreflective 
positive evaluation of the aforementioned bias. Indeed, by allowing groups to figure in 
normative explanations, it becomes possible to identify how groups become excluded 
through a seemingly objective characterisation of culture. Certainly, it is not clear whether 
the post-modern conception of culture is explanatorily deficient or whether it presents an 
additional, normative characterisation of culture. Be that as it may, from describing culture 
in the absence of groups, there normally follows the normative and more contentious claim 
that groups should be excluded from any consideration.  
The suggestion here is not to adopt a robust understanding of groups, but to follow a 
methodological principle in order to prevent collapsing the descriptive with the normative. 
Accordingly, groups are understood in a methodological sense equivalent to “group 
holism”72, the view that sometimes the best way to characterise social practices is in terms 
of the practices of a group. In securing modest space for groups, the approach remains 
analytically objective. This allows, on the one hand, understanding that the dilemma faced 
by minorities, as explained by Waldron, cannot be reduced to individual interests. On the 
other hand, it shows that because criminal law seeks to reproduce a liberal social world, it 
is naturally biased towards benefiting individuals. Mezey’s account is not objective in this 
regard, for the conception of culture on which the bidirectional approach stands does not 
make room for groups. By transforming Rapa-Nui into aggregations of individuals, the 
bidirectional approach excludes them as units of meaning. In turn, it obscures the way in 
which criminal law contributes to the practices of the group of which it is part. In other 
words, the account makes invisible the collective and political character of both the claims 
of Rapa-Nui and the state’s response through criminal law. Because groups are units of 
                                                
71 This leads the post-modern account of culture to face serious problems in explaining cultural continuity, 
see Nikolas Kompridis, ‘Normativizing Hybridity/Neutralizing Culture’ (2005) 33 Political Theory 318-343. 
72 See Deborah Perron Tollefsen, ‘Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences’ (2002) 32 Philosophy of 
the Social Sciences 25-50; also Allan Bouvier, ‘Individualism, Collective Agency and The Micro-Macro 
Relation’ in Ian Jarvie and Jesus Zamora-Bonilla (eds.), The Philosophy of Social Sciences (Sage 2011) 199-
216. 
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meaning, an approach that allows group-holism remains analytically objective. Let us 
observe more closely how the post-modernist conception of culture fails in this respect. 
Mezey adopts a post-modernist conception, according to which culture is a non-coherent, 
contested and heterogeneous system of meaning. This is a non-essentialist conception of 
culture, opposed, as seen above, to structuralism. Here it is examined Uma Narayan’s 
work, not only because it is one of the most prominent and influential accounts of the post-
modernist, non-essentialist conception of culture, but also because this is the account 
which Mezey relies on. Narayan’s conceptualisation makes explicit the normative 
considerations that underlie the post-modernist conception of culture. Narayan construes 
the notion of culture bearing in mind the idea of cultural essentialism. Cultural essentialism 
is equivalent to gender essentialism73. Gender essentialism and cultural essentialism differ 
only in scope, not in kind74, and both provide an essentialist account of culture and groups. 
An essentialist account of culture is also an essentialist account of groups, illustrated by the 
following. First, one defines a culture as having features A, B, C, and so forth. Second, one 
defines membership according to members having features A, B, C, and so forth. 
Membership then becomes defined in terms of culture. By defining membership in this 
way, the essentialist can describe groups as homogeneous. Narayan argues, however, that 
such construction involves more than a mere description75. In such a description, the 
essentialist takes only the experiences and subjectivities of the members who have features 
A, B, C, and so forth. Upon these, the essentialist projects not only a homogeneous image 
of members, but also fixes unequal relations of power76. 
Cultural essentialism homogenises the group77 and fixes relations of power in favour of 
those who dominate the group, for they are the ones who decide the properties that define 
their culture. When Mezey claimed that the bidirectional approach rejects the idea of 
culture as described by traditional structuralist thought, she rejected the essentialist, 
                                                
73 Uma Narayan, ‘Essence of Culture and a Sense of History: A Feminist Critique of Cultural Essentialism’ 
(1998) 13 Hypathia 87. 
74 Narayan, ‘Essence of Culture’ (n 73) 88. 
75 Ibid 88. 
76 Ibid 88. 
77 Ibid 92. 
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normative description of culture and groups. And so when Narayan and Mezey take the 
view of culture and, in turn, of groups as non-coherent, contested and heterogeneous, they 
adopt a normative standpoint, one that allows the contestation of relations of power. 
Cultural non-essentialism holds that cultural differences exist78, but denies that they 
correspond to distinctive cultures. All cultures are subject to dissent, all cultures are 
interconnected, and there is no authentic representative of a culture79. This permits, 
according to them, a critical standpoint toward any essentialist description of cultures, and 
thus they claim these would be better described as aggregations of individual cultural 
interactions. 
It should be noted that suddenly members of groups cannot define themselves as having a 
particular culture. They cannot actually define themselves as a group. Certainly, members 
of Rapa-Nui cannot be taken to be in consensus towards what is and what is not part of 
their culture. Rapa-Nui’s culture is interconnected with all cultures, especially with 
Chilean culture, and even if that interconnection was not consented to80, the question still 
arises: can they claim to be the authentic representatives of their culture? It seems that 
according to the post-modern conception of culture, they cannot. For that to be possible, 
they should (a) depict their culture as at least relatively isolated. If it were too 
interconnected with other cultures, there would be no way to disentangle it in order to be 
able to say that there is “a” Rapa-Nui culture. They should also be able to (b) agree upon 
the main features of what it is to be Rapa-Nui, for if there is too much dissent, there could 
be no agreement on what is and is not of their culture. It follows that, because the post-
modern conception rejects (a) and (b), it also rejects (c); that is, Rapa-Nui’s claim to be the 
authentic representatives of their culture. Indeed, necessary interconnection (a) and 
necessary dissensus (b) entail that anyone can claim to be an authentic representative of a 
culture, yet equally anyone can be prevented from claiming as much. In sum, there can be 
no authentic representation of Rapa-Nui culture, not even if it comes from Rapa-Nui 
themselves. 
                                                
78 Ibid 103. 
79 Ibid 103. 
80 Eastern Island was annexed to the Chilean State under the promise that only lands and not sovereignty was 
being transferred, see Jose Bengoa (comp.), La Memoria Olvidada: Historia de los Pueblos Indígenas de 
Chile (Publicaciones del Bicentenario 2004) 632. 
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Now, this implication of the post-modernist conception should be rejected. If someone can 
claim to be representative of a group, it must be that some of its members understand 
themselves as being part of something more than a mere aggregate. Rapa-Nui should be 
able to claim that much. Therefore, cultures can be understood as isolated, at least 
relatively so, and there can be some consensus as to what is and is not part of their culture. 
Thus, it turns out that rejecting this implication of the post-modernist account of culture 
should lead to it being modified in important respects. Therefore, the approach can thus 
remain analytically objective. Notice that analytical objectivity applies to understanding 
culture and also to the legal institutions of western, liberal social orders. The post-
modernist conception of culture is not normatively neutral towards groups, because it treats 
social practices as practices of isolated individuals. In effect, viewing cultures as non-
coherent, contested and heterogeneous appeals to individuals as the only units of meaning. 
It is individuals making choices about which values to endorse and which values to contest 
which results in a heterogeneous culture. In other words, culture is the outcome of 
individuals’ choices. Yet this not only describes a culture, but also involves a normative 
consideration about how culture should be understood: as being about individual 
individuality. This explains why cultural and legal meanings are contingent, according to 
the bidirectional approach. Of course, it assigns the role of reproducing legal meanings 
solely to individuals. Nonetheless, whilst this is a descriptive error, it is still indicative of 
the normative value assigned to individuals and explains the exclusion of groups. More 
importantly, it highlights how this normative exclusion arises from a descriptive exclusion 
that characterises culture as non-coherent, contested and heterogeneous, reproduced and 
chosen by individuals. 
In sum, it is necessary to maintain a conception of culture that remains objective towards 
the role that individuals and groups may play in the overall process of 
transformation/reproduction of meanings. Culture is neither totally coherent, uncontested 
and homogeneous, nor totally incoherent, contested and heterogeneous. Members of 
groups might share a culture. Some of its parts maybe incoherent, yet others maybe fairly 
coherent81; they might contest some areas of their collective beliefs, yet not all of them; 
                                                
81 This also suggests that characterising culture as a system is a mistake. However, it can be valid insofar as 
what is meant is that there is a conglomeration of different cultural elements, which are intertwined and 
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and they might hold relatively homogeneous views in some areas and heterogeneous views 
in others. Post-modernist conceptions of culture are surely correct in stressing that to a 
certain extent cultures are porous, contested and heterogeneous, but they need not deny 
that cultural groups can exist and can claim access to their collective practices. Indeed, it is 
not necessary to claim that all social ontologies are composed only by individuals, and that 
cultures are always in every way incoherent, contested, and heterogeneous.  
1.2. Second Step in Understanding Criminal Law as a Cultural Practice: the Reproduction 
and Transformation of Socio-Cultural Life 
1.2.1 Culture Beyond the Bidirectional Approach 
At this point, the legal literature seems insufficient in order to understand the “social” and 
“cultural” in criminal law. It is necessary to move beyond legal theory to social theory82, in 
order to examine more deeply these two aspects of criminal law. Let us start by focusing 
on the social, that is, on legal institutions understood as social structures, and their relation 
to culture. An examination of this topic seems to lead back to the endless debate on culture 
and social structure83. Whilst it is not necessary to elaborate on this topic in great detail, it 
must nevertheless be drawn on the broader points it raises, given that legal institutions 
have been characterised as social structures. Moreover, it was stated that they frame and 
constrain the apparent contingency of cultural meanings and established that the 
bidirectional approach fails to consider them. Now, the thesis follows the position that 
considers that legal institutions are social institutions84, and that social institutions are 
                                                
82 The thesis draws on insights from social theory and not explicitly anthropological theory, because at a 
certain level of abstraction both converge on their objects, so there are many affinities between the present 
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Understanding Cultures: Perspectives in Anthropology and Social Theory (Second Edition, Blackwell 2001), 
and Haviland et al, Anthropology: The Human Challenge (Wadsworth 2011) Chapter 14. 
83 On the multiplicity of approaches, see Munch and Smelser, ‘Relating the Micro and Macro’ in Jeffrey 
Alexander et al (eds.) The Micro-Macro Link (University of California Press 1987) 356-387; also Jeffrey C. 
Alexander and Steven Seidman (eds.), Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates (CUP 1990); George 
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social structures85. While social theorising does not focus directly on legal institutions in 
relation to culture, it does touch upon the relationship between social structures and 
culture, which is sufficient to elaborate a robust approach. 
Naturally, it is not possible to examine in-depth all aspects of the debate. For that reason, it 
is considered in sufficient detail to make discussing legal institutions as social structures, 
and how they relate to culture, intelligible. Current social theorising starts with the 
question of whether it is possible to distinguish culture and social structure, and if so how 
to account for the difference. The standard position is that culture and social structure are 
entangled yet different, and that the difference can be observed in the effects of social 
structure on culture: namely, that social structure constrains culture86. Not all agree on this. 
According to a second approach, associated with structuralist sociology and anthropology, 
social structures determine cultural meanings87. This is more or less what the second 
unidirectional approach sustains88, yet here it is expanded to the relations between culture 
and social structure. This alternative, however, collapses culture with social structure. If 
social structure determines the agency of individuals, then cultural values and beliefs have 
no independent existence, nor do they have any role to play, aside from the effects of 
social structures. In short, individuals are determined by social structure. A third approach 
arrives at the opposite conclusion, in considering that culture determines social structure. 
This approach can be either the post-modernist conception of culture or that of rational 
choice theory89, according to which social structures are just individual interactions driven 
by power or self-interest. Yet, with this move, social structure becomes superfluous and 
                                                
85 Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ‘What are Institutions?’ (2006) 40 Journal of Economic Issues 2. 
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Leon H. Mayhew, ‘Introduction’ in Mayhew (ed.), Talcott Parsons: On Institution And Social Evolution. 
Selected Writings (University of Chicago Press 1982). 
87 The standard position here is the work of Louis Athusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays 
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University Press 1959). 
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89 See for instance Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (CUP 1989) 10, the standard position of 
reductive methodological individualists. 
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meaning unconstrained. Neither the second nor the third approach seems plausible. The 
most plausible account is the first approach, which asserts that social structure and culture 
are entangled yet different. The question becomes how to elaborate that relationship. 
1.2.2 Margaret Archer and the Dynamics of Culture and Social Structure 
According to the standard approach, there is a mutual dependency between social structure 
and cultural meanings, and culture is characterised as being relatively autonomous from 
social structure. The relative autonomy of culture is a general methodological position that 
holds that cultural meanings cannot be identified from social actions alone90. That is, 
methodologically, it is not possible to analyse cultural meanings as equivalent to mere 
regularities of social behaviour. Cultural meanings are distinct from, yet dependent on, 
social action. Nonetheless, because this autonomy is relative, it must be acknowledged that 
culture is also constrained by social structure91. In this way, both are entangled and 
different. However, in order to understand this method better, it is still necessary to know 
with more precision how it is that they interact and remain different. 
Among the different positions that elaborate the relative autonomy of culture92, the thesis 
follows Margaret Archer. Archer’s is the best-developed account of the relationship 
between social structure and culture. Having engaged with the most influential sociological 
and anthropological literature, Archer provides a suitable way for understanding the social 
and the cultural in criminal law. Archer develops a method she denominates as “dualist”93. 
Dualism seeks to understand both social structure and culture as analytically different, thus 
avoiding reducing culture to social structure and social structure to culture. Archer’s 
dualism prevents collapsing culture and social structure either as the “downward 
conflationist”, who reduces culture to social structure, or as the “upward conflationist”, 
who reduces social structure to individual interaction94. That was, more or less, what both 
                                                
90 Jeffrey C. Alexander, ‘The relative autonomy of culture’ in Jeffrey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman 
(eds.), Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates (CUP 1990) 25. 
91 Alexander, ‘The relative’ (n 90) 26. 
92 See Steve Fleetwood, ‘Structure, Institution, Agency, Habit, and Reflexive Deliberation’ (2008) 4 Journal 
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94 Margaret Archer, Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory (CUP 1990) Part I. 
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unidirectional approaches maintained. It also rejects the “central conflationist”95, who 
claims that culture and social structure are mutually constituted and refuses to make any 
analytical distinction between them. For dualism, the focus of attention is the interface 
between culture and social structure, in order to explain the achievement of social and 
cultural reproduction or transformation96. 
Archer distinguishes social structure (SS) and cultural system (CS) as two separate levels 
of analytical examination. Both have similar internal dynamics. Consider first CS. In order 
to make sense of CS, Archer contrasts the events that take place at a socio-cultural level 
(S-C) and how CS conditions them97, that is, how ideas (CS) condition socio-cultural 
interaction (S-C). To these two sequences of analytical differentiation, Archer adds a third, 
which is the result of socio-cultural interaction: cultural transformation (CT) or cultural 
reproduction (CR). As a consequence, the dynamics of culture are explained as three 
sequential levels, which can be distinguished temporally and that form what Archer 
designates a “morphogenetic” approach. The focus of this approach is the interface 
between SS and CS levels, which leads either to morphogenesis or transformation, or 
morphostasis or reproduction. When there is morphogenesis “…subsequent interaction will 
be different from earlier action precisely because it is now conditioned by the elaborated 
consequences of that prior action. Hence the morphogenetic perspective is not only 
dualistic but sequential”98.  
The above explanation suffices as a basic depiction of the morphogenetic approach to 
culture and social structure. The approach explains cultural dynamics by distinguishing 
temporal sequences of social and cultural events. The sequence has the following form: 
cultural conditioning (CC) → socio-cultural interaction (S-C) → cultural elaboration 
leading either to cultural transformation (CT) or cultural reproduction (CR). According to 
Archer, the causal influence exerted by cultural conditioning (CC) pre-exists S-C, which 
means that agents have to deal with a CS that is not of their making 99. Yet, they are 
responsible for the results of socio-cultural interactions in terms of cultural elaboration, 
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that is, reproduction (CR) or transformation (CT)100. After cultural elaboration, a new cycle 
commences with cultural conditioning (CC). Cultural elaboration then post-dates101 the S-
C level, that is, cultural reproduction (CR) or transformation (CT) occurs after S-C, and 
CC precedes S-C.  
According to Archer, social structures (SS) have the same dynamic as the cultural system 
(CS). That is, events occurring within SS follow the same sequence as the events occurring 
within SS. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish: structural conditioning (SC) → social 
interaction (SI) → structural elaboration leading either to structural reproduction (SR) or 
structural transformation (ST)102. According to Archer, both SS and CS cycles intersect in 
the middle of the sequence103. Thus the result - social and cultural reproduction or 
transformation - depends on the S-C/SI interface. This interface is of particular importance, 
for it shows both that SC has effects on subsequent CC by virtue of SI influencing CR/CT, 
and that CC has effects on subsequent SC by dint of S-C influencing SR/ST. That is, 
culture causally influences social structure and social structure causally influences culture. 
Archer’s account of the dynamics of culture and social structure are not only dualistic and 
sequential, but also cyclical, for both culture and social structure become part of cycles of 
cultural and social events that mutually intersect. 
Archer’s morphogenetic approach accounts for both the differentiation and the 
interrelatedness of CS and SS, and thus offers a way to understand their dynamics. That 
dynamic is sequential and shows how agents start their social interactions conditioned by 
CC and SC, then engage in socio-cultural interactions at S-C/SI interface, the result of 
which is either CR/SR or CT/ST. That dynamic is also cyclical, for both sequences of 
culture and social structure become mutually intersecting and feed each other in each 
cycle. Finally, Archer’s scheme shows that, in broad terms, agents are both passively 
shaped by and yet actively shape their cultural and social environment in sequences and 
cycles that leads continuously from conditioning to interaction to 
reproduction/transformation. With Archer’s approach, it is possible to elaborate further the 
two-way feedback relation and specify the dynamics of the “cultural” and the “social”: by 
                                                
100 Ibid 106. 
101 Ibid 91. 
102 Margaret Archer, Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach (CUP 1995) 91-92. 
103 Archer, Culture and Agency (n 94) 282. 
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analytically distinguishing CS from SS in criminal law, and understanding them in terms 
of a sequential and cyclical relationship. However, before applying this model to criminal 
law, there is one final aspect of Archer’s theory that needs to be scrutinised, and which 
leads to an important modification104. 
1.2.3 From the Dynamics of Culture to Wittgensteinian Social Practices 
It is Archer’s understanding of cultural meanings, which figure as the content of CS, that 
require modification. Here, Archer’s approach reveals itself to be too narrow. The reason is 
related to Archer’s main focus: the SS/CS interface for explaining processes of social 
causation. The purpose of this thesis lies, instead, in understanding a social practice by 
elucidating the processes of reproduction/transformation of cultural meanings (and social 
structures). This requires a different approach. Archer’s narrowness stems from how her 
approach characterises cultural meaning, which Archer takes from Karl Popper. For 
Popper, the CS of a society lies in the logical contents105 of physical bases like books, 
registers, and computers106. Because all of this information is treated as an object of 
knowledge, the cultural world can be specified in propositional forms107. The cultural 
world would therefore be those sets of propositions that entail knowledge, thus cultural 
meanings are cashed out in terms of true propositions. For Archer, the CS involves only 
logical relations, and so it can be examined logically in terms of rules of coherence, 
consistency and completeness. However, many cultural practices and cultural artefacts 
cannot be explained in terms of logical relations between true propositions108. Archer’s 
reliance on formal semantics for analysing contradictions and consistencies seems 
unsuitable to account for the CS of a society and for understanding its practices. Thus, it is 
necessary to introduce a key modification to Archer’s approach. Nevertheless, by 
appealing to formal semantics, Archer has hinted at where to look for an alternative 
conception of meaning. 
                                                
104 This is because Archer rejects what the thesis seeks to do, basically, to complement her approach with 
Wittgenstein’s view on meaning, see Archer, Culture and Agency (n 94) 108. 
105 Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Revised Edition, Clarendon Press 1979) 
74. 
106 Archer, Culture and Agency (n 94) 104. 
107 Ibid 105. 
108 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action (n 38) 81. 
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In order to understand the content of CS in terms of meaning, it is necessary to separate 
formal semantics from philosophical semantics109. Archer’s approach adopts the former, 
which focuses on computing the values of expressions110 on the assumption that meaning 
has truth-values111. That is, Archer adopts a view in which meaning is uncovered in terms 
of truth. This is why she reduces cultural meanings or ideas to true propositions. This 
suggests that if the focus is on meaning, it is possible to turn to a philosophical approach. 
Indeed, philosophical semantics does not start from an a priori idea of truth in order to 
attain an understanding of meaning. Actually, it claims that truth cannot say much about 
how meaning emerges. Thus, philosophical semantics accords with the notion that cultural 
meaning goes beyond a formal-semantic approach. This is the view it is necessary to 
adopt112. 
The role of cultural meanings can be characterised in terms of what they accomplish, and 
what they accomplish is enabling individuals at the beginning of cycles to engage in social 
and cultural interaction. Participants need to master meanings in order to engage in social 
practices. To the extent that meaning is connected with social practices, it seems that 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views113 on meaning suits the present purposes. This is because 
Wittgenstein’s focus lies in understanding meaning as a public engagement in social 
practices. While it is not intended to dwell deeply on the philosophy of language, it is 
nonetheless necessary to connect Archer’s approach with a broader idea of meaning, so 
that social practices may come to occupy a more prominent place within it. For that reason, 
                                                
109 On this distinction see Robert Brandom, ‘Reply to Michael Dummett’s “Should Semantics be Deflated?”’ 
in Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom On Making It Explicit (Routledge 2010) 
342-346. 
110 Robert Brandom, ‘Explanatory vs. Expressive Deflationism About Truth’ in Richard Schantz (ed.), What 
is Truth? (Walter de Gruyter 2002) 115-116; also Michael Dummett, ‘Should Semantics be Deflated?’ in 
Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom On Making It Explicit (Routledge 2010) 
213-226. 
111 Archer is not alone here; most theories advancing a representationalist account of meaning within an 
interpretivist account of the CS endorse the same position. For an influential essay on this way of 
understanding cultural meanings, see Todd Jones, ‘Uncovering “Cultural Meaning”: Problems and Solutions’ 
(2004) 32 Behavior and Philosophy 247-268. 
112 A similar approach seems to follow from the approach developed by George Pavlakos, Our Knowledge of 
the Law: Objectivity and Practice in Legal Theory (Hart Publishing 2008), yet there are some differences in 
orientation that may play out in the understanding of meaning, for while Pavlakos espouses the semantic-
exhaust ontology thesis, the thesis would put semantics above the pragmatic dimension.  
113 As Foegelin has argued, properly understood, Wittgenstein does not develop a “theory of meaning”, but 
important principles and remarks about meaning; see Robert Fogelin, ‘Wittgenstein’s Critique of Philosophy’ 
Hans Sluga and David Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (CUP 1996) 36. 
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a basic explanation of the way Wittgenstein connects the idea of meaning with social 
practices will suffice. 
Wittgenstein understands meaning as appropriate rule-following, which is public or social 
in character. In other words, meaning for Wittgenstein is a rule-governed activity in which 
individuals engage as a form of social practice. Whilst meaning involves following rules, 
which might be susceptible to truth conditions, rules cannot be understood according to 
rules themselves114. Participants grasp meaning when they grasp rule-following, which is 
fundamentally a practical mastery. Thus, participants can identify what someone is doing 
because they have mastered the same practice of rule-following. Though it may seem 
obvious that people can identify what someone is doing, this obviousness obscures that 
complex process of mastering social rules. It was already seen that cultural meaning is not 
a mere regularity of public behaviour, for a mere regularity may have different and 
possibly contradictory meanings. Out of the plurality of different meanings a regular social 
behaviour can exhibit, participants can identify which of those multiple meanings is 
correct. How can participants do this? They can because they have mastered them as 
participants in a social practice, and so they can identify the cultural meaning beneath 
public behaviour. 
Wittgenstein asks this question concerning the correct application of rules in order to 
emphasise the same point: if many different courses of action can be made to accord with 
the rule, which one is correct? Wittgenstein remarks that the answer cannot be given by the 
rule itself. Just as with regular social behaviour, rules are not self-interpreting. According 
to Wittgenstein, it is tempting to believe there is an alternative way of identifying meaning 
from outside of the practice. One way to avoid the participant’s perspective is to believe 
there is a meta-rule that specifies the appropriate course of action, as an action under a 
rule. Thus, it removes the theorist as a participant from the practice. However, this move 
generates an infinite regress, which makes it impossible to settle the correct interpretation. 
Certainly, even if it is developed such a meta-rule, the same question arises now at this 
meta-level: what is the appropriate course of action according to this meta-rule? If the 
answer is offered in terms of a meta-meta-rule, then the alternative faces an infinite 
regress. Wittgenstein’s answer to how we might identify appropriate rule-following is to 
                                                
114 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (Wiley Blackwell 2009) (Revised fourth edition, 
Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte) para. 201. 
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consider it as a social practice115. This shifts the question of cultural meaning from truth 
conditions, that is, from the activity of referring to objects in the world116, to the process of 
mastering public rules as a social practice. A key corollary is that the criterion of 
correctness for appropriate rule-following is given by the practice itself, not by rules or 
objects external to the practice. Participants cannot remove themselves from the practice in 
order to understand meaning. 
Archer’s emphasis on formal semantics117 - at the expense of the philosophical aspects of 
meaning - does not suffice to capture the complexities of cultural meanings. Broadening to 
social practices suggests that SS/CS cycles may contribute to an explanation of the socio-
cultural transformation/reproduction of meaning. Certainly, meanings are part of both CS 
and SS, for both are social practices. It follows that if meanings are part of SS/CS cycles, 
then they are transformed and reproduced accordingly. This is the basis for explicating the 
social construction of reality, which the thesis develops more fully in Chapter 2. For 
present purposes, the conclusion is that while cultural meanings may have a semantic form, 
the key is to recognise that meaning can be grasped only in terms of social practices in 
which participants engage publicly.  
1.2.4 Understanding Criminal Law as a Cultural Practice 
Notwithstanding the fact that the empirical question concerning the role criminal law plays 
in morphogenetic cycles has yet to be investigated118, it is nevertheless possible to advance 
an interpretation of the position it holds within them. Naturally, the modified 
morphogenetic approach now has a different methodology, whose ends diverge from 
                                                
115 Wittgenstein, Philosophical (n 114) 82, para. 202. 
116 Which, after all, is nothing if not something individuals also learn as a social practice. In other words, 
individuals learn the “game” of naming objects, see Meredith Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning: 
Toward a social conception of mind (Routledge 1999) 147-148; also John Gunnell, Social Inquiry After 
Wittgenstein & Kuhn: Leaving Everything as It Is (Columbia University Press 2014) 77.  
117 Notice that Archer is not alone in emphasising the semantic aspect of cultural items; both Habermas and 
Luhmann emphasise the same. See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action (n 38) 140; Luhmann, Social 
Systems (n 37) 163; also Daniel Bell, ‘The Disjunction of Culture and Social Structure: Some Notes on the 
Meaning of Social Reality’ (1965) 94 Daedalus 208-222. 
118 Only recently have Margaret Archer and her associates started to examine the legal system, yet thus far 
little has been said on the topic or on criminal law. See the recent volume Margaret Archer (ed.) 
Morphogenesis and the Crisis of Normativity (Springer 2016). Note, however, research has not yet addressed 
with enough specification the distinct domains and levels of the legal system.  
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Archer’s. The modified morphogenetic approach explicates the relationship between 
culture and social structure and thus provides the elements for understanding criminal law 
as a socio-cultural practice. The result is this: if criminal law is a social institution, then it 
is a social structure analytically distinct from culture. Initially, this provides a conception 
of criminal law based upon its “social” components, because it is a SS. Yet, following 
Archer’s approach, it is necessary to distinguish two types of cycles, SS and CS, and so to 
distinguish two analytically different forms of criminal law. Let us start by understanding 
criminal as a SS (social structure). 
Understood as a SS, criminal law appears in the first sequence as pre-structuring the way 
in which individuals interact socially. That is, criminal law conditions structurally (SC) the 
situation individuals find themselves in prior to their social interactions. Previous to 
individuals interacting, criminal laws are set in place to structure what has been previously 
defined as crime. This is why, properly speaking, criminal law is a form of structural 
conditioning that operates more clearly throughout the second sequence. In the second 
sequence, criminal law frames social interactions (SI) by establishing the institutional 
pathways that individuals choose. By instituting officials and courts, through legislation 
and precedent, by defining procedures, rules and principles, by setting competences, and 
through its adjudicative institutions and enforcement, criminal law institutionalises the 
choices of agents. This is the sense in which the institutions of criminal law are social 
structures: they structure individual choice. 
The notion of “institutional” is used here in a broader way, when contrasted with how it is 
standardly understood in legal theory; namely, as a relationship between operative facts 
and normative consequences119. Here, instead, it is followed Robert Merton’s conception 
of institutional structures in order to elucidate how is it that criminal law structures 
individual choices. According to Merton, social structures structure the choices of 
individuals120 because they structure the alternatives individuals have as objects of their 
                                                
119 See Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (OUP 2007) 24-26. 
120 Merton makes a further claim that social structures not only constrain motivations, but also exert pressure 
on individuals located at different positions on the socio-economic scale to engage in conforming or non-
conforming social behaviours. See Robert Merton, ‘Social Structure and Anomie’ in Merton R, Social 
Theory and Social Structure (The Free Press 1968) 185-214. 
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choices and attach to them institutional consequences121. Merton showed this in his study 
of criminal deviance, theorising about the motivations agents had towards certain desirable 
social goals and how their relative position in the social structure influenced their 
achieving them. It is possible to combine Merton’s view with understanding criminal law 
as SS. From this point of view, as SS criminal law structures individual choices by 
structuring institutional alternatives and institutional consequences. The distinction allows 
for differentiating between two parts of the second sequence, in terms of institutional 
alternatives and institutional consequences. 
Whilst this might seem overly abstract, the two-fold Mertonian social structure shows itself 
clearly in criminal law. Consider first the institutional consequences of the structuring of 
criminal law. As a consequence of committing a crime, the machinery of the state and the 
institutions of criminal law intervene in the scene in SI: police, prosecutors, courts and 
prisons. However, an understanding of this operation cannot be detached from the framing 
of institutional alternatives prior to those consequences. In effect, the operation of the 
applicative and operational institutions of criminal law is conditioned by institutional 
alternatives that define what is regarded as criminal. Once individuals follow an alternative 
defined as a crime, the institutions of criminal law follow as a consequence. Finally, the 
third sequence concerns the structural effects of criminal law: how as a social structure, 
criminal law reproduces or transforms. Reproduction or transformation involves the 
intended and unintended effects of criminal law for subsequent SS and CS. Notice that SI 
steers socio-cultural practices, directing them to SR in terms of institutional alternatives 
and consequences. In other words, it aims at ensuring that ‘permitted’ SS in the social 
world, whatever they are, remain the same. In other words, not any SS is reproduced, for 
criminal law may aim at transforming SS; for instance, the SS of the mafia122. Thus, it 
appears that criminal law may transform and reproduce SS at the same time. 
                                                
121 Arthur Stinchcombe, ‘Merton’s Theory of Social Structure’ in Arthur Stinchcombe, Stratification and 
organization: Selected Papers (CUP 1986) 290. On renewed interest in the structural aspects of Merton’s 
theorising, see Sanjay Marwah and Mathieu Deflem, ‘Revisiting Merton: Continuities in the Theory of 
Anomie-and-Opportunity- Structures’ in Mathieu Deflem (ed.), Sociological Theory and Criminological 
Research: Views From Europe and the United States (Elsevier 2006) 57-63. 
122 On understanding criminal organisations as SS, see Ross Matsueda, ‘Social Structure, Culture, and Crime: 
Assessing Kornhauser’s Challenge to Criminology’ in F. T. Cullen et al (eds.), Challenging Criminological 
Theory: The Legacy of Ruth Kornhauser: Advances in Criminological Theory, Vol. 19 (Transaction 
Publishers 2015) 117-143. 
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Criminal law is also part of CS: at this level, criminal law operates as free-floating cultural 
meaning, like cultural beliefs and moral values, meanings with no form in terms of SS. As 
a free-floating cultural meaning concerned with prohibitions and permissions, criminal law 
enters into the first sequence, that is, it serves as a form of cultural conditioning (CC). For 
instance, the wrongness of rape and homicide as behaviours to be devalued enters the CC 
in the form of values and norms, and so there seems to be no clear separation between 
them as legal forms and moral values. In the second sequence, these values and norms are 
the object of socio-cultural interaction (S-C). At this level, CS and SS intersect and the 
free-floating meanings of individual actions intersect with the structuring of criminal law. 
At the third level, criminal law is directed towards cultural reproduction and 
transformation. 
The approach so far is compatible with conflicts between meanings and, furthermore, it 
does not take the view that criminal law applies only to those practices conducive to the 
healthy reproduction of social life. To the extent that SS becomes not only analytically 
distinct but also empirically distinct from CS123, it might turn out that SS can undermine 
those practices even if its aim is reproduction124. Relatedly, it is not a condition of the 
efficacy of SS and CS that agents know all of the effects and unintended consequences of 
what they do125. The same applies to understanding the world participants live in. 
Disclosing the meanings embedded in SS might not be achieved without self-reflection on 
the social world in which the participant lives. Without that reflection, participants tend to 
overlook that cultural values are embedded in SS, and thus, that the process of 
institutionalising alternatives and consequences is not value-neutral. This is a corollary of 
the connection between meaning and social practices, for to the extent that SS are social 
practices, it follows that they possess meaning. Thus, institutions embody cultural values. 
                                                
123 To the extent shared values become part of SS, values can constrain other free-floating cultural values, 
and thus become in a sense independent from them. This independence is, of course, limited. Surely, SS and 
thus institutions appear as shared values independent of the mental states of the community that shares them, 
yet they are not independent of their social practices. 
124 This is more or less what Habermas held in his thesis on the colonisation of the lifeworld. On a 
restatement of his thesis, emphasising its normative dimensions, see Timo Jutten, ‘The Colonization Thesis: 
Habermas on Reification’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Philosophical Studies 701-727. 
125 Agents need not be psychologically aware of all the implications of the social reality that they recreate 
together. Robert Ulin has shown in the debate between Peter Winch and Evans-Pritchard concerning the 
Azande, that neither of them made sense of how the British Empire affected the Azande’s practices and their 
SS, of which, apparently, not all members of the tribe were aware. See Ulin, Understanding Cultures (n 82) 
59-62. 
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Now, more schematically: criminal law as SS (social structure) is directed at ST (structural 
transformation) of what is defined as criminal, and to SR (structural reproduction) of what 
is not. Similarly, as CS (cultural system), it is also directed at CT (cultural transformation) 
of what is defined as criminal and CR (cultural reproduction) of what is not. Given CS and 
SS intersect at S-C (socio-cultural interaction) / SI (social interaction) the intersection has 
subsequent effects on both CS and SS sequences. In other words, institutional alternatives 
and consequences direct the effects of the S-C/SI intersection at SR/ST and at CR/CT. In 
the example provided by Lacey at the beginning of this chapter, if criminal law seeks to 
challenge a pre-existing cultural standard concerning sexual consent (1) it seeks CT, that 
individuals change their understandings so that when X says, “No”, X is not saying, “Yes”; 
(2) it also seeks CR of what is regarded as appropriate consent, which is also present in 
social practices, to understand “No” as “No”; (3) it seeks to achieve (1) and (2) through 
framing S-C/SI in terms of institutional alternatives and institutional consequences, thus, 
conducive to SR; (4) it may seek also ST of criminal SS, for instance, if there is a sex-
trafficking organisation, which in many cases involves rape, the paradigm of understanding 
“Yes” when the victim says, “No”. 
Criminal law is always directed at both the reproduction and transformation of social 
structures and cultural meaning, for by seeking to reproduce/transform socio-cultural 
practices it seeks to reproduce/transform meaning and social structures. This latter aspect, 
the reproduction part, is most likely one of the most important contributions of the 
modified morphogenetic approach to understanding criminal law126. Institutionalisation of 
alternatives and consequences is the way in which criminal law aims at securing that social 
practices remain the same or are reproduced. By structuring the choices of individuals in 
terms of institutional alternatives and institutional consequences, it directs socio-cultural 
interaction to SR/CR. Thus, it secures meanings and social structures for subsequent 
                                                
126 In understanding that cultural values embody social institutions the thesis follows Talcott Parsons 
selectively. It seems unnecessary to assert, as Parsons did (following, as he stated, Emile Durkheim), that the 
coherence of values at CS ensures consistency at SI/S-C, see Parsons Talcott, The Structure of Social Action: 
Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers (The Free Press 1949) 
403-404. Jeffrey Alexander also interprets Parsons views on institutionalisation as the institutionalisation of 
values and thus of culture. See Jeffrey Alexander, ‘Commentary: Structure, Value, Action’ (1990) 55 
American Sociological Review 339-345; for the connection between rule-following and institutions, see 
David Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions (Routledge 1997) 5, 34. Now, from a broader point of view 
concerning the connection between culture and social structure, the thesis also agrees, partially, with 
Durkheim in that criminal law contributes to maintain society’s key values. See my explanation of the link 
with Durkheim below in notes (463) and (519). 
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SC/CC and SI/S-C, and thus, for subsequent sequences and cycles. This approach allows a 
better understanding of the critical function. Recall that the critical function seeks to 
reaffirm the continued validity of shared values by criticising those conducts that depart 
from them. It is possible to re-describe this more precisely, stating that the critical function 
aims at reproducing/transforming cultural meanings and social structures for subsequent 
cycles by seeking to reproduce non-crime and transform crime at the intersection of S-
C/SI. This has an important implication: the critical function cannot be reduced to 
instances of questioning visible cultural standards, for it is in itself a continuous socio-
cultural practice of reproducing/transforming cultural meaning. 
In addition, the critical function ensures that the basic units of cultural meaning remain 
individual human beings. Certainly, the institutionalisation criminal law effects does not 
consider just any entity as a bearer of meaning, for it only registers individual choices. In 
this way, as a SS, criminal law defines who is to count as a legal subject by defining which 
interests can be protected, who can be harmed/wronged, and who can be made responsible. 
Once criminal law applies, it registers only what can be registered. Put otherwise, claims 
made by minorities about groups being entitled to interests and having the potential to be 
harmed and wronged become invisible in criminal law. Indeed, it only frames individual 
choices because it draws on the specific social practices of a group for which there should 
be only individual choices. It results, then, that the exclusive concern of criminal law with 
individuals is part of a structural process by which legal institutions create institutional 
alternatives and institutional consequences that attach only to them. Individualisation 
becomes institutionalised in criminal law. Finally, notice that this approach takes neither a 
position on  “the role” of criminal law, nor concerning “the” function it plays. Thus, it 
remains neutral as to the diverse ends that criminal law might seek to achieve, be it 
prevention, retribution or rehabilitation. In fact, it is compatible with arguing that criminal 
law may seek multiple ends simultaneously.  
Preliminarily, under this framework, the critical function involves a process of institutional 
individualisation127 . This, naturally, has implications for accommodation, which the 
following section addresses. 
                                                
127 Note, this is not the same idea sustained by Joseph Agassi, ‘Institutional Individualism’ (1975) 26 The 
British Journal of Sociology 144-155, which refers exclusively to a method for social science, yet it is quite 
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1.3. Excluding Accommodation from SS 
Having identified that preserving the critical function is fundamental for the operation of 
criminal law, it becomes necessary to explore this in greater detail. Assume hypothetically 
that changes are made to it. That is, suppose that accommodation reaches the critical 
function. What would happen if the critical function were altered? According to modified 
morphogenetic framework, this would represent a transformation of criminal law as a SS, 
namely, a transformation of its institutional form. Consider first the side of institutional 
alternatives. Changing institutional alternatives would mean accepting other entities aside 
from individuals as objects of legal register. Different kinds of groups corresponding to 
different belief systems would widen both the moral and legal community, and 
accordingly, transform institutional alternatives. Groups would now be able to have 
interests, be harmed and wronged. Accordingly, institutional consequences would also 
have to change in order to make room for the new diversity of entities that can be 
punished. If there is ST and CT, this would lead in the next sequence to new structural 
(SC) and cultural conditioning (CC), and a new interface between S-C and SI would ensue: 
social practices and thus meaning would become different. Certainly, the transformation of 
meaning follows from transformations in social practices, for transformation in social 
practices entails transformation in meanings. Naturally, an alteration of criminal law in 
these terms would undermine the critical function of criminal law. Indeed, it would remove 
its capacity to question what offenders have done against the self-understanding of the 
political community as a community of individuals. It would be a new political community. 
The transformation of meanings would change the sense of agency, as well as the sense of 
responsibility: individuals would be living in another socio-cultural world. Notice that 
whilst perhaps this revision to criminal law is unthinkable, it touches upon some of the 
aspects the Rapa-Nui and Shabina were looking to challenge. Shabina was looking for, 
among other things, recognition of her religious beliefs as part of an autonomous religious 
community and, thus, as belonging to a particular group also entitled to its own practices. 
She sought then a form of equality that the law could not recognise. Rapa-Nui, on the other 
hand, also sought to access their traditional practices as members of a particular group. 
They contested the application of criminal law not as individuals, but as a self-determined 
                                                                                                                                              
close to what Parsons named institutionalised individualism; see Talcott Parsons, ‘Law as an Intellectual 
Stepchild’ (1977) 47(3) Sociological Enquiry 11-58. 
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group. They contested that this was more than just an application of criminal law because, 
more importantly, it was a socio-cultural and a political conflict between two self-
determined groups that had to decide the reach of their respective rules. However, there 
was no political register. In the end, of course, neither Shabina nor Rapa-Nui could be 
heard. Their actions and responsibilities were framed in terms of institutional alternatives 
and institutional consequences; the law could only register individual agency. In both 
cases, by denying groups legal register, the law denied that the conflict was political. It 
was just an accommodation of claims to recognise cultural diversity. 
It was argued earlier that Lacey and Waldron defend the critical function because it entails 
a defence of the social reality that those meanings contribute to, yet both ceded some room 
for accommodation. This raises a broader question concerning whether accommodation is 
possible at SS level. It seems that it is not possible to accommodate the basic aspects of 
criminal law without undermining the critical function. That is, even if institutional 
alternatives and consequences remain fixed on the individual, changing the definition of 
offences, what is to be understood by actus reus and mens rea can modify in substantial 
ways the capacity of the political community to evaluate departures from shared values. Of 
course, this in part depends on how far the community is disposed to accommodate the 
demands of minorities. Yet insofar as it also deems necessary the capacity to evaluate and 
assess departures from shared values, it seems it cannot go very far. The critical function 
demands lesser expectations from those to be accommodated. 
Notice that there is another aspect of the critical function underlying its operation, which 
provides a positive justification for the application of criminal law. As Waldron and Lacey 
note, defences cannot undercut the role of the critical function in preserving shared values. 
Now, this does not suggest that a mere departure suffices to justify criminalisation, but 
allows emphasising another aspect of the critical function. The idea is not to trace a clear 
line around the conditions under which X merits criminalisation, but to put in a different 
light what it would mean to bring X within the structuring of criminal law. Namely, that 
citizens express or construct a sense that values are shared. Put differently, defences that 
prevent the political community from criticising departures from their values are not 
permissible because they express that values are not shared. In this sense, blocking 
defences equally to all would express that some values should remain valid for the whole 
population. Thus, nobody can claim that they do not share those values in order to seek 
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immunity from criminal law. By criminalising X, shared values remain shared, regardless 
of whether they are actually shared.  
This has an important implication for accommodation in criminal law: justifications cannot 
be provided. Turning prohibitions into permissions widely accessible to minorities would 
undermine the critical function. Indeed, if justifications were available on the grounds that 
individuals belong to different communities, then this would reaffirm that values are not 
shared. Now, this suggests that defences that effectively punish allow for the argument that 
values are shared, even if they do not apply - strictly speaking - equally to all. Punishment 
would signify that even belonging to a different community does not relieve the individual 
from the critical function. This guarantees that values remain shared in the sense that 
departures from them can be criticized. Chapters 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 develop 
further the role of the critical function concerning these ‘shared values’. For now, it 
suffices to say that the critical function also contributes to maintain that values are shared. 
The above suits Lacey and Waldron’s call for a modest approach that, while maintaining 
the critical function, may require accommodation. This seems plausible. While it seems 
that altering some components of criminal law might undermine the critical function, it is 
implausible to suppose that any change would undermine it. Certainly, to a certain extent, 
“shared values” are normally in conflictual relationships with each other. Considering this 
more broadly, it seems it is not always possible to give priority to all shared values. 
Sometimes, it is necessary to give priority to one at the expense of another, which does not 
mean they are not shared. Observe the different weight different values carry across 
different stages of criminal law. Indeed, in different stages of criminal law, abstract 
formulation of norms by legislation or precedent, application by courts and enforcement, 
there is a clear, differentiated emphasis on different values. One can observe at least 
deontological values, utilitarian values and virtue theoretic values in each of these stages, 
yet they are weighted in different ways. 
In traditional, non-regulatory crimes, the emphasis on the intentions of the individual and 
what he knows or believes are important to determine whether the act or omission can be 
criminalised. Deontological considerations do play important roles in some areas of 
criminal law, yet in other areas, other values are at play. For instance, strict liability 
offences are guided by utilitarian considerations. Also, consider some forms of defences, 
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like most excuses, and sentencing: these are all clear instances wherein the focus is first 
and foremost upon the character traits of the individual, thus prioritising virtue ethics. 
Examining the degree to which different domains of criminal law give prominence to 
different values and examining whether these undermine each other is not part of the 
present examination. The point is that recognising the variegated forms of the state’s 
response to crime entails variegated emphasis on different values. It also appears they form 
something like a system, and to this extent, allow the political community to say that 
values remain shared. The same occurs with responsiveness to cultural diversity. It should 
be noted that it is not that cultural diversity forces, as it were, the responsiveness of SS 
from outside. On the contrary, it is the very design of criminal law that allows for such 
responsiveness. That is, accommodation is a form of internal responsiveness. This not only 
aligns with the idea that meaning is internal to social practices, but also with values being 
shared, for now responsiveness to diversity is a shared value. Here, the focus is only on 
those two aspects of SS from which most of the responsiveness to cultural diversity comes. 
First, the retributive focus on the particular harm/wrong done by the individual and the 
proportionality of the state’s response towards what has been done warrants some attention 
to cultural factors within criminal law. As Chapter 4 examines, the demand that sentencing 
should be individualised leads to particularised punishments, which allows for the 
characteristics of particular cases to become salient. This sets the stage for some 
receptivity towards cultural diversity. Second, the concern with individual autonomy 
captures another important organising principle for criminal law to recognise diversity. 
Specifically, the Kantian concern with individual autonomy means recognising that 
individual choices are to be respected in principle, along with whatever conceptions of the 
good individuals adopt as a way of living the good life. Thus emerges one of the key 
characteristics of a pluralist social order: that of treating the diversity of individuals’ 
decisions as worthy of respect. 
These two values, autonomy and retributivism, are particularly important in the design of 
defences and they can be expanded to allow for different conceptions of the good within 
certain limits. This suggests that there are spaces within criminal law that can be more or 
less responsive to cultural diversity, especially at the level of defences where these two 
considerations, autonomy and retributivism, seem to be at play. In other words, defences 
can be responsive to cultural diversity because the values they convey, especially 
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retributivism and autonomy, seem to require such responsiveness to the individual case and 
its own particularities. Hence, it seems that the structure of criminal defences allows for 
distinct cultural values to enter SS cycles. Indeed, the very construction of cultural 
defences out of the pre-existing materials of defences allows cultural values this influence, 
by expanding pre-existing defences. 
The question at this point is what kind of defences can be at play. Lacey suggests that any 
space they might have depends on how general socio-economic considerations bear upon 
punishment and the varying needs of coordination and legitimacy. For Lacey, in principle 
cultural defences are not that different from situational defences arising out of harsh social 
conditions. Yet, if they really differ, then either they might give reasons for criminalisation 
or, if not, they would fall under the same rationale as situational defences, namely, the 
legitimacy of criminal law128. Waldron, on the other hand, distinguishes between crimes 
grounded in utilitarian or deontological considerations. Arguably, it becomes possible at 
times to distinguish between crimes that are rights-based and utilitarian-based as Waldron 
suggests; yet most of the time, crimes have multiple components and thus it seems 
unworkable to differentiate in this way. However, even if it were workable to identify 
which crimes are grounded only in utilitarian considerations, this would mean that 
exemptions would be available to all. Waldron had in mind exemptions to the criminal 
prohibition of hunting. Yet, exemptions are provided not only to indigenous peoples, but 
also to regular hunters when certain conditions are met. For both Lacey and Waldron, 
exemptions would not be counterfactually dependent on an individual being a member of a 
minority, but on the nature of considerations applicable to all. On these conditions, the role 
of cultural diversity appears as marginal, if not irrelevant. Chapter 4 nonetheless advocates 
for an approach that aims at making it more robust, even if it ultimately falls short of the 
promise of recognising cultural diversity. 
Conclusion 
The modified morphogenetic approach has, up to this point, allowed to identify the social 
and cultural components for understanding criminal law as a socio-cultural practice. It 
allowed for an examination that suggested scepticism towards the promise that indigenous 
                                                
128  Lacey, ‘Community, culture’ (n 27) 304-305. 
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peoples can access their cultural practices. Surely, being accommodated means being part 
of the process of institutional individualisation that reproduces/transforms a social world of 
shared values, values that attach only to individual beings. The next chapter seeks to draw 
a connection between the social / cultural components of criminal law and its political 
components, yet the full connection will have to wait until Chapter 3. Chapter 2 uncovers 
this connection through a critical examination of the claim that the liberal social order can 
be neutral towards different ways of life. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MULTICULTURALISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, CRIMINAL LAW AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 developed a framework for understanding criminal law as a socio-cultural 
practice, which clarified its “social” and “cultural” components by analytically 
differentiating between cultural meanings and social structure. In starting to integrate the 
political components to this framework, it will be seen that criminal law is part of a process 
of social construction. Thus, the focus in this chapter is mainly on how socio-cultural 
practices contribute to criminal law, without overlooking how criminal law contributes to 
them. Chapter 2 seeks to build upon this by bringing into the discussion how 
accommodation is framed as a problem, how that frames the solution, and the implications 
that follow from that framing. While it was previously considered how partial defences fit 
the retributive and individualist structure of criminal law and how its fairness might be 
endangered by not accommodating the claims of minorities, it has not yet been elaborated 
on the reasons why accommodation is necessary in the first place. This requires identifying 
the frame of both the problem and the solution. If the task is to contextualise 
accommodation as an intelligible phenomenon, the key seems to be to recognise that there 
is a pre-existent context of cultural diversity. More specifically, a pre-existent context 
which values the cultural diversity that forms part of it. In other words, from this positive 
assessment of cultural diversity comes a recognition of the challenge this poses to the 
institutional structures of the political community in general, and thus to criminal law in 
particular. 
The debate shifts from legal and social theory to political philosophy, because most 
research into accommodation has been undertaken in this field. Indeed, the very term 
“multiculturalism” was coined by political philosophers. Based upon the premise of 
valuable cultural diversity, the political philosophical literature on multiculturalism 
considers that there is a relationship between majorities and minorities which places the 
latter at a disadvantage. More precisely, minorities are in a situation of inequality in 
relation to the majority. Thus, accommodation is framed as a struggle for equality. A 
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considerable part of the literature addresses how to recognise and compensate for this 
inequality, and so deals with the question of what kind of rights or legal recognition should 
be given to minorities. It should be noted here that there is a transition from identifying a 
problem - of inequality - to its solution - the practices of accommodation - which are 
cashed out legally in terms of special rights. Special rights, because they are regarded as 
“rights”, are linked to the legitimacy of the political community. Special rights do not 
appear incidentally, as an implication of the political community’s growing self-awareness 
that they are or are becoming multicultural, but as a condition for its legitimacy in terms of 
providing equal treatment. Accordingly, specific rights and exemptions within the legal 
system and criminal law become necessary for maintaining its legitimacy. 
In this chapter, however, the concern is not with those special rights or exemptions as they 
may apply within criminal law, for that will be examined in Chapter 4. Chapter 2 focuses 
on the principles or values within which those rights and exemptions are thought of as 
solutions to the minority’s situation of inequality. That is, the principle or value that both 
frame the problem and the solution, and thus provide the justification for special rights. 
Fundamentally, this is the principle of neutrality; that is, the principle that the liberal 
political community can be neutral between individuals holding different conceptions of 
the good. It might prove difficult to identify an explicit recognition of neutrality in the 
legal order. However, because neutrality derives from other principles, which are normally 
explicitly recognised, it can be identified implicitly. The derived principle may normally 
be observed when the legal order establishes in one way or another that all members of the 
political community should be treated as equals. Conditioned, as it was argued, to a context 
in which cultural diversity is respected and cherished neutrality can be derived from the 
principle of equal treatment. In these circumstances, neutrality becomes an expression of 
equality in a context of cultural diversity129.  
It is necessary to stress that neutrality achieves equality, and thus unity, by reconciling 
unity with diversity. Certainly, if the political community can be neutral between different 
conceptions of the good, then they can be treated equally and thus peacefully coexist 
together. Unity is achieved. Neutrality reconciles unity with diversity through special 
                                                
129 Jonathan Seglow, ‘Neutrality and Equal Respect: On Charles Larmore’s Theory of Political Liberalism’ 
(2003) 37 The Journal of Value Inquiry 86-87. 
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rights, which have a specific aim: to foster autonomous choice130. Legal practices of 
accommodation are supposed to be sensitive to breaches of neutrality. Special rights are 
activated when neutrality is breached, and they seek to re-establish the conditions for 
choosing options the individual regards as being of worth. For the majority, neutrality 
contributes to strengthening the social order in a context of cultural diversity, by treating 
all equally and with fairness. For minorities, neutrality affords them the opportunity to 
pursue those projects they find worthwhile. Thus, neutrality preserves diversity and unity 
by entitling society to designate itself as neutral between different conceptions of the good. 
It follows from this that there is a challenge for the critical function. Indeed, if minorities 
are being criminalised for being minorities, then accommodation is failing and equality is 
breached. Certainly, under these conditions, can the state really claim to be neutral? If 
criminal law is not neutral, then do minorities require special rights? This chapter seeks to 
address these questions and the implications of the political community’s responses. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 starts by examining the principle of 
neutrality, looking at the most influential approach for accommodating the claims of 
minorities within the liberal state, Will Kymlicka’s multiculturalism. Section 2 highlights 
the unresolved tensions in Kymlicka’s proposal to realise equality in terms of enhancing 
individual choice. Section 3 explores the failure of neutrality in criminal law and the 
implications of efforts that aim to correct it. Section 4 proposes strengthening the idea of 
neutrality by adopting the notion of responsiveness in order to assess the situation of 
indigenous peoples within criminal law. 
2.1. Will Kymlicka’s Theory of Multiculturalism 
2.1.1 Autonomy and Equality 
Will Kymlicka’s multiculturalist theory has been so influential that most of this new field 
in political philosophy can be seen as an extension or further development of his ideas. 
This justifies the focus on his work. In Liberalism, Community and Culture131, Kymlicka 
                                                
130 Underlying this is, as Waldron has put it, a connection between personal autonomy or autonomous choice 
and moral autonomy, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy’, John Christman and 
Joel Anderson (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (CUP 2005) 307-329. 
131 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Clarendon Press 1989). 
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establishes the central points of his theory of liberal multiculturalism. Specifically, he sets 
out a theoretical foundation for minority rights by combining the values of autonomy and 
equal treatment. His basic aim is to develop a theory for securing minorities’ access to 
their cultural practices, compatible with what he holds are the fundamental elements of 
liberalism. The first central element of liberalism is individual autonomy. More 
specifically, according to Kymlicka, the fundamental value that liberalism seeks to 
guarantee consists in the individual’s interest in living a good life132. That is, one’s interest 
in following a conception of the good which is worthy of pursuit. In contrast to John 
Rawls, Kymlicka holds that what matters most is not having deliberative capacities for 
choosing a conception of the good, but having worthy projects to pursue. The value of 
having deliberative capacities, namely, the value of being able to revise beliefs133, is 
derivative; it derives from individuals caring about their projects134. 
Kymlicka seeks to connect the value of having worthwhile projects to pursue with access 
to cultural contexts or practices. He rejects the view that individuals are in some sense pre-
social, a view he attributes to Rawls. On the contrary, Kymlicka claims that individuals 
need access to cultural contexts to make meaningful choices, and thus, to have worthy 
projects to pursue. This links the basic liberal concern that individuals should live good 
lives and have the capacity to revise their ends, with the communitarian concern that 
cultural contexts are necessary for meaningful choices135. Kymlicka reformulates Rawls’s 
theory of justice, considering that cultural contexts are primary goods, goods that any 
rational agent would consider in the original position136. That is, under the veil of 
ignorance, individuals would know that they need cultural contexts for their choices to be 
meaningful, and so those contexts cannot be regarded as dispensable. This is another way 
of saying that agents are not pre-social; choices under the veil of ignorance always rely 
upon cultural contexts to be meaningful. According to Kymlicka, this in no way 
contradicts liberalism’s fundamental values. Indeed, whilst cultural contexts provide the 
range of valuable options, the authority to select them lies in the individual himself137. 
                                                
132 Kymlicka, Liberalism (n 131) 10-12. 
133 ibid 13. 
134 ibid 12. 
135 ibid 165. 
136 ibid 166. 
137 ibid 165. 
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What gives these contexts authority is the individual’s decision concerning which context 
to choose and live according to. 
The second central element of liberalism is individual equality. According to Kymlicka, 
liberalism requires that individuals should be treated equally when they choose a 
conception of the good. Once it is recognised that cultural contexts are necessary for 
autonomous choice, liberalism requires that those situations of inequality or disadvantage 
in which individuals find themselves when accessing their cultural contexts be rectified.  
Kymlicka holds that an individual is treated unequally when access to their cultural 
contexts is more costly than for others. Thus, it follows that compensation is due in order 
for them to receive equal treatment. Kymlicka draws on Ronald Dworkin’s138 resources 
view of equality, according to which, in deciding how to distribute goods, the basic criteria 
is that individuals should take responsibility for their choices. Individuals are responsible 
for what they choose. Thus, according to the resources view, if an individual’s choices are 
expensive and therefore require the allocation of more resources, then they themselves 
must bear the costs, as such a re-distribution would not be permitted. Asking X to 
contribute to Y’s expensive life plans would require an unacceptable redistribution of X’s 
resources, as this would mean that X is asked to take responsibility for Y’s choices. 
According to Kymlicka, things are different if individuals are not responsible for their 
choices being expensive. That is, when a choice is expensive due to “circumstance”, and 
not individual responsibility. When this occurs, individuals should be compensated139, and 
this is the case when an individual follows an expensive conception of the good that is not 
under his control140. This has implications concerning equal treatment. Indeed, access to a 
cultural context the expense of which the individual is not responsible for means that he 
has to bear a cost which he would not otherwise have to pay, had the individual chosen a 
non-expensive conception of the good. To treat individuals unequally because they have 
different conceptions of the good constitutes an inequality that needs to be corrected 
                                                
138 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’ (1981) 10 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 283-345. 
139 Kymlicka, Liberalism (n 131) 37-38. 
140 This idea has been advanced by several authors, Thomas Scanlon, ‘The Significance of Choice’, in 
Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Volume VIII (Utah University Press 
1988) 149-216; G. A. Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice (1989) 99 Ethics 906-944; Richard 
Arneson, ‘Primary Goods Reconsidered’ (1990) 24 Nous 429-454. 
 
62 
through some form of compensation 141 . Distributing resources to those whose 
circumstances make their choices expensive reinstates equal treatment.  
This is important for this entails not only a principle of restraint, but also a principle of 
positive action to meet the demands of equality. Thus, the alternatives for redressing 
inequalities in access to cultural contexts become expanded. According to Kymlicka, there 
are many groups whose access to cultural contexts is expensive, amongst which figures the 
particularly clear case of Canadian indigenous peoples. When compared with non-
indigenous Canadians, it appears that whilst they access their culture for free 142 , 
indigenous peoples have to pay to enjoy the same kind of access. This means indigenous 
peoples’ conceptions of the good are not treated equally. Thus, granting special rights to 
access their cultural contexts is justified in realising equal treatment. Special rights, then, 
fulfil two objectives. On the one hand, they realise equality, for these rights are owed143 as 
a matter of justice. On the other hand, they realise autonomy, for rights aim to improve 
minorities’ access to their cultural contexts by maximising144 individual choice. 
2.1.2 Societal Cultures and Special Rights 
In his first book, Kymlicka provided a philosophical justification for special rights, yet left 
underdeveloped some important aspects, particularly the kind of rights minorities should 
be endowed with and the meaning of “cultural contexts”. In his subsequent book, 
Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka developed these145, explicitly taking into consideration 
current political and legal arrangements. According to Kymlicka, there are three types of 
rights minorities can be awarded with: self-government rights, which allow the group to 
integrate according to their own way of life146; polyethnic rights, which allow the group to 
                                                
141 Kymlicka, Liberalism (n 131) 38-39. 
142 ibid 187. 
143 ibid 190. 
144 ibid 148. 
145 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press 1995) 
26-33. 
146 Weak forms of self-government rights are held by some tribes in Canada. For an overview, see Jennifer E. 
Dalton, ‘Aboriginal Title and Self-Government in Canada: What is the True Scope of Comprehensive Land 
Claims Agreements?’ (2006) 22 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 29-78. 
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integrate better into the larger society, be exempted147 from general duties and provide 
special funding opportunities148; and finally, special representation rights. These rights 
come with a proviso. According to Kymlicka, liberalism justifies these rights insofar as 
they consist of “external protections”. Minority rights are external protections when they 
protect minorities from the wider political community to which they belong149. Self-
determination or self-government rights are obviously in this category. However, minority 
rights are not justified when they consist in “internal restrictions”; that is, when they aim to 
control internal dissent within the minority community itself150. The reason is that internal 
restrictions put liberal freedoms at risk and so they cannot be justified by liberal politics, 
whereas external restrictions, insofar as they advance liberal freedoms, are not only 
compatible151, but they may also be required. 
Kymlicka also introduces a conception of culture that was missing from his earlier work, 
albeit this is a complex notion with three meanings that are not easily identified and 
commonly misinterpreted, as it will be seen. The first meaning of culture has already been 
introduced and we will come back to it shortly. The second meaning of culture152 aims at 
differentiating both between multicultural and non-multicultural countries, and between 
immigrants and national minorities. Concerning the former differentiation, Kymlicka holds 
that whilst a society might be pluralistic, it is not necessarily multicultural. Multicultural 
societies require the co-existence of at least two different cultures, whereas being 
pluralistic only requires the acceptance of at least two different conceptions of the good. A 
single culture might embody different conceptions of the good, whilst the converse is not 
true. Concerning the second differentiation, Kymlicka holds that both immigrants and 
                                                
147 In the UK, in Mandla vs Dowell-Lee [1983] UKHL 7, [1983] 2 AC 548, the school’s decision to expel a 
Sikh school boy who refused to take off his turban to comply with the dressing regulations was held to be 
unlawful. In the US, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), it was held in favour of the Amish 
community that they could be exempted from compulsory education from the 8th grade. 
148 See, for instance, in the UK the special funds that local government have to improve the conditions of 
sites to which Gypsies and Travellers have access. See Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (OUP 2011), at 
69-72. In Canada, for instance, there are tax exemptions for the Nisga tribe, which were settled through an 
agreement with the provincial authorities in British Columbia. See Patricia Dickason and David T. McNab, 
Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples From Earliest Times (4th Edition, OUP 2009) 416. 
149 Kymlicka, Multicultural (n 145) 36, 43. 
150 For instance, in the form of controls for free speech, ibid 36. 
151 ibid 75. 
152 ibid 10-19. 
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national minorities are sources of cultures that make a country multicultural. However, he 
only considers national minorities as holders of special rights, and while in principle, he 
denies immigrants access to them, he nevertheless considers that they may be provided 
with some polyethnic rights. 
With the third meaning of culture, that is access to a “cultural context”, Kymlicka specifies 
what national minorities are entitled to by special rights. In order to explain this, Kymlicka 
introduces the notion of “societal cultures”. Societal cultures involve a set of institutions, 
political, religious, or social, by which individuals organise their social world and which 
provide them with different ways of life153. It is this third meaning of culture that has been 
commonly misinterpreted154, because scholars have not related it to Kymlicka’s first 
meaning of culture, which concerns the position of culture within a theory of justice. 
Recall that for Kymlicka, culture has a place within a theory of justice as a context for 
meaningful choice. It appears then that these cultural contexts for meaningful choice, once 
contextualized, are societal cultures. That is, when Kymlicka speaks of culture in the third 
sense he has in mind institutionalised cultural contexts for meaningful choice155, contexts 
which involve political, religious and social institutions that allow individuals to live 
different ways of life156. Then it becomes clear that the aim of special rights is to enable 
and enhance national minorities’ institutions, political or otherwise, such that they would 
amount to societal cultures if special rights were granted. Granting such rights would tend 
to correct the problems of inequality indigenous peoples currently experience. 
In the following, when speaking of culture, the reference is to societal cultures. With this 
notion, Kymlicka reunites the basic elements of his conception of liberalism: respect for 
                                                
153 ibid 76. 
154 Joseph Carens has argued, wrongly in my view, that for Kymlicka, indigenous peoples cultures emerged 
in modernity, given that societal cultures did not exist before. See Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship, 
and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (OUP 2000) Chapter 3. Similarly, 
Bhikhu Parekh claims that Kymlicka uses culture and societal culture interchangeably. However, this is 
incorrect because Kymlicka’s idea of societal cultures points out the institutional conditions under which 
cultural contexts are meaningful in modern times, whilst culture refers to the contexts for meaningful choice. 
See Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (MacMillan Press 
2000) 101. 
155 Kymlicka, Multicultural (n 145) 83-84. 
156 Though Kymlicka does not say so, he seems to refer to what is known in the sociological literature as 
‘institutional completeness’. See Raymond Breton, ‘Institutional completeness of ethnic communities and the 
personal relations of immigrants’ (1964) 70 American Journal of Sociology 193-205. 
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autonomous choice, for equality, and the culturally embedded nature of meaningful choice. 
Certainly, if societal cultures are necessary for meaningful choice, then individuals should 
be given wide access to them in order for their choices to be meaningful. The authority to 
make decisions about how to live a good life still concerns the individual alone, but these 
decisions require a societal culture. Access to them is a primary good, a good any rational 
agent would choose to have access to under the veil of ignorance, and so it should be 
equally distributed. This is the role played by societal cultures: a benchmark of what 
equality demands. If national minorities suffer inequalities in such access, then special 
rights should be granted. The requirements of equality are met157 once those rights are 
granted, for having those rights amounts to cultures being capable of emerging as societal 
cultures. On this view, minority cultures are left to the autonomous decisions of their 
members, so that if they do not develop into societal cultures and seem disadvantaged, this 
could owe to their members having decided that the culture in question is not worth 
pursuing. Thus, minorities cannot be depicted as disadvantaged even if they have failed to 
become societal cultures. 
2.2. The Problem of Liberal Neutrality 
2.2.1 Neutrality as Individual Autonomy and Individual Equality 
The above suffices as a description of the main elements of Kymlicka’s theory, capturing 
the philosophical and moral character of special rights afforded to minorities. Before 
assessing it with the present approach, it is necessary to make clearer the connections 
between equality and neutrality, and therefore between neutrality and autonomy. In the 
present context, neutrality applies to state actions158 and it requires treating individuals, 
according to Ronald Dworkin’s terminology 159 , as equals. That is, the state treats 
individuals equally when it abstains from promoting one particular conception of the good 
over another. There is a close connection between equal treatment and not promoting a 
particular conception of the good. Indeed, if the state were to promote such a conception, it 
                                                
157 Kymlicka, Multicultural (n 145) 77-80. 
158 The concern then is state neutrality, see Peter Jones, ‘The Ideal of the Neutral State’, in Robert Goodin 
and Andrew Reeve (eds.), Liberal Neutrality (Routledge 1989) 9-38. 
159 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 272. 
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would not treat individuals equally. This is because it would disqualify160 those whose 
conceptions of the good are not worthy for the state161, at the expense of promoting those it 
deems worthy. In other words, if the state promotes a particular conception of the good, it 
does not treat those who hold different conceptions of the good equally. Certainly, state 
policies would distinguish between those who pursue worthy life plans and those who do 
not, benefiting the former and burdening the latter. It appears then that to treat individuals 
equally, the state needs to be neutral between different conceptions of the good. 
According to Steven Wall, the above is one of the central meanings of liberal neutrality, 
which acknowledging the existence of a reasonable disagreement concerning the good life, 
considers that the state should not promote the good162. This is the role of neutrality: it 
permits the identification of inequalities and the way to correct them. According to 
Kymlicka, under conditions of pluralism and competing conceptions of the good, the state 
should remain neutral between them. However, he recognises that state policies cannot 
avoid being non-neutral in their consequences. Kymlicka then distinguishes between 
“neutrality of consequences” and “neutrality of justification”163, and following Rawls, he 
adopts the latter. Kymlicka argues that the state can be neutral in the justification of its 
public policies, but that its consequences can be non-neutral. Here enters the idea of 
individual autonomy. For Kymlicka, consequences are non-neutral yet unproblematic 
because they stem from individuals’ autonomous decisions when they choose what they 
consider to be valuable or preferable. Thus, if individuals are responsible for the choices 
they make, no compensation is necessary. Within this framework, non-neutrality is neither 
intentionally nor directly pursued, and the commitment to neutrality is preserved at the 
                                                
160 Will Kymlicka, ‘Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality’, (1989) 99 Ethics 900. 
161 This follows given the assumption that the State ranks different ways of life differently. See Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously (n 142) 273. Thus, the perfectionist, which is Dworkin’s and Kymlicka’s central 
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162 Wall, ‘Perfectionism’ (n 161). 
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level of justifications. It follows that which conceptions of the good flourish and which end 
up vanishing is left to the “market place of ideas” 164.  
Now it is necessary to examine Kymlicka’s views critically. At the core of neutrality of 
justification lies a traditional liberal value: individual autonomy. It should be noted that 
individual autonomy is not only compatible with neutrality of justification, but it is also the 
means through which it can be achieved. What explains neutrality of justification is the 
fact that there are individuals making choices concerning which conceptions of the good to 
endorse. Yet invoking the centrality of individual autonomy as the way of understanding 
neutrality seems to confuse two separate things. Indeed, to claim both that individual 
autonomy is central and that the liberal social order can be neutral seems to confuse the 
state not promoting some particular conception of the good with the state not promoting 
any conception of the good. Indeed, the state may be able to abstain from promoting some 
particular conception of the good, but it cannot avoid promoting a conception of the good, 
for otherwise how to endorse a conception of the good would be up for grabs. Definitely, 
for Kymlicka, this is not up for grabs; autonomous individual choice is how the good 
should be chosen, and is what makes the state neutral. In other words, the liberal state 
endorses a conception of the good in conditioning its attainment to the exercise of 
individual autonomy. 
It appears that by endorsing the value of individual autonomy, neutrality of justification is 
not neutral165; this is the first conclusion of this section. Whilst those who support166 and 
reject 167 neutrality recognise that it cannot be neutral, it seems that they have not fully 
worked out the implications for the equal treatment of minorities. That is, the several 
implications that follow from considering that individual autonomous choice is not worthy 
                                                
164 Kymlicka, ‘Liberal individualism’ (n 160) 895. 
165 Steven Wall, ‘Neutrality and Responsibility’ (2001) 98 The Journal of Philosophy 389-410. Others, like 
George Sher, restrict neutrality only to controversial conceptions of the good, meaning it does not cover 
individuals’ interests in being prosperous and free, George Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and 
Politics (CUP 1997) 37-38. 
166 See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Legislation and moral neutrality’, in Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 
1981-1991 (CUP 1993) 159; Gerald Gaus, ‘The Moral Foundations of Liberal Neutrality’ in Thomas 
Christiano and John Christman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy (Blackwell 2009) 83. 
167 See Thomas Nagel, ‘Rawls on Justice’ in N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls (Basic Books 1975) 1-16; 
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986) chapter 5; also Sher, Beyond Neutrality (n 
165) 66-67. 
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of respect per se. It has been seen that neutrality identifies a problem of individual 
inequality and solves it by appealing to the non-neutral principle that attaining the good is 
achieved through autonomous individual choice. However, this argument is far from 
complete. A full endorsement of the value of autonomous choice would consider a broad 
range of choices as worthy, insofar as value is given by autonomous choice. Indeed, if the 
concern is having a worthy project to pursue, then little importance should be given to the 
beliefs of the minority in providing such rights, if they are pursued autonomously. Yet, 
Kymlicka stressed that projects should be “worthy”, as seen above. Accordingly, Kymlicka 
holds that these rights should not be provided when they promote fundamentalist politics, 
for then “… far from appealing to the primary good of cultural membership, [this] conflicts 
with it, since it undermines the very reason we had for being concerned with cultural 
membership –that it allows for meaningful individual choice”168.  
Kymlicka asserts that it is because fundamentalist politics undermine meaningful choice 
that special rights should not be granted, but this is misleading. Indeed, the choices of 
fundamentalists can be meaningful for them, thus if the reason is allowing meaningful 
choices, then there should follow some form of entitlement to access special rights. 
Kymlicka’s rejection of this conclusion is not related to the meaningfulness of choices. It is 
instead explained by the fact that for his theory, those choices are not worthy of being 
promoted and protected by liberal politics. The reason why fundamentalist politics should 
not be respected is because they are not valuable in the first place; they are non-valuable 
options. Thus, it is not only that there is a bias towards choices being valuable if they are 
taken autonomously, but also that only a subset of them is actually worthy of respect: 
precisely, those options compatible with liberal values. But then the move is deliberately 
inconsistent with the claim to state neutrality, for now it appears that autonomy, whilst 
valuable, is only instrumental to achieving not just any good, but the liberal good. 
Now it is possible to see that Kymlicka’s argument in its complete form denies 
neutrality169. Indeed, it entails a ranking of some ways of life above others. Therefore, it 
does not treat all individuals with equal concern, insofar as they may hold non-valuable 
                                                
168 Kymlicka, Liberalism (n 131) 172. 
169 As Hurka has argued, this means Kymlicka endorses a view Hurka names philosophical perfectionism, for 
it holds that some values are intrinsically superior to others and make individuals’ lives better. See Thomas 
Hurka, ‘Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on Liberal Neutrality’ (1995) 3 The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 36-57. 
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conceptions of the good. In other words, it justifies treating unequally those conceptions of 
the good incompatible with liberal values, which is why he denies special rights as internal 
restrictions. This kind of unequal treatment becomes fundamental, for otherwise those who 
seek to advance fundamentalist politics that undermine liberal freedoms might claim 
protection, paradoxically, from the liberal state in the form of special rights. This bears on 
his theory of special rights for indigenous peoples. Certainly, it appears that self-
government rights are limited to social practices that are compatible with liberal freedoms, 
that is, those which replicate fundamental liberal values. Whilst Kymlicka might not 
dispute this conclusion, it has important implications for the accommodation of the claims 
of indigenous peoples, as examined in the next section. Equally important, it has 
implications for understanding the majority’s access to their societal cultures. Basically, it 
makes explicit that the majority needs to access their societal cultures and that this access 
cannot be for free. 
It is now possible to appreciate the depth of the non-neutrality of the liberal state between 
different conceptions of the good, which hangs on the proposal to understand criminal law 
as a socio-cultural practice. In broad terms, it has been claimed that criminal law 
contributes to socio-cultural practices by reproducing/transforming meaning and social 
structures. Central among those meanings is individual autonomy. Put differently, the 
value of individual autonomy seeking the good is legally enshrined in the very institutional 
structure of society. Accordingly, it appears that Kymlicka’s multiculturalism not only 
adopts a conception of the good, but that it requires one as one of the guiding ends of 
societal cultures. Certainly, Kymlicka might claim that societal cultures do not fulfil that 
role for a conception of the good, but then they would be superfluous. If they are 
superfluous for achieving justice and equality, then they should not figure in society’s 
basic structure. However, this would contradict Kymlicka’s theory of justice, which has as 
its object just institutions because they contribute to the good life. It follows that Kymlicka 
needs to accept that those institutions are fundamental in this sense. In other words, he 
requires societal cultures because autonomous choice has meaning within them, and 
reproducing/transforming those practices cannot be for free. 
It is attained the second conclusion of this section: Kymlicka is mistaken in arguing that 
the majority have access to their societal cultures for free. In effect, maintaining the 
operation of multiple legal, social, and cultural institutions suitably synchronised to give 
 
70 
effect to the meaning of autonomy is not for free. The social world needs to be organised 
in a particular way if it is to serve as a context for meaningful autonomous choice. This is 
why the majority require societal cultures to be non-neutral. For individuals to experience 
the free marketplace of ideas requires a pre-existent context in which that market makes 
sense and is thus not monopolised by conceptions of the good for which individual 
autonomy is irrelevant or non-valuable. For that reason, the liberal order requires 
reproducing/transforming social practices upon which the idea of autonomous individuals 
choosing the good has meaning. If this is correct, then access to this societal culture is 
certainly not for free: it must be continuously recreated in order to ensure that the 
marketplace of ideas is run by individual choice seeking the good.  
Now it is necessary to examine how claims for self-determination fit under this description 
of the non-neutrality of the principle of neutrality, and the implications of this within 
criminal law. Firstly, it is examined indigenous peoples’ claims to self-determination, and 
below the implications for criminal law. 
2.2.2 Collective Political Equality  
Upon the non-neutrality of the principle of neutrality, it seems possible to re-articulate 
expensive tastes as impossible tastes: indigenous peoples face disadvantage because the 
language of modern institutions is tailored to meet individual interests, and this makes 
many of the choices they value, which are collective, not only more expensive but 
impossible. This claim will be substantiated later in Section 2.4.3. For now, it is important 
to note that whilst the institutions of the liberal state are well-fitted to address the claims 
and demands of individuals and their interests, this does not hold for the interests or the 
value of groups directly. The process of accommodation cannot be detached from being 
informed by a particular conception of the good. Thus, no matter how much compensation 
is given, it will always remain short of what indigenous peoples claim if what they seek 
does not accord with the centrality of autonomous individual choice seeking the liberal 
good. It should be emphasised that this centrality is not arbitrary. The majority need to be 
non-neutral, because they seek a particular context of social practices within which their 
actions have meaning, and so they need to control the ways those contexts are reproduced 
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and transformed. In a word, the majority claim justified control over their own CS/SS 
cycles170. 
Understood in this way, accommodation entails the denial of what most indigenous 
minorities seek: equality between groups. Indigenous peoples do not seek any form of 
equality, but collective political equality: self-determination 171 . Collective political 
equality between groups, however, leads to questioning the motive for accommodation; 
namely, reconciling unity with diversity, thus achieving unity. Collective political equality 
would leave criminal law open to be modified in the ways it was described in the last 
section of Chapter 1. Certainly, making a relation between groups politically equal entails 
empowering minorities with the capacity to shape their own practices, including criminal 
law, and this would undermine such reconciliation. Political equality between groups 
amounts to introducing a break in the normative unity of the state because it recognises 
that other groups are also entitled to set which norms to abide by. It begins to appear with 
more clarity that what indigenous peoples demand is not only access to their cultural 
practices, but also to their political practices. In other words, indigenous peoples also seek 
justified control over their own SS/CS cycles. 
Let us suspend for the moment the enquiry into whether indigenous peoples’ claim to be 
self-determining is justified, for this would lead to an examination of the many ways in 
which a group can be self-determined172 and so to the many ways of recognising self-
determination173. It is started from the assumption that indigenous peoples claim to be self-
                                                
170 While in different words, see Margaret Moore, ‘Defending Community: Nationalism, Patriotism, and 
Culture’ in Duncan Bell (ed.), Ethics and World Politics (OUP 2010) 130-146. 
171 The argument covers not only indigenous peoples, but also national minorities previously entitled to self-
determination. See Will Kymlicka, ‘Beyond the Indigenous/Minority Dichotomy?’ in Stephen Allen and 
Alexandra Xanthaki (eds.), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart 
Publishing 2011) 183-208.  
172 Note that the claim here is a normative claim concerning self-determination, and not whether indigenous 
peoples meet the requirements that, according to international law, should be sufficient to claim it. The 
reason lies both in the narrowness of international law concerning the subjects of self-determination, for it 
excludes clear cases of indigenous peoples, and the blurriness of international law concerning the 
differentiation between minorities (including immigrants) and indigenous peoples. On the former, see Will 
Kymlicka, ‘Theorizing Indigenous Rights’ in Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, 
Multiculturalism and Citizenship (OUP 2001) 120-132; on the latter, see Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous 
Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester University Press 2002) 54. 
173 See Marc Weller, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap (Martinus Nijhoff 2008). 
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determined174 and that this claim, which may range from the claim to secede to a claim to 
some form of sub-state autonomy, provides the criteria for the kind of accommodation they 
seek. That is, it specifies the criteria that the State would need to satisfy in order to fulfil 
the demands of equality: empowering indigenous peoples with self-determination. 
Overlooking this political claim to self-determination, and the fact that it entails control 
over SS/CS cycles, prevents theorists from distinguishing between the different forms of 
equal treatment that the process of accommodation should provide when addressing the 
demands of different minority groups. It is explored these different forms of equal 
treatment in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. At this point, it is necessary to determine the 
implications of non-neutrality for criminal law. 
2.3 Neutrality and Criminal Law 
2.3.1 Neutralists and Perfectionists on the Neutrality of the Harm Principle  
The foregoing analysis has prepared the terrain to explore what implications - if any - the 
principle of neutrality has in the context of criminal law. A preliminary approximation 
considers that neutrality matters for criminal law, for if it did not, then there would be no 
need to identify breaches of equality. If neutrality does not matter for criminal law, then 
this would mean that it treats all persons equally. Surely, it is possible to consider 
neutrality as excluded from criminal law, so that even if criminal law were not neutral, it 
would not follow the requirement to award minorities special rights. It is examined this 
possibility in the next chapter175. Now, if neutrality matters for criminal law, then the 
question turns upon whether it is necessary to empower minorities with special rights. One 
should recall that awarding minorities special rights is necessary in order to treat 
individuals equally from the perspective of respecting a plurality of conceptions of the 
good. As has been seen, the principle of neutrality demands, to the extent that access to 
societal cultures is unequal, awarding those rights. Now, the question is whether they are 
applicable in criminal law.  
                                                
174 This recognition has reached the level of international law. See James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples and 
International Law (OUP 2000). 
175 This is examined in the sense that criminal law can be impartially justified, namely, as based on normative 
reasons that all could agree upon. 
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In other words, given that criminal law might not be neutral, the question is whether 
polyethnic rights may be required for grounding exemptions in the form of defences 
provided for minorities. This is different from what has been seen in Chapter 1, for the 
issue here is not whether there is pre-existing responsiveness of defences, but whether 
there can be a right to such defences. However, what needs to be established before 
addressing the possibility of special rights is whether or not criminal law is neutral. 
Certainly, if it is, then it appears inquiring into special rights is inconsequential. Whilst it is 
not possible at present undertake the broader task of determining whether criminal law as a 
whole can be neutral, it can be pursued the narrower task of whether the critical function 
can be neutral. This is equally fundamental, for if the critical function is not neutral, then 
neither is criminal law. It has been said that the critical function aims to 
reproduce/transform social practices for subsequent cycles and that it contributes to values 
being shared. The focus on shared values and the evaluative function it implies seem to 
indicate that the critical function cannot be neutral towards the social practices it seeks to 
reproduce/transform, for if it were, it would be neutral between the values that are to be 
shared.  
It is appropriate to explore this apparent necessity of the non-neutrality of the critical 
function in relation to a fundamental principle of criminal law. Consider that an important 
part of the critical function appeals to the harm principle, both as a principle of restraint, 
indicating the considerations why criminal law should be limited, yet also as a positive 
principle for permissible criminalisation176. That is, the harm principle illuminates in at 
least some relevant parts of the criminal law the values that should be protected from 
criminal law, as well as the values that it seeks to protect by preventing crime. The focus 
on deterrence is not meant to underplay retributivist considerations. On the contrary, it has 
already been accepted that retributivist considerations are part of criminal law. Yet from 
the present perspective, retributivist considerations seem to prove far more directly that the 
state is not neutral between different conceptions of the good, for in defining what 
                                                
176 For the multiplicity of meanings of the harm principle, see James Edwards, ‘Harm principles’ (2014) 20 
Legal Theory 253-285. For a critique of this multiplicity, see Bernard Harcourt, ‘The collapse of the harm 
principle’ (1999) 90 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 109-194. 
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constitutes wrongful conduct, it appeals to moral considerations which are in principle 
forbidden by the principle of neutrality177. 
If it is possible to determine the sense in which the critical function is not neutral by 
ascertaining that the harm principle is not neutral, then we may also arrive at better reasons 
to believe that neither is criminal law, and thus whether some kind of special rights might 
be necessary. Given that there are retributive considerations already at play, it seems there 
is an inclination for the state not to be neutral, a proposition which can be further 
confirmed. The harm principle is a liberal principle that aims to restrict criminal law to the 
prevention of harm-causing conducts. Defenders of the harm principle are also neutralists 
for they believe that the only aim of criminal law should be to prevent harm, which leads 
them to embrace deterrence as the exclusive function of punishment. It follows that the 
harm principle realises important liberal virtues, yet the question remains: must it be 
considered neutral between different conceptions of the good? Wojciech Sadurski, a liberal 
neutralist, argues that whilst the state should be neutral between individuals’ conceptions 
of the good, it does not need to be neutral between harmful and non-harmful conducts178. 
Joel Feinberg, also a neutralist, explains that the harm principle is a moral principle that 
sets permissible criteria for the criminalisation of punishment179, endorsing individual 
autonomy as a fundamental value for organising criminal law. It seems then that after all, 
the harm principle as one organising principle of criminal law does enforce a conception of 
the good, and thus cannot be regarded as neutral. As was evidenced above, almost all 
political philosophers agree on this.  
It is interesting to note here the congruency between the perspectives of those who defend 
the principle of neutrality and those liberal perfectionists who reject the principle. 
Following the perfectionists, one may conceive that the state should pursue a particular 
conception of the good. Not, of course, a single conception of the good, according to which 
there is but one single value worthy of respect, but a plurality of values. This strategy 
aligns with the views of Joseph Raz and George Sher, for it holds that there are multiple 
                                                
177 This is at least true of moral forms of retributivism, see Jean Hampton, ‘Retribution and the Liberal State’ 
(1994) 5 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 128-129. Political forms of retributivism will be examined in 
Chapter 5. 
178 Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Theory of Punishment, Social Justice, and Liberal Neutrality’ (1989) 7 Law and 
Philosophy 372. 
179 Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (OUP 1988) 13. 
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sets of objective values that obtain independently of the agent’s subjective states. 
Accordingly, instead of saying that there are valuable and non-valuable choices, the 
perfectionist says there is a plurality of valuable and non-valuable options. In this regard, 
the role of the state should be to promote valuable options and at least discourage non-
valuable ones. This matters for criminal law, for it leads one to consider that there are 
positive reasons that make criminalisation permissible: not because it might prevent harm, 
but because it might discourage non-valuable options180. Granted, perfectionists concede 
that there are additional considerations that must be weighted in deciding whether to 
discourage non-valuable options through criminal law181. For instance, that identifying 
breaches requires infringing other fundamental rights, or that punishment can prevent the 
individual from attaining the good. However, they nonetheless agree that criminalising a 
subset of non-valuable options would be desirable and justified, notwithstanding that doing 
so would make criminal law non-neutral. Accordingly, no special polyethnic rights would 
be needed, for no unjustified inequality would ensue. 
According to the perfectionist, the harm principle is justifiably not neutral between 
different conceptions of the good. Can the neutralist argue differently? From the point of 
view of the neutralist, the harm principle as a restraint is justifiable only in its capacity to 
prevent harm. It might seem that the neutralist could understand harm as neutral between 
different conceptions of the good. Indeed, if it were possible to remove from criminal law 
all cultural meanings that draw on the majority’s culture182, then none would feature in the 
process of criminalisation. However, this would undermine the very rationale of the harm 
principle. Consider the following. It is often said that criminal law is special in one or more 
of the following three ways: in the values it seeks to protect; in the kinds of attacks from 
which it seeks to protect; and in the values it sets back when applied. In other words, it is 
agreed that criminal law protects only the most important values of the political 
community; that it seeks to protect individual autonomy from harm; and that because it 
                                                
180 Moral wrongdoing is one such a consideration, see Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the 
Criminal Law (OUP 1997); also Sher, Beyond Neutrality (n 165) 70-71 and Raz, The Morality (n 167) 420, 
and Koen Raes, ‘Legal Moralism or Paternalism? Tolerance or Indifference? Egalitarian Justice and the 
Ethics of Equal Concern’ in Peter Alldridge and Chrisje Brants (eds.), Personal Autonomy, the Private 
Sphere and the Criminal Law: A Comparative Study (Hart Publishing 2001) 43-45. 
181 More generally, the perfectionist might clam that the good requires abstaining from state interference, see 
Steven Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (CUP 1998) 3. 
182 This is proposed by Claes Lernestedt, ‘Criminal Law and “Culture”’ in Will Kymlicka, Claes Lernestedt 
and Matt Matravers (eds.), Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity (OUP 2014) 45. 
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represents a serious interference with individual autonomy, it is justifiable only under 
exceptional circumstances. Now, if criminal law were not based on a particular conception 
of the good, then there would be nothing special about it: neither in terms of the interest it 
protects, nor the harms it seeks to prevent, nor the harms it causes through punishment183. 
More concretely, if sexual autonomy is just a subjective preference like any other, then 
why punish rape as a serious offense? If liberty and bodily integrity are just subjective 
preferences like any other, then why all the fuss about punishing the innocent or doing so 
disproportionately184? In other words, the rationale of the harm principle would be 
undermined and the critical function would become meaningless. 
It has been demonstrated that the liberal state requires endorsing a conception of the good; 
something similar occurs in criminal law. Surely, preventing harm requires relying on a 
substantive account of the good, for only then does it become important to limit state 
power and the exercise of coercion. However, this suggests that in the two readings, 
neutralist and perfectionist, the harm principle should not be neutral after all. The 
importance of considering these two views about the harm principle lies in the extent to 
which they inform considerable parts of criminal law. That is, both neutralist and 
perfectionist present different liberal conceptions of the good that are present in the 
configuration of criminal law. It follows that there is something special about the critical 
function neither the perfectionist nor the neutralist can abandon. Actually, it would be too 
revisionist to argue that there is nothing special about the critical function in the three 
dimensions it has been considered. Accordingly, the same applies to criminal law, of 
which the critical function is a part. That is, criminal law not only is not neutral between 
different conceptions of the good, but insofar as it aims to be special, it requires being non-
neutral. 
2.3.2 Neutrality and the Critical Function  
Based upon the previous section, one comes fairly directly to the conclusion that if the 
harm principle is not neutral, then neither are the critical function nor criminal law. It 
follows that by treating individuals who hold these conceptions unequally, the critical 
                                                
183 See Jeffrie Murphy, ‘Legal moralism and retribution revisited’ (2007) 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy 10. 
184 See Hampton, ‘Retribution’ (n 177) 129-130. 
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function breaches the principle of neutrality. In principle, in the context of accommodating 
minorities, if state action leads to breaches of neutrality, then this is supposed to be 
compensated by polyethnic rights. However, it has also been seen that the liberal social 
order can provide these kinds of compensations only when they are compatible with liberal 
freedoms, and that the harm principle is presumably informed by such a conception. Thus, 
whilst it appears that criminal law might be non-neutral, it remains unclear whether it is 
necessary to award minorities special rights. 
This lack of clarity needs to be examined. As was seen above, the critical function is not 
neutral between different conceptions of the good because it requires being non-neutral. As 
in the case of the harm principle and the neutrality principle, if the critical function were 
not based on a conception of the good, then it would be meaningless. Indeed, there would 
be nothing fundamental about the values of the political community it seeks to defend and 
nothing special about the rights it interferes with and threatens. It follows that it would be 
superfluous in terms of the social practices it secures for subsequent cycles, and 
superfluous in terms of the shared community of values that it helps to construe. The 
critical function needs to be non-neutral if it aims to make an important and meaningful 
contribution to the practices on which it depends. This is precisely what its function is: to 
defend the values of the political community by transforming behaviours that convey 
values which depart from them, and to reproduce cultural meanings and social structures 
that are taken as important for subsequent cycles. It seems that both the harm and the 
neutrality principles require guidance, and thus it is reached the key point: this guidance is 
provided by the underlying conceptions of the good embedded in the social practices that 
give criminal law its meaning. 
It appears, then, that the conceptions of the good underlying the critical function justify its 
non-neutrality. The point now is whether from the recognition that the critical function 
treats minorities unequally, there follow a requirement to give polyethnic rights to 
minorities. The answer was already suggested in Chapter 1: it is not possible to endow 
minorities with polyethnic rights that undermine the critical function. Polyethnic rights, in 
the form of exemptions from criminal law, would undermine the meaningfulness of the 
critical function in the terms it has been in the previous chapter. Without the operation of 
the critical function, it would not be possible to state that the political community shares 
the values that it shares, thus rendering it impotent to respond when crimes that depart 
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from these values occur. Indeed, if the political community defines itself as not sharing a 
single fundamental value, there could be no agreement on how to engage in social 
interaction, no social structures or institutions, and thus social practices and the contexts 
they create for meaningful action would be at risk of being transformed into something 
else. Therefore, what settles the guidance here are the conceptions of the good underlying 
the critical function. 
Defending a guided critical function requires the application of criminal law, which 
implies that polyethnic rights cannot be justifications. Surely, if they were justifications, 
then minorities could impose their own conceptions of the good. What about partial 
defences? Here, perhaps, there is a contrast between the neutralist and the perfectionist. 
Indeed, it seems that whilst the neutralists reluctantly agree that the critical function is not 
neutral, the perfectionist celebrates it, for he argues that the principle treats all equally in 
the sense that it respects all valuable options. Recall that for the perfectionist, there is no 
inequality in the first place, and this supports whether there is a reason for ameliorating 
punishment. Though in principle, the perfectionist could not find a reason for a partial 
defence at all, it could not only upon the ground of unequal treatment. Thus, there might be 
a case for a partial defence if the values the minority upholds coincide with the 
perfectionist understanding of valuable options.  More specifically, the issue is one of 
moral responsibility and thus the lack of conditions for individuals to choose among 
valuable options. If, for instance, the individual has not fully developed their capacity for 
choosing the good, this might be an obstacle for accepting that full punishment should 
proceed, and thus there is some space for partial defences. 
On the other hand, whilst the neutralist seems to be in the dilemma of justifying the 
inequalities created by the critical function, in truth there is simply no dilemma because 
like the perfectionist, the neutralist does in fact endorse a conception of the good. Indeed, it 
has been seen that Kymlicka’s framework is committed to a comprehensive view of the 
good. As such, the framework entails a ranking of ways of life, some above others, and 
therefore it accepts treating individuals unequally insofar as they hold non-valuable 
conceptions of the good. In other words, it justifies treating unequally those conceptions of 
the good incompatible with liberal values. This has a direct bearing on criminalisation, for 
it suggests - for the same reason offered by perfectionists - that criminalising actions which 
undermine liberal values can be justified. Thus, no breach of liberal neutrality occurs when 
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Rapa-Nui are criminalised, and no polyethnic rights can be awarded. Again, the neutralist 
agrees with the perfectionist that in some instances there could be a partial defence, but 
that would be so insofar as the minority in question holds values which elicit a response 
from the values embedded in criminal law. Again, the fact the individual is a member of a 
minority does not feature in this reasoning. 
Hence, it is attained a similar conclusion to that which was reached in Chapter 1, yet it 
shows that the responsiveness of the legal system is narrower than initially suggested. 
Certainly, only those cultural values that represent valuable options can obtain some kind 
of responsiveness from criminal law. Lacey and Waldron, then, join Matt Matravers, who 
holds that if lesser punishment is justified, then this is not because the defendant acted 
from a specific cultural reason, but because criminal law itself is sensitive to claims that fit 
its own definition of the conditions of criminal responsibility185. If, according to criminal 
law, the individual can receive full punishment only when he meets the conditions for 
being fully responsible, being less responsible can merit a lesser punishment. One should 
note that criminal law is responsive not only if there is compatibility of values in 
substantive criminal law, for the critical function also extends to criminal procedure. That 
is, criminal law may or may not be responsive to cultural values during the criminal 
procedure. The case R v D (R)186 is illustrative. In this case, the Crown Court had to decide 
whether it was possible for a defendant to wear a niqaab, a garment used by Muslim 
women that covers their body, including half of the face, during the criminal proceeding. 
According to the Court, the right to manifest a religious belief could not impinge on the 
way in which evidence is given during a trial. That is, the structural principle of adversarial 
justice cannot be trumped by a religious belief. In other words, when it comes to what is 
taken to be the essential parts of the form of the criminal trial, how it communicates, how it 
criticises, these cannot be accommodated. Surely, the critical function needs to be 
protected. 
In sum, it can be observed that the strategy of framing both the problem and the solution in 
terms of breaches of neutrality constructs criminal cases as cases of individual inequality. 
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The solution that criminal law offers is directed towards what it considers a problem in its 
encounter with diversity. Because there is no particular problem in defending the critical 
function, minorities can be awarded a defence on the condition that there is an agent 
choosing valuable options. If the individual is not choosing valuable options, there is no 
reason to reduce the response of criminal law, unless there is a lack of what for criminal 
law are the conditions for ascribing criminal responsibility. However, then indigenous 
peoples disappear, for not only are they prevented from claiming collective self-
determination in their search for individual equality, but moreover, they are treated as just 
another agent of the liberal group. Indigenous peoples’ cultures are left to the marketplace 
of ideas. 
2.4 Meaning and the Social Construction of Social Reality 
2.4.1 Separating the Individual From Social Practices 
It is now time to start explicating the process of the social construction of reality in which 
both accommodation and criminal law take part. In this section, it is rejected the notion 
that the good obtains independently of social practices and argued that, on the contrary, it 
is enabled by them. In the next section, it is offered a theory of the social construction of 
reality. It has been seen that the recognition of diversity and efforts to accommodate 
minorities are processes that occur in political communities that designate themselves as 
valuing and respecting cultural diversity. This is where the principle of neutrality appears 
and where it becomes important. Neutrality identifies a problem of individual inequality 
and, accordingly, it aims at solving a problem of individual inequality. In other words, it 
construes both the problem and the solution exclusively in terms of treating individuals in 
certain ways. The fundamental implication of framing both the challenge of and the 
solution to cultural diversity in terms of individual inequality is that it separates the context 
of social practices from the meaning on which individual autonomy depends. That is, it 
severs individual choice from the context of choice. Examining the principle of neutrality 
has led to two important implications that help to disclose this separation. Firstly, that 
neutrality is in fact not neutral, for it seeks to realise a specific conception of the good at 
the expense of others, one in which autonomous individuals seek valuable options. 
Secondly, that accordingly the majority requires non-neutrality for access to societal 
cultures that are not for free, given its need to be reproduced/transformed. Drawn together 
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and in general terms, it appears that the political community requires that underlying its 
social practices is a particular conception of the good and that these social practices, 
characteristic of the community, need to be reproduced/transformed in order for 
individuals to attain the good. That is, social practices invest the good with meaning. 
Neutrality, however, rejects these implications, and by so doing it severs the individual 
from the social practices on which he depends and which depend on him. In other words, it 
neglects social holism. Social holism provides a view in which the meaning of individual 
actions depends on social practices, simultaneously claiming that social practices depend 
on those individual actions. In other words, by providing a method for examining 
meanings and social practices, it also provides a view of how reality is socially 
constructed. To see this, it becomes appropriate to distinguish between autonomous 
choices being meaningful and having meaning, which are not interchangeable. Autonomy 
being meaningful is conditional upon the set of valuable options autonomous individuals 
have in choosing what kind of life to live. Autonomy having meaning, in contrast, does not 
refer to the availability of a narrow range of options, but to a broader context of social 
practices where autonomy and other values can have meaning. That means that only within 
the context of certain social practices it is possible to understand what it means to be an 
autonomous individual. Whilst being meaningful points to the existence of valuable 
options, having meaning points to the social practices which confer meaning.  
Kymlicka, as seen above, rejects having meaning and endorses being meaningful. 
Kymlicka is solely interested in contexts that present the individual with valuable options; 
that is, social practices that are compatible with liberal freedoms. However, by making 
recourse to such a defence, Kymlicka becomes a perfectionist, thus dividing having 
meaning and being meaningful. Let us see how this separation arises. It has been seen how, 
according to the neutralist, policies can be justified neutrally but can have non-neutral 
effects. Nevertheless, these effects are admissible because they are the product of 
individual choice, so long as they choose the good. It has also been seen that, according to 
the perfectionist, policies can be non-neutral if they aim at improving the likelihood of the 
individual attaining valuable conceptions of the good. Though it seems there is a stark 
contrast between the former and the latter, for the former emphasises autonomous choice 
whilst the latter does not, the contrast is misleading. Both claim the good is objective: the 
former considers that the good requires the exercise of autonomous choice, whereas the 
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latter does not consider that exercise indispensable in every case. For both, the objectivity 
of the good means that obtaining the moral good is independent of social practices. From 
this point of view, social practices become external to the good; something that either 
hinders or facilitates attaining the good. 
With these arguments in place, it can be developed a challenge by elaborating the 
argument of “social construction”: valuable options either depend on social practices or 
they do not. If they do not, as seen above, it seems that it makes no sense to claim that 
having access to societal cultures is a matter of basic justice. Surely, if being meaningful 
can obtain regardless of social practices, then they can obtain regardless of those contexts. 
Kymlicka, the neutralist, and the perfectionist appear aligned in holding that the good is 
external to social practices. Accordingly, if the good does not depend on social practices, 
then the good is not socially constructed, and thus valuable options are invariant across 
contexts of social practices. However, as it has been seen, this would undermine the project 
of accommodation from the start, for there would appear to be no reason why access to 
societal cultures is relevant at all. Additionally, it would make societal cultures natural or 
costless, neglecting their history as historical achievements. Finally, it would make 
criminal law irrelevant in the three senses discussed above. Yet, this seems overly 
implausible. These implications should be rejected, which leads us to endorse the opposite 
view. If valuable options depend on social practices, then it makes sense to claim that 
societal cultures are a matter of basic justice, for without them, participants can have no 
meaning. If the aim is to provide an account on which societal cultures matter by the role 
they play for meaning, it must be accepted that valuable options depend on social 
practices. That is, that being meaningful depends on having meaning, while the converse is 
not true187. 
Consistent with adopting the argument of social construction is an understanding that 
social practices are more than artefacts that hinder or facilitate: social practices enable the 
good. Accepting the argument of social construction leads to an understanding that 
meaningful options depend on having meaning. This has two important implications for 
the present enquiry. The first is that if there are many social practices, it seems that there 
are many meanings to what are valuable options. This is the context within which the 
                                                
187 Certainly, only a radical ethnocentrism would warrant the claim that it is possible to understand only what 
is valuable, and would reject that is not possible also to understand what is not. 
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claims of indigenous peoples come to be heard: a context in which the state recognises and 
values cultural diversity. The dependence of having meaning on access to societal cultures 
shows how fundamental that access is for minorities, but equally important, how 
fundamental it is for the majority to access theirs. The second implication makes the 
neutralist and perfectionist insistence on liberal freedoms primarily a political argument, 
and only derivatively a moral argument. Certainly, if the good is socially constructed, then 
there is a justified reason to believe that the good depends on how individuals organise 
their collective life, that is, their social practices. Since any argument concerning how to 
organise social life to enable what their members regard as valuable options is a political 
argument, it seems the argument of social construction helps to disclose, in general terms, 
the political character of the question of justified control over SS/CS cycles. 
One should note that accepting the argument of social construction paves the way for the 
perfectionist and the neutralist to show they can justify their selection of valuable options. 
Yet, this is not in terms of the true morality of the good, but rather collective self-
determination. That is, on deciding collectively on which social practices to engage in. 
This is what the argument of social construction reconnects: the fact that social practices 
generate meaning with the kind of meaning individuals aim to collectively generate. In 
other words, social practices are required for obtaining valuable options. This points more 
concretely to the socio-cultural conditions under which being meaningful has meaning. 
The neutralist, for instance, can argue that one should care about autonomous choices. 
However, having accepted the argument of social construction, he can no longer accept 
this on the grounds that autonomy is the only morally valuable option. The nature of the 
claim has changed; now it is a socio-cultural and political claim. The same goes for the 
perfectionist. Thus, whether there are other communities, also entitled to collective self-
determination and which could call in their favour the requirement of a non-neutral 
account of the good, resurfaces as a politically salient issue188. 
In sum, the connection between social practices and the good appears to the extent that the 
individual search for meaning is understood upon particular social practices. Recognising 
this connection involves understanding that the good is socially constructed. In other 
words, that there is an internal connection between social practices and attaining the good. 
                                                
188 Yet see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’ (1992) 25 University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 783. 
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It follows that there is a plurality of different meanings as to what the good is. 
Reconnecting the good with social practices also allows for an acknowledgement of the 
relevance of accessing societal cultures, for both minorities and the majority. Additionally, 
this facilitates understanding that access to social practices has a political character, 
because it implicates the collective organisation of social life towards valuable options. 
This is what control over SS/CS cycles specifies, the kinds of cultural and social processes 
over which political control is exercised in light of reproducing or transforming social 
practices, and thus, societal cultures. 
2.4.2 Reconnecting the Individual to Social Practices 
It has been developed a particular argument holding that the good is socially constructed, 
but this hangs on a broader conception of the social construction of social reality. Here 
again, there arises a tension in the morphogenetic approach, given Archer’s account of 
meaning. As shown above, Archer’s insistence that cultural meanings are true propositions 
is tailored to the claim that CS only “conditions” agents; that is, CS conditions their 
selection of cultural meanings. Agents choose within a cultural world that is not of their 
making, yet it falls to them to decide among the options they have within their reach. With 
the idea of “conditioning”, Archer rejects social determinism, considering that agents are 
reflexive enough to mobilise and decide which meanings to choose. Yet this image 
commits Archer to an impoverished understanding of the dilemma facing minorities, 
particularly in criminal law. Indeed, Archer sees agents choosing cultural meanings as 
objects describable in term of true propositions. If true, decisions as to which meaning to 
choose would be a matter of selecting among those that are true and knowable.  
If this view is correct, then it is hard to understand why, as Waldron suggests, individuals 
are torn between whether to abandon a practice or become criminalised. If it is a decision 
concerning the truth of some set of propositions: why should the Rapa-Nui be torn apart by 
abandoning their practices? Similarly, if one takes the good to be independent from social 
practices, then it is not clear why minorities should be seen as facing an unfair moral 
dilemma. Raz argues, for instance, that the moral values central to liberalism are context-
independent189 and immutable190, freedom among them191. It seems that for Raz and 
                                                
189 See Jay Wallace, ‘Introduction’, in Jay Wallace (ed.), The Practice of Value (OUP 2003) 3. 
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Archer, deciding simply involves exercising the natural capacity for theoretical reasoning. 
This conforms better with understanding indigenous peoples as systematically deceived by 
their practices, such that they can be relieved from false consciousness through appropriate 
moral reasoning to apprehend those moral facts which make for a fulfilling life 192. Raz 
and Archer understand values and meaning as objective and external to social practices, 
and thus frame the relationship between them and the social world in terms of how the 
latter either facilitates or hinders attaining the good. However, it has already been rejected 
the idea that meaning and moral values can be understood outside of social practices. 
The thesis has adopted the social construction argument showing the inadequacies of 
Archer’s understanding of cultural meanings, which also applies to Raz’s view on moral 
values. Starting from social holism, it has been tried to show that there is a mutual 
relationship between engaging in social practices and meaning. This accords, as has been 
seen, with rejecting determinism193, and whilst it considers social practices may condition, 
that is, facilitate or hinder social actions, it does not reduce them to mere conditioning. 
Clarifying the conception of social construction aids understanding this non-reductive 
position. Put in more positive terms, when groups and individuals engage in social 
practices they enable social actions to have meaning. More generally: social practices 
enable having meaning. In terms of the modified morphogenetic approach, CS/SS cycles 
                                                                                                                                              
190 Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’ in Raz, Ethics In The Public Domain: Essays in the 
Morality of Law and Politics (Clarendon Press 1995) 196. 
191 For Raz, ‘freedom’ does not depend on social practices, see Joseph Raz, ‘The Practice of Value’ in Jay 
Wallace (ed.), The Practice of Value (OUP 2003) 34. This view is adopted by many authors, some natural 
law theorists and other legal positivists, see Mark Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (CUP 
2006), Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin, Demystifying Legal Reasoning (CUP 2008), Michael Moore, 
Educating Oneself in Public: Critical Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP 2000). 
192 Raz, ‘The Practice’ (n 191) 26. True, Raz seems to be enquiring into the metaphysical relation between 
practices and values, but the relation between them is not (only perhaps) metaphysical, but fundamentally 
practical. In the case of Archer, because she develops her theory from the work of Roy Bashkar, she inherits 
his moral realism, see Dave Elder-Vass, ‘Realist Critique Without Ethical and Moral Realism’ (2010) 9 
Journal of Critical Realism 33-58. 
193 It rejects determinism in the sense that rejects that SS determines S-C/SI, allowing strategic moves. More 
broadly, the conjunction of CS and SS does not commit to either social or cultural determinism, for this 
would return to denying the autonomy of culture thesis, which it has already been defended. Enablement is 
not compromised by determinism for two more reasons. First, given its institutional structure, it may fail to 
reach the totality of social interactions, and second, even if it reaches them, it may fail to integrate as 
participants all those it applies to. Certainly, state and social institutions more generally need not cover all 
socio-cultural interactions, allowing (sometimes forcing) dispersed communities to remain disperse. More 
importantly, the autonomy of culture shows that participants can remain bi-cultural, for participants can 
master more than one group’s practices and meanings. 
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do not only condition social actions194, because they are implicated in the process of 
reproducing/transforming the continuity of social practices in order to achieve the 
continuity of meaning. It is necessary to stress this, for it points to the fundamental basis 
for the present approach: meaning is socially enabled. 
In order to elaborate what it means to say that meaning is socially enabled, it is employed 
the work of John Searle on the nature of social reality. Basically, the claim is that to say 
that social practices are enabling is to say that some of them are institutional facts. It is not 
necessary to dwell on his theory; it will suffice to emphasise its social constructivist side in 
order to characterise the social world. The fundamental insight of Searle’s theory is his 
view on the institutional character of the social world. There is a proviso in using Searle 
here. It is better to understand Searle not as having provided a comprehensive account of 
the social world, but as having identified and characterised fundamental features of social 
practices. Thus, it is particularly illuminating in expanding the understanding of SS. Within 
the morphogenetic approach, individuals experience SS as part of an external environment, 
this is why it merely conditions agents. Yet this appearance is a mistake. Individuals and 
groups engage as participants in the transformation/reproduction of their social and cultural 
lives: they enable each other through their social practices to have meaning. This is what I 
consider most valuable from his contribution. For this reason, the interpretations from his 
work emphasise his social constructivist side, which is nonetheless not in accord with 
Searle’s explicit intentions. 
Searle uses the term “institutional” in a different sense to how it has been used here. Searle 
characterises institutions philosophically, guided by the methodological principle that it is 
agents themselves who construe the institutions they inhabit195. Underlying this approach 
is the Wittgensteinian view that human social practice confers meaning on what humans 
do196. So, with minor modifications, Searle’s insights are broadly compatible with the 
                                                
194 The traditional understanding of enablement means mere conditioning, a position held by Anthony 
Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Polity Press 1984) 173-175; 
also Margaret Archer, Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation (CUP 2003) 4-5. 
195 John Searle, ‘Social Ontology: Some Basic Principles (with a new Addendum by the Author)’ in John 
Searle, Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays (CUP 2008) 22. This is in contrast to other rational-
choice theories that construe agents externally by idealizing them as maximizing individuals, see Frank 
Hindriks and Francesco Guala, ‘Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory’ (2015) 11 Journal of 
Institutional Economics 463. 
196 Hans Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Blackwell 1996) 328-329. 
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modified morphogenetic approach. Searle views social reality in terms of a theory of 
institutional facts, through which individuals articulate and organise their social world. It 
has three main components: the first is “collective intentionality”197. Intentionality does not 
mean, according to Searle, to act with the intention to do A, but rather it characterises the 
mind as directed at the world. Searle considers this form of directedness operative at a 
collective level, namely, at the level of collective action. Intentional collective action is a 
form of directedness at the world that takes place when the contents of individuals’ mental 
states are collective. This condition is met when what agents are doing together can be 
described as something “we are doing”198. This form of individual mental content is, 
according to Searle, irreducibly collective. Individuals take part in collective action insofar 
as the content of their mental states is collective. This first component shows that 
institutions emerge collectively and intentionally. 
The second component is “function assignment”199. Humans assign functions to objects, 
and they do so with collective intentionality. The result is the creation of “institutional 
facts”. Viewed from the perspective of these two elements, one can assert that these facts 
are socially constructed. One should note further that the evaluative dimension that comes 
with institutions is also socially constructed. With the creation of institutional facts, a 
normative dimension is introduced200. For instance, assigning the social function of a credit 
card to a piece of plastic involves assigning one or several social functions. The normative 
and evaluative vocabulary that accompanies institutional facts enables descriptions of 
credit cards as achieving or failing their purpose. In other words, institutional facts also 
create evaluative practices internal to institutions, as achieving or failing to achieve certain 
ends. The second component shows that participants ascribe ends to institutions. That is, 
institutions serve evaluative, socially-constructed ends201, the ends of those who form the 
collective intentionality and engage in the practice of function assignment. 
                                                
197 John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (Free Press 1995) 23-26. 
198 Searle, The Construction (n 197) 26. 
199 ibid 13-23. 
200 John Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (OUP 2010) 59. 
201 On the idea of ends as the defining part of institutions, see Seumas Miller, Social Action: A Teleological 
Account (CUP 2001) and Seumas Miller, The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions: A Philosophical 
Study (CUP 2010). 
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The third component of Searle’s theory of institutional facts is “status functions”202, which 
is the state of affairs of an object having a status function. According to Searle, objects 
perform certain functions beyond what their physical properties allow them to perform. 
They accomplish this by virtue of a collective ascription of a status function. Once the 
status function operates, that is, once there is collective acceptance of the function 
assignment, the object performs a function by virtue of the collective intentionality of the 
community in which it performs that function. With the third component in place, the basic 
structure of institutional facts emerges: “X counts as Y in C”. In the case of the credit card: 
there is a piece of plastic (X) that counts as a credit card (Y) when certain circumstances 
obtain (C). This third component shows formally that there is an intentional collective 
assignment of a function to an object X, such that it can fulfil function Y in certain 
circumstances C. In sum, through collective intentionality a group assigns a function to an 
object X. Once there is collective acceptance of function assignment, X fulfils the role as Y 
when certain conditions obtain. This third element shows that the practice of participants 
gives rise to a new institutional fact. 
The basic insight Searle’s theory provides for present purposes is its explanation of how 
social practices become socially enabled by participants’ collective, intentional, practical 
attitudes. In short, some social practices become institutional facts, which permits 
understanding them beyond merely hindering or facilitating social actions. Social practices 
are a collective intentional process that involves function assignment and collective 
acceptance. Once these conditions are met, institutional facts enable new social practices 
and thus new meanings. Moreover, it also shows that the institutional social world serves 
specific ends that a group seeks through their respective institutions.  
The problem, however, is that the way Searle presents his theory is not compatible with the 
present constructionist interpretation of institutional facts as enabling social practices and 
meaning. On the one hand, Searle’s theory is too individualistic and centres on individuals’ 
mental states. Indeed, institutional facts are reducible to individuals’ mental contents 
taking part in collective actions. On the other hand, the theory is too naturalistic, for it 
claims that every institutional fact can be reduced to a physical base on which it 
                                                
202 Searle, The Construction (n 197) 33-34. 
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supervenes. A reinterpretation is necessary to preserve the constructivist interpretation. 
Surprisingly, no substantial modification is needed, as showed below. 
The key reinterpretation concerns the individualistic understanding of collective 
intentionality. For Searle, it is an individual whose psychological mental state represents 
what he does in collective terms as ‘We’ (“assign credit cards function Y in C”). Yet, 
collective intentionality does not depend strictly speaking on individuals having 
psychological mental states regarding what they do together in order to collectively assign 
a function. Functions are assigned collectively not because individuals have mental 
contents that are collective, but because they engage collectively in public social practices. 
Function assignment only makes sense in a context of social practices, for such assignment 
is not a matter of mental contents203, but of understanding and mastering a practice. Thus, 
collective intentionality is better understood as a collective practice ranging over both 
function assignment - the practice of ascribing X as Y in context C - and status function, 
which it is renamed collective acceptance - X’s achievement of function Y in context C. 
With these three elements in place institutional facts appear204. 
Using Searle’s theory provides a clearer sense of what it means to say that social reality is 
constructed or, in other words, that social practices and meaning are socially enabled. 
Enablement means that some social practices are institutional facts. One should note that 
claiming social reality is enabled is a strong claim. It is to claim that through participants 
engaging in social practices, new facts come into existence, which did not exist before. 
Social practices enable or create institutional facts, which is how participants construct 
their social reality. Institutional facts involve the existence of new social practices that 
depend on participants’ intentional, collective, practical attitudes. Social reality, the world 
individuals inhabit, depends on collective practices of function assignment and its 
recognition through collective acceptance. There is no linear dependence on brute facts, in 
the sense that brute facts do not particularly determine the emergence of institutions. 
Institutional facts are internally related to participants, for it is they who engage in a 
collective practice of function assignment and collective acceptance. Thus, by conceiving 
                                                
203 Searle recognises this much in his more recent work, but still sustains that this is a matter of individual 
mental contents, although he now demands the existence of mutual belief, see Searle, Making (n 200) 58. 
204 A similar view is proposed by James Coleman, ‘Commentary: Social Institutions and Social Theory’ 
(1990) 55 American Sociological Review 333-339. 
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some social practices as institutional facts, it can be observed that CS and SS contribute to 
enable new social practices, and thus, they enable new meanings205. In other words, new 
meanings are enabled that could not be understood before. 
2.4.3 From Non-Neutrality to the Responsive Nature of Social Reality 
The constructivist reading of Searle’s theory allows observing institutional facts in both SS 
and CS, for it seems that many, if not all, social practices follow the structure of 
institutional facts. Therefore, the presence of institutional facts in the social world is 
pervasive. SS/CS should, then, be characterised as cycles of social construction, for if 
social practices have an institutional-fact structure, then cycles of socio-cultural 
reproduction/transformation are implicated in enabling new meanings that could not be 
understood before. This aligns with the methodological requirement that in order to 
understand the social world, one should adopt the participant’s point of view. If social 
practices have an institutional-fact structure, they are to be understood from the inside, as a 
participant. It appears then that in the sense used here, both Searle and Archer’s views on 
the social world are complementary. In effect, they can be reinterpreted as seeking to 
answer different questions. Searle’s theory is genetic, for it aims to elucidate the conditions 
that allow the social world to enable contexts for social action in terms of institutional 
facts. Archer’s theory, on the other hand, aims to outline the social and cultural dynamics 
by which that world is reproduced/transformed, thus ensuring continuity within social 
practices through time. With these resources, it is now possible to understand the 
impossibility of admitting indigenous peoples’ tastes. 
If the political community is institutionally enabled, it cannot be neutral in terms of the 
enablement of social practices and meaning. As outlined above, the process of 
accommodation only makes available options compatible with the liberal good; now, this 
can be comprehended more generally in terms of the impossibility of enabling different 
social practices. Because groups need to socially construct their practices, they cannot, 
                                                
205 This is not as controversial as it appears, for what is indeed controversial is the opposite: that speech acts 
are not socially constructed. For a defence of the view that meaning is socially constructed, see Frederick 
Stoutland ‘On Not Being a Realist’ (1989) 89 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95-111; Torbjorn 
Tannsjo, ‘Moral Relativism’ (2007) 135 Philosophical Studies 123-143; Dave Elder-Vass, The Reality of 
Social Construction (CUP 2012) Chapter 6; David Velleman, Foundations for Moral Relativism, (Second 
Expanded Edition, Open Book Publishers 2015) 60-73. 
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through their institutional facts, provide the practical space indigenous peoples need in 
order to ensure the continuity of their meanings. Certainly, through them groups only 
enable their meanings. The impossibility of indigenous peoples tastes depends on two 
conditions obtaining. First, that they are defined as not being collectively self-determined. 
Second, that they engage in their social practices within the institutional-fact structure of 
the larger group of which they are part, and which denied their self-determination. Because 
the first condition obtains, it is necessary to show why the larger group cannot enable 
different meanings, which can be demonstrated by the responsiveness of institutional facts. 
It is important to note that by now the issue is not neutrality, but the need for the larger 
political community to enable particular social practices. In other words, the issue is not 
one of hindering or facilitating. 
Because the first condition obtains, indigenous peoples as participants must confront 
meanings that are not only external and imposed, but which also impinge on their capacity 
to enable their own meanings. This is further explored in the next chapter, but first it is 
necessary to uncover the problem that institutional facts represent. The first key point is to 
understand accommodation as located at the level of enablement of meaning, for then it 
enters into direct conflict with what the group understands itself as entitled to. If the 
conflict is about who should enable meaning, then it appears that accommodation 
challenges those for whom institutional facts are institutional facts of a collective practice; 
that is, of a ‘collective subject’. The second key point to note is that if social practices 
enable meaning, then not any meaning is being enabled, but only a meaning. The 
institutional reality individuals inhabit enables a social world that could have been 
otherwise, that could have created different meanings. However, it has not; instead, it has 
excluded potential meanings from being enabled by virtue of enabling others. 
Accommodation challenges where the line should be drawn and which meanings should be 
enabled: it challenges a ‘collective subject’ as the enabler of meaning. To this extent, 
accommodation also challenges participants, for their ‘collective subject’ instituted 
institutional facts that enable their meanings. The problem, then, lies in that institutional 
facts are responsive to the social practices and meanings of participants. Insomuch as 
institutional facts are responsive by being enabled by the social practices of participants, 
they respond by requiring the use of particular meanings and advancing their ends. 
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To say that institutional facts are responsive to participants’ social practices and meanings 
means two different things. First, they are responsive in terms of meaning: meaning-
responsiveness. As a matter of practical mastery, the rules that govern the institution can 
be grasped through the social practices of the collective subject of which the institution is 
part 206 . Second, they are responsive in terms of interests or values: axiological-
responsiveness. As shown by Searle, the ends served and advanced by institutions are 
those that the collective subject has set as valuable for their social and cultural world. 
Institutional facts, then, not only become intelligible to those who were the original 
participants207, because later participants can also master the meaning-responsiveness and 
axiological-responsiveness of the institutions they inhabit. As a consequence, institutions 
speak to and are the voice of those who continuously construct them through their social 
practices. They speak the voice of a ‘collective subject’. 
It has been arrived at characterising institutional facts as doubly responsive. To say that 
institutions are non-neutral fails to specify the ways in which institutional facts are 
responsive to participants’ social practices. This allows for a better understanding of how 
practices of accommodation operate in criminal law: insofar as they are institutional facts, 
they are also meaning-responsive and axiological-responsive to particular social practices 
and to a collective subject. Double responsiveness follows from the impossibility of the 
non-neutrality of criminal law, for if it were really neutral then there would be no 
underlying conception of the good. Thus, criminal law would say nothing about the values 
and the interests it protects, neither of the harms it seeks to prevent, nor of the harms that it 
                                                
206 On how to understand the learning process in terms of social practice, see Meredith Williams, Blind 
Obedience: Paradox and Learning in Later Wittgenstein (Routledge 2010) Chapter 3. 
207 Of course, SS may favour different ends, and because they remain empirically different from CS, they 
develop with certain independence of groups. Surely, in capitalism, the owners of the means of production 
could be defined in terms of ethnic belonging, but this is not necessary. Therefore, social organisation can 
end up favouring a minority within an indigenous group. Indeed, it is widely recognized that this is what has 
happened in Fiji since the mid 20th century, where Indo-Fijians, who were a minority, came to dominate the 
economy of the country, and thus, state politics, when they turned into the majority of the population. Yet 
successive military coups have aimed to favour ethnic Fijians without success, it seems, see Wadan Narsey, 
‘Review of Fiji’s Economic History, 1874-1939: Studies of Capitalist Colonial Development’, by Bruce 
Knapman’ (1990) The Contemporary Pacific 208-213; William Sutherland, ‘Nationalism, Racism and the 
State: Class Rule and the Paradox of Race Relations in Fiji’ (1990) 31 Pacific Viewpoint 60-72; Stephanie 
Lawson, ‘Constitutional Change in Fiji: the Apparatus of Justification’ (1992) 15 Ethnic and Racial Studies 
61-84; Terrence Carroll, ‘Owners, Immigrants and Ethnic Conflict in Fiji and Mauritius’ (1994) 17 Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 301-324; Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, ‘A Tale of Three Constitutions: Ethnicity and 
politics in Fiji’ (2007) 5 ICON 639-669. 
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causes through punishment. However, the critical function requires being non-neutral; in 
other words, it requires exhibiting double responsiveness because it is guided by the 
underlying conceptions of the good endorsed by the collective subject. 
Now, it appears that criminal law, as an institutional fact, is doubly responsive to a 
collective subject; to the Chilean political community. Double responsiveness can be 
identified in criminal law’s institutional alternatives and consequences. The definition of 
crime and the responses to its occurrence, which conducts to forbid, which conducts to 
exempt and which to aggravate, how to conduct the investigation and which items are 
necessary to prove the charges, the way to address the offender, who is to count as an agent 
and who is not, what can and cannot be resolved during the criminal process, what are the 
ends of punishment and the institutional design for that end, etc., are all matters responsive 
to Chileans’ meanings. As a result, by enabling, they exclude other forms of defining, 
investigating, processing and punishing. This is a responsive institutional world, as every 
institutional world is. 
Now it becomes possible to better illustrate the dilemma faced by Rapa-Nui. Rapa-Nui’s 
social practices and meaning register in criminal law through Chilean institutional facts, 
and they are the object of socio-cultural practices of reproduction/transformation. In other 
words, they are part of a socio-cultural practice by which meaning is enabled for another 
collective subject. Rapa-Nui’s choices towards engaging in their cultural practices in the 
cave have been criminalised. It should be noted, first, that their choices have been 
institutionally structured, for what they have done is regulated by criminal law in terms of 
individual choices. Second, their choices have been institutionally described as individual 
actions and have been ascribed institutional consequences, in this case, concerning 
criminal law. Police and prosecutors, public defenders and courts speak to and from the 
Chilean dominant meanings. Third, it appears those institutions are biased in what 
concerns the register of different forms of collective agency: Rapa-Nui exist in criminal 
law only as an aggregation of individuals. Accordingly, there are no group interests in the 
case at hand, and of course, no group has been harmed. Thus, not only do the Rapa-Nui 
disappear, but so does the collective subject for which criminal law is playing a role: the 
Chilean political community. Fourth, as a condition for engaging meaningfully in criminal 
law, Rapa-Nui need to master successfully the legal techniques of the Chilean criminal 
procedure. The Rapa-Nui are asked to defend themselves by engaging in the institutional 
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framework set to register their demands in institutional terms. Fifth, as a consequence, 
what the Rapa-Nui might aim to contest is circumscribed by what the institutional 
framework allows to be discussed and resolved, for that institutional framework is 
responsive only to certain ends. That is, by using criminal law to conduct the process of 
accommodation, the Rapa-Nui become instrumental to further the institution of criminal 
law and the ends it serves. Thus, it will only be responsive if Rapa-Nui appear as 
reasonable Chileans. Finally, by engaging in criminal law, they are regarded as part of that 
larger group of participants who share the same values; they are regarded as Chileans. 
Conclusion 
In sum, and again provisionally, it has been strengthened the case for understanding 
accommodation as a failure. Indigenous peoples’ tastes seem impossible, at least within the 
institutional facts that are doubly responsive to the collective subject of which they are 
part. However, this is a consequence of that subject’s social world being institutional. It 
could not have been different, for otherwise their institutional world would have been 
compromised. The social world of the collective subject is socially enabled, as are their 
social practices and meaning. It is socially constructed. This casts the situation of 
minorities as a dilemma for accommodation, because accommodation is an institutional 
fact not only doubly responsive to the collective subject’s social practices, but also furthers 
that Rapa-Nui are not Rapa-Nui. Divested of self-determination, they can only be regarded 
as Chileans, and thus, can only ask that criminal law treats them with leniency by relying 
on what would make a response lenient for a Chilean. Rapa-Nui’s practices and their 
continuity as a group are left to the marketplace of ideas. More needs to be said about this 
‘collective subject’, for now it appears too diffuse. The next chapter addresses this by 
arguing that it is a constitutional order possessing a constitutional identity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CRIMINAL LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIALOGUE 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 ended arguing that the social of construction of reality is political because it 
concerns the organisation of collective life, and that a conflict appears in terms of who 
should enable meaning. This chapter, explores the question of this “collective subject”, and 
argues that it refers to a constitutional order. As a part of the constitutional order, criminal 
law limits accommodation politically. It is argued that criminal law is political because it 
makes a key contribution to the constitutional order. More specifically, what makes 
criminal law political is that it forms part of the identity of the constitutional order, as a 
constitutional order. In other words, a constitutional order claims to control criminal law in 
a way that excludes any potential interference, because it is a mark of its own identity. 
What still requires elaboration is, first, that the constitutional order organises collective life 
politically. Basically, the claim is that the constitutional order seeks to enable particular 
meaning-responsive and axiological-responsive institutional facts, a process that can be 
conceptualized as generating a constitutional identity. Constitutional identity draws 
attention to how the constitutional order places boundaries that enable its own identity. 
Second, understood as part of the constitutional order, it is argued that criminal law is part 
of its identity and thus, shapes how it marks the boundaries which make that order what it 
is. From this perspective, criminal law becomes political by virtue of contributing to set 
those boundaries. It follows that limiting the accommodation of cultural diversity is also 
political, because in doing so, criminal law contributes to draw the boundaries of the 
constitutional order.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 elaborates the notion of constitutional 
practice, shifting the focus from the constitutional text to the constitutional order. Section 2 
develops a theory of constitutional identity with which it is examined the current debate 
concerning constitutional identity in EU law, in order to illustrate what it means to claim 
that criminal law is part of it.  In the first part of Section 3, it is challenged the view that 
sees in constitutional dialogue a way for minorities to be recognised within the 
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constitutional order, and thus within criminal law. Finally, in the second part of Section 3, 
it is proposed a principled distinction for treating indigenous peoples equally in contrast to 
other minorities that do not seek to fragment the constitutional order, but rather to integrate 
with it. 
3.1. Constitutional Order 
3.1.1 Constitutional Order and Social Practices 
It seems appropriate to start by employing social holism to understand the constitution, in 
order to make sense of the social practices on which it depends, and how they in turn 
depend on the constitution. The idea of a two-way feedback relation reappears in the sense 
that the constitution has meaning by virtue of being part of broader social practices, while 
simultaneously contributing to those practices having meaning208. The focus in the 
following is mainly on how the constitution contributes to socio-cultural practices, without 
overlooking how socio-cultural practices contribute to the constitution. Starting from social 
holism, it appears that the constitution is identified primarily with particular socio-cultural 
practices and not with a text. Thus, this approach proposes a shift from understanding the 
constitution exclusively in reference to a text, to a socio-cultural practice of constitution-
making. In other words, it is possible to understand the constitution as a constitutional 
order209. By understanding the constitution in this way, it is highlighted that its foundations 
are pre-constitutional 210 , for it draws on the social practices and meanings of its 
participants. This is the key to understanding the constitutional order. 
One virtue of the constitutional order understood as a socio-cultural practice of 
constitution-making is that it complies with Wittgenstein’s dictum that rules cannot be 
                                                
208 For similar accounts, see Matthew Palmer, ‘Using Constitutional Realism to Identify the Complete 
Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution’ (2006) 54 The American Journal of Comparative Law 
587; Ernest Young, ‘The Constitution Outside of Constitution’ (2007) 117 Yale Law Journal 408. 
209 This traces more or less the distinction between the constitution and constitutional law. See W. J. 
Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree (CUP 2007) 28-29; Zachary 
Elkins,Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (CUP 2009) Chapter 3; 
David Strauss, The Living Constitution (OUP 2010) 35. 
210  See Frank Michelman, ‘Constitutional Authorship’ in Larry Alexander (ed.), Constitutionalism: 
Philosophical Foundations (CUP 1998); also Frederick Schauer and Larry Alexander, ‘Defending Judicial 
Supremacy; a Reply’ (2000) 17 Constitutional Commentary 460-462. 
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self-interpreted211. This has implications for constitutional interpretation, for the meaning 
of a constitutional provision cannot be determined solely by its semantic content. It 
becomes fundamental to appeal to the context in which a provision is applied and 
understood: the context of its pragmatic use. Another virtue is that given its focus on social 
practices, unwritten constitutions become unproblematic. If the practice of constitution-
making is fundamental, it is not necessary to rely on the existence of a written document in 
order to characterise it as having a constitution. Instead, it would be necessary to look at 
the constitutional practice. In this examination, it would suffice to identify whether the 
practice has the properties with which it is possible to characterise a constitutional order. 
Thus, the approach also allows that oral traditions can have a constitutional order, as much 
as written traditions can. There are many virtues to this approach, yet the key, is that the 
constitutional order allows drawing attention to the political practices that organise 
political power212, for they underpin the constitution. This is the focus of attention.  
The most important virtue of the constitutional order as a concept is that it highlights that 
constitution-making practices are essentially a political phenomenon. The constitutional 
order is a socio-cultural and political practice of constitution-making. In other words, it is a 
way of organizing political power, which understands it as constrained or non-absolute in 
regard to the collective life that it organises, which is in turn what gives meaning to that 
political organisation. Crucial in this respect is the following: because it gives form to a 
political power that organises social life and that depends on it, it is not merely a 
constraint. In other words, it is overlooked what is most fundamental about the 
constitutional order if it is admitted the liberal contention that all it does is fulfilling the 
negative function of constraining power. This view pays no attention to social holism. By 
structuring and giving form to the exercise of political power, the constitutional order also 
shapes the form of social practices on which it depends. From this perspective, while the 
constraining function appears as one important dimension of the constitutional order, it 
does not exhaust it.  
The above has implications for what is most characteristic of the constitutional order. As a 
socio-cultural and legal practice formally similar to criminal law, the constitutional order 
                                                
211 This idea was developed earlier in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3. For a good compilation of essays on the 
influence of Wittgenstein in jurisprudence, see Dennis Patterson (ed.), Wittgenstein and Law (Ashgate 2004). 
212 Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (Princeton University Press 2004) 1-2. 
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also appears to play a role in the social construction of reality on which it depends: it is an 
institutional fact. Now, if understood as an institutional political phenomenon, then the 
constitutional order is enabling. It is arrived at the most important function of the 
constitutional order: it enables political power. This form of political power is institutional 
in the philosophical sense. It was enabled in the sense that historically social practices 
made it possible, and thus as a new institutional fact, once it emerged it contributed to 
social practices and meanings that were not possible before. The constitutional order 
enables political power by organizing it within the order it sets for itself. In modern states, 
one can identify this role in how the constitutional order channels the will of the people 
and gives it a particular constitutional form. Certainly, by organizing the sources and form 
of political power213, the basic fuel of political and legal reproduction/transformation, and 
by enacting individual rights214 and organising its form through agencies, competences, 
and procedures, it organizes itself politically.  
In sum, the claim is that by enabling political power, the constitutional order plays a 
fundamental role in the socio-cultural reproduction/transformation of social life. The main 
contribution of the constitutional order lies in enabling political power. Now, it is 
necessary to defend this view against an important counterargument. One may object that 
this approach is just a theoretical view of constitutional states, so that any purchase it may 
have must be in terms of how a constitution motivates individuals to act in conformity with 
its prescriptions. Let us explain. The challenge is directed toward the claim that 
constitutions play a role at least at a cultural level. If this is true, then it would be necessary 
to show that individual actions are motivated by the constitution, at least on some relevant 
occasions. The challenge is then that unless it can be demonstrated that constitutions 
actually do motivate individuals with respect to what they prescribe, the enabling aspect of 
the constitutional order cannot be vindicated. That individuals are indeed thus motivated 
may be confirmed if they have integrated the values and principles of the constitution, and 
what they do, at least in the legal context, can be explained by reference to the 
                                                
213  Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-
Sociological Perspective (CUP 2011) 372. 
214 In the same way, Thornhill notes that rights contributed to expand the power of states and strengthen their 
economies. See Chris Thornhill, A Sociology (n 213) 219; on the role of constitutional arrangements securing 
property rights and facilitating the stabilization of the economy, see Douglass C. North and Barry R. 
Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth-Century England’ (1989) 49 The Journal of Economic History 803. 
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constitution’s prescriptions. Because the challenge claims that constitutions need not 
motivate individuals in this way, the notion of constitutional order is undermined. 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy has raised this challenge by asserting that in some states, constitutions 
play no role at all, or at least not in the way the present approach suggests. In Australia, for 
instance, Goldsworthy expounds, the constitution plays largely no role in contemporary 
social movements215. Australian social movements rarely rely on the constitution when 
they pursue, for instance, legal recognition for some moral right. Moreover, even from a 
narrower point of view, the constitution remains hidden from the legal practice itself, as for 
the most part lawyers and courts rarely rely explicitly on the constitution216. It can be 
accepted that what Goldsworthy describes is not an isolated phenomenon. It can be 
accepted that in many states, the constitution may not exhibit an explicit integrative effect, 
in the sense of being a source for individual psychological motivations. For instance, in 
Canada, outside of Charter cases, which have a particular procedure under the competence 
of specific courts, Charter’s rights are rarely mentioned in case-law. The same could be 
said of the UK, where there is no written constitution on which to ground psychological 
motivations. 
The claim about the constitution can be vindicated, notwithstanding the above. Individual 
psychological motivations may be absent, yet it does not follow from this that the 
constitution is not enabling. True, the constitutional order might be investigated 
empirically in terms of psychological mental states, but the point of the constitutional order 
is to draw attention to its institutional character. In other words, the focus is on how the 
constitutional order enables social practices 217 , and thus contributes to the 
reproduction/transformation of the broader social practices on which it depends. This is not 
to say that psychological states are not important. On the contrary, they are, yet they 
                                                
215 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutional Cultures, Democracy, and Unwritten Principles’ (2012) University 
of Illinois Law Review 685. 
216 Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutional Cultures’ (n 215) 685-686, recounts that Free Speech is said to have only 
been recognized by the Constitution since 1992.  
217 On the integrative role of constitutions, see Rudolf Smend, ‘Constitution and Constitutional law’, in 
Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink (eds.), Weimar: A Jurisprudence in Crisis (University of California 
Press 2000) 218. On the integrative role of law, see Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law (Butterworths 
1992) 72-73; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (The MIT Press 1996) 66-81; Dieter Grimm, ‘Integration by Constitution’ (2005) 3 ICON 193; 
for an empirical view, see Keith Whittington, ‘More Unto the Breach: Post-Behavioralist Approaches to 
Judicial Politics’ (2000) 25 Law and Social Enquiry 601. 
 
100 
supervene on the social practices that give them meaning. Singling out one’s motivation 
for doing something only represents a partial, incomplete explanation. Think of neurons 
firing. Certainly, every time individuals are motivated to do something, their neurons are 
firing, yet knowing this does not allow one to draw nearer to the meaning of social 
practices than one might by examining psychological mental states. Just as it is 
individuated a neuron firing within a context of social practices that enable meaning, it is 
singled out motivations to do something. Indeed, only grounded within a context of social 
practices can the neuroscientist relate the neurons firing with what individuals are doing218.  
From the fact that it is not observed a psychological motivation grounded in the 
constitution in an individual bringing his case before courts, it does not follow that the 
constitution is not enabling. If such an individual brings his case before the courts, it may 
well be the case that he has no psychological motivation grounded in the constitution. 
However, the constitutional order figures in what the individual is doing because that 
context has been politically organised, and what the individual does has meaning in part by 
virtue of that contribution. If value A (e.g. freedom from harmful interferences) does not 
figure explicitly in the psychological states of individual X, say because X neither knows 
nor believes that the constitutional order establishes value A, it does not follow that, in 
asking courts and police for protection from individual Y, who has threatened to kill X, 
that the constitutional order is not enabling A. On the contrary, what X is doing and 
believing has meaning because there is a constitutional order that supports institutions to 
which he might appeal in protecting A. Perhaps because in the long run, as it is well 
accepted219, the constitutional order creates path-dependence220, which pushes institutional 
facts beneath the surface, this may appear as just another brute fact; but appearances are 
deceiving. 
In sum, the lack of psychological motivations does not prove that the constitutional order is 
not enabling and, therefore, that it does not contribute to the reproduction/ transformation 
                                                
218 For a similar argument, see Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson, Minds, Brains, and Law: The 
Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2013) 21. 
219 See Keith Whittington, ‘Constitutional Constraints in Politics’ in Steven Kautz et al (eds.), The Supreme 
Court and the Idea of Constitutionalism (University of Pennsylvania Press 2009); also Jack Balkin, Living 
Originalism (Harvard University Press 2011), chapter 14. 
220 For empirical evidence of path dependence in general, see James Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism: 
Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America (The John Hopkins University Press 2001). 
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of socio-cultural practices. Even Goldsworthy recognizes, implicitly, the underlying role of 
the constitutional order. Indeed, he claims that the Australian constitution just plays a 
structural and power-conferring role. But if this is true, then the Australian constitution 
does play a fundamental role in the particular configuration of the political system (by 
establishing that elections should be conducted with certain regularity), in the legal system 
(by establishing the existence of a Supreme Court), in the economic system (by 
determining the position of the state vis-a-vis that of markets), and so on. In other words, 
his challenge does not disprove that the constitutional order is enabling. 
3.1.2 Nationalism and Constitutional Order 
Thus far the claim has been that constitutions enable political power, and that they are 
better understood as constitutional orders. Drawing on the previous chapter, it appears that 
if the constitutional order is an institutional fact, then it is also meaning-responsive and 
axiological-responsive. The social reality the constitutional order contributes to requires 
that participants master its meanings to advance their particular ends. In other words, the 
constitutional order is a complex network of institutional facts by which participants 
enable their political organisation, which in turn reflects back in the form of double 
responsiveness. Now, whilst this understanding is conceptual, it can be supplemented by 
the history of modern states becoming constitutional orders. Surely, the constitutional 
order was informed by particular social practices and meanings, and as a consequence 
constitutionalised a particular form of political and socio-cultural life.  
In seeking to historically vindicate double responsiveness, it is taken the uncontroversial 
interpretation that locates the origins of western modernity in the rise of European states221. 
It also seems uncontroversial to join the assertion that the modern state-form conveys a 
new form of political organisation centred around the ideas of individual rights and popular 
sovereignty, explicitly distanced from the monarchical and absolutist forms of early 
modern Europe222. What seems to have facilitated the rise of states was the idea of the 
nation, yet because this process is understood as enabling, this history is approached from 
a different perspective. Specifically, the relation that is the focus is the process of 
                                                
221 Gerard Delanty, Formations of European Modernity: A Historical and Political Sociology of Europe 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013) Chapter 9. 
222 Thornhill, A Sociology (n 213) 218-219. 
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collective identity formation and its impact on the modern constitutional order, which I 
examine in terms of the history of transformation/reproduction of particular constitution-
making practices. 
In the extensive literature on nationalism, two dominant strands compete in explaining 
nationalist movements, and thus how they contribute to the emergence of modernity. 
According to Anthony Smith, instrumentalists223 assume that national identity, understood 
as ethnic identification, was largely a process of instrumentalisation used by political elites 
to achieve territorial control over a particular land. Instrumentalists thus situate nationalism 
at the very the origins of modernity. Primordialists224, on the other hand, consider national 
identity grounded in the idea of ethnicity as immemorial, and thus situate nationalism at 
the origins of human civilisation. According to Smith, it is necessary to find a middle way 
between these two approaches in order to recover what is valuable in both and to reject 
what is not. This means recognising both the role played by nationalisms in the emergence 
of modernity and the role of pre-existing ethnic identifications. The aim here is more 
modest, and consists simply in underlining what Smith and historians of nationalism225 
insist should not be disregarded in the study of nationalism and, thus, the formation of 
nation-states: that every nationalist movement relied on their own pre-existing social 
practices226. This is important for it places emphasis on some commonalities between what 
are traditionally considered two distinct possible origins in the formation of modern states: 
national and non-national movements227. Whilst there are certainly differences between 
                                                
223 Anthony Smith, ‘Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism’ (1989) 72 
International Affairs 446. According to Krishan Kumar, both the work of E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and 
Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (CUP 1992) and Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (Revised edition, Verso 1991) are 
instrumentalists, to which it is possible to add the work of Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism (Sage 
1991), for all locate nationalisms at the emergence of modernity and understand it as an instrument of elite 
domination. On the considerable divide between historians and sociologists on the origins of nationalism, see 
Krishan Kumar, ‘Nationalism and the Historians’ in Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (eds.), The Sage 
Handbook of Nations and Nationalism (Sage 2006). 
224 Smith, ‘Culture’ (n 206) 446. 
225 Key works here are Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300 (2nd 
edition, Clarendon Press 1997) and Anthony Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about 
Ethnicity and Nationalism (New England University Press 2000). 
226 See also the recent work of Azar Gat and Alexander Yakobson, Nations: The Long History and Deep 
Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism (CUP 2013). 
227 The standard view considers that England was formed by fundamentally non-ethnic and thus non-national 
attachments, as compared, for instance, with Scotland and Ireland, see Philip Gorski, ‘Pre-modern 
Nationalism: An Oxymoron? The Evidence from England’ in Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (eds.), The 
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them, there are also commonalities, for both state-forms emerged by relying on their pre-
existing social practices. 
The present interpretation claims that regardless of whether there was a common, ethnic, 
national identity, states emerge drawing on their pre-existing social practices228, and thus 
the new practices that emerged from them became later institutionalized229. In other words, 
if states emerged drawing on pre-existing social practices, then the new institutions that 
emerged with them were meaning-responsive and axiological-responsive. It is important to 
underline the implications of this idea for the formation of the constitutional order, for this 
was part of the new institutions that emerged during the rise of the modern state-form. 
Certainly, this casts a different light on the standard distinction between ideologically-
unified nation states and non-ideologically-unified states. It is often said that constitutional 
orders emerged within nation-states, but this then leaves unexplained constitutional orders 
which emerged from states that were not ideologically unified. The recourse to common 
social practices offers an explication: namely, that constitutional orders emerge from 
common social practices. However, nation-states illustrate perhaps more clearly what it is 
necessary to show now: how, by centralising political power230, the state constructed a 
unity of social practices. It is thus valuable to examine them for the clarity they provide 
regarding how minorities become excluded from the state-form. 
Let us examine the nation-state building narrative. The narrative holds that there was a 
unified collective, a unitary homogeneous group231, that decided to give itself a higher 
law232. To be sure, the group that could as a matter of fact manage to enact the constitution 
had to imagine itself as a unitary sovereign demos233. More importantly, because it was a 
                                                                                                                                              
Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism (Sage 2006) 146, although, as Gorski states, this view has been 
contested. 
228 Thornhill locates the incipient rising of European states in 12th and 13th century, as a decoupling of the 
political sphere from the economic sphere, Thornhill, A Sociology (n 213) 22-25. 
229 Giddens thus distinguishes between nationalism and nation-state, see Anthony Giddens, ‘Nation-state and 
violence’ in Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology (Stanford University Press 1987). 
230 Thornhill, A Sociology (n 213) 19. 
231 Heather Rae, State Identities and Homogenisation of Peoples (CUP 2002) 5. 
232 Thornhill, A Sociology (n 213) 189-191. 
233 Maria Koundoura, ‘Multiculturalism or multinationalism?’ in David Bennett (ed.), Multicultural States: 
Rethinking difference and identity (Routledge 1998); Stephen Tierney, ‘“We the Peoples”: Constituent Power 
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group that instituted its own practices, and that defined itself as homogeneous234, by 
achieving its unity it excluded those who did not share its practices. Accordingly, only the 
meanings of a group were represented by the nation-state235 that constructed itself as a 
collective unity236. Here emerges the nation-state erected as a sovereign state, justifying 
itself in terms of the political power that it has enabled. 
Within this justificatory narrative, that is, in the claim that there was a homogeneous group 
prior to the constitution which decided to give itself a higher law, appears a fundamental 
problem for minorities. The problem, as has been seen, concerns more than the narrative 
itself; it reaches the institutional order whose emergence the narrative facilitated. In 
historical terms, what made possible such a narrative was the development of the state as a 
centralised form of political power. One should note that the same occurs without the 
narrative - as in England - or with a narrative that at times verges upon describing two 
peoples sharing sovereignty, as in Canada. With or without a unified ideological discourse, 
the new constitutional order emerges along with the centralised institutional form of the 
state. The state’s institutions emerged as meaning-responsive and axiological-responsive to 
those whom constructed the state by centralising political power. In other words, through 
the formation of states emerges a context of centralised, therefore unified, institutional 
facts. 
Naturally, the state excluded from itself, given its institutional character, alternative social 
practices and sources of meaning 237 . Two consequences follow from the state’s 
                                                                                                                                              
and Constitutionalism in Plurinational States’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds.), The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constituent Form (OUP 2007) 231. 
234 It has been already learned the implications of this move thanks to post-modern theorists of culture. 
235 Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (OUP 2005) 9; Michelman, ‘Constitutional 
Authorship’ (n 210) 79-80; James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (CUP 
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premised on the possession of certain minimal economic status, and thus excluded most of those whom 
would be considered entitled to vote today, see Nicholas Capaldi, ‘The Meaning of Equality’ in Tibor 
Machan (ed.), Liberty and Equality (Hoover Institution Press 2002). 
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centralisation. First, the new institutionalised context places boundaries upon the state238: 
what emerges is taken as a new collective with a new identity ranging over a territory, 
regardless of their co-existence with others who do not consider themselves included in the 
group 239 . These are acts of inclusion. Second, the others who co-exist within the 
boundaries of the space the group claims for itself are excluded, given the double 
responsiveness of the new institutional facts. Therefore, the nascent collective, by 
constructing a unity of social practices underlying the centralised state, with boundaries 
specifying what this unity is and is not, excludes and includes minorities from the 
beginning240.  
In the next section, it is elaborated on what is meant by “identity”. For now, it seems 
necessary discarding a social-psychological concept of identity sometimes used to 
characterise the constitutional order. The reason lies in that it gives a superficial 
description of social practices and their capacity to integrate, very much like what was seen 
in Goldsworthy’s challenge. Accordingly, it makes invisible how social practices integrate 
into a pre-existing unity of social practices. This tends to be the upshot of social-
psychological concepts of identity, which seek to examine human practices through the 
individualising methods of cognitive science241. This is clear in the now dominant identity 
                                                
238 On seeing the nation as a unity, see Michael Walzer, ‘The national question revisited’, in Nation and 
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University Press 1992) 28. 
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theory242. In analysing the possibility of a constitution for the EU, Armin von Bogdandy 
adopts identity theory, criticising the need for collective identities for EU integration243. In 
his opinion, it suffices for a successful common constitutional project the existence of a 
plurality of “weak” collective identities244, without relying on individuals identifying 
themselves with it. Bogdandy holds that a “weaker” kind of association would be sufficient 
for European integration, one that is less demanding, “…one would follow more of a 
liberal, contract-oriented model of European Constitutional law.”245.  
Bogdandy claims that a collective identity exists insofar as the motivations and self-
ascriptions of individuals are adequately identified. Thus, he psychologises the institutional 
dimension of pre-existing social practices and how these achieve integration. Specifically, 
Bogdandy seems to overlook how the practices he relies on are no less demanding. 
Observe market practices: it is uncontroversial to hold that as markets expand, so do the 
social practices they rely on, so that achieving a common market between different groups 
means not only increased market integration246, but also greater political and cultural 
                                                                                                                                              
Abrams and Michael Hogg, ‘Collective Identity: Group Membership and Self-Conception’ in Michael Hogg 
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Categories (CUP 1981). For references concerning the dominance of this paradigm in contemporary social 
psychology, see Russell Spears, ‘Group Identities: The Social Identity Perspective’ in Seth Schwartz et al 
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243 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘European constitution and European identity: Text and subtext of the Treaty 
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179. 
245 Bogdandy, ‘European Constitution’ (n 243) 315. 
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economic integration, see Francesco Duina and Nathan Breznau, ‘Constructing Common Cultures: The 
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integration of the kind that provides for the harmonization of social practices which 
markets require. This seems particularly true in the case of the EU which, although it arose 
specifically centred on the idea of common markets, stands today as a supra-national 
political institution. It appears, then, that market integration cannot be considered less 
demanding for two reasons.  
First, the very language that Bogdandy employs - the language of liberal autonomous 
individuals entering constitutional contracts - already relies on thick assumptions about the 
historical practices that emerged during European state formation247. In other words, 
Bogdandy apparently overlooks how even a weaker idea of integration, under which the 
EU is just a form of economic integration, still relies on thick assumptions about particular 
social practices and meanings. Certainly, it relies, among other things, on: describing 
individuals as autonomous beings capable of entering freely into contractual relations; 
describing markets as free and driven by the logic of private appropriation; and describing 
private property as embedded in an institutional system of law enforcement and protection. 
In short, it relies on describing the social conditions which historically, over the long run, 
made possible western capitalist liberal democracy.  
Second, and as it will be seen shortly, EU integration led to the creation of a new 
autonomous political entity that pursues an identity of its own. In creating its own identity, 
serious tensions have emerged around the putative depth of European integration, yet these 
cannot be plausibly understood if economic integration is as weak as Bogdandy assumes. 
Finally, it should be highlighted that no part of the foregoing entails a positive evaluation 
of the capacity of market and capitalist integration, nor of the EU as an economic and 
political project for that matter. Even as its voraciousness constantly threatens its own 
unity with crisis, collapse and injustice, it should not be denied what these practices do: 
achieving the integration of common socio-cultural practices. 
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3.2 Constitutional Identity 
3.2.1 Hans Lindahl’s Theory of Constitutional Identity 
It now becomes necessary to develop a more refined conception of constitutional identity 
and link it to the constitutional order. For this purpose, this section draws on the work of 
Hans Lindahl, particularly his ideas about what a constitution is and the identity of the 
legal order. In order for a theory of the constitutional order to understand, acknowledge, 
assess and possibly correct the exclusion that minorities have experienced, it must go 
further than showing that institutional facts are responsive. This is an important step, but it 
is also necessary to account for the process of boundary setting, that is, of minorities’ 
exclusion from, and inclusion within, the constitutional order. In other words, a theory of 
constitutional order needs a theory of constitutional identity.  It should be noted that while 
in previous sections, it was described how the rise of the state form enabled a new 
institutional world that excluded and included minorities, it was not elaborated on how 
those boundaries were actually maintained248. This is where Lindahl’s theory enters249. 
Whilst Lindahl says little about what it means for a constitution to have an identity, he 
develops a substantive theory of the identity of the legal order. He also considers how a 
constitution should be understood, and so provides what is necessary to develop a theory of 
constitutional identity. 
A word of caution is necessary before commencing. The present use of Lindahl’s theory is 
selective. This is due not only to the immense richness of his theory, but also to the extent 
that he draws on a phenomenological tradition, it is not the aim to strain his insights to fit 
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the present framework. Within the present framework, the process of boundary setting is 
understood as specifying how the constitutional order takes part in a process of the social 
construction of reality. While this involves modifying his views, this will be in minor 
respects, because this section draws on his insights as they apply to the legal domain, and 
from this draws more general implications according to the present approach. Insofar as 
the present approach is broad in its orientation, Lindahl’s approach facilitates unpacking it. 
Let us start. According to Lindahl, the legal order is a first person plural concept, that is, an 
authoritative collective action 250  that regulates human behaviour, requiring specific 
addressees (subjectivity) to do something (content), in some place (space) and at some 
point in time251 (time), in order to achieve a normative point252 (the values that justify legal 
ordering).  
It deserves attention that how Lindahl characterises the end of the legal order is quite 
similar to axiological-responsiveness, for legal institutions seek a normative point. While it 
goes further in indicating what aspects of human action become relevant for the law, it 
falls somewhat short in terms of considering the role of institutional ends with regards to 
the broader social practices on which they depend. Lindahl says little on meaning-
responsiveness, but it is safe to assume he would agree with the notion as a condition for 
engaging meaningfully in the legal domain. Now comes the important point: by regulating 
these four dimensions of human action, the legal order establishes legal boundaries. In 
other words, it includes practical possibilities of action, while excluding others in light of 
achieving a normative point. Legal boundaries include how they define human actions as 
legal, that is, characterising them in four-dimensional ways. Boundaries also exclude, 
internally253, by defining some practical possibilities as illegal, in light of what been 
defined as legal. Together, the legal plus the illegal also define what the law might be said 
to exclude externally: non-law in the words of Lindahl254. Non-law resides outside of legal 
boundaries, and thus, lies beyond the normative point the collective seeks to realise.  
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Importantly for the purposes of uncovering the ‘collective subject’ it was left 
underdeveloped in Chapter 2, Lindahl characterises legal boundaries as a form of 
collective agent engaging in collective action. Legal boundaries cannot be conceived of as 
reducible to individual interests or expectations because the legal order is not merely an 
aggregation of individuals. On the contrary, as well as regulating collective actions under 
laws, the legal order is also a collective agent in its own right. Very succinctly, drawing on 
the work of Margaret Gilbert, Lindahl distinguishes between two different instances of 
collective action, we-each and we-together. For Lindahl, the legal order is an instance of 
the latter because participants see themselves as a collective or group255. Whilst necessary, 
this is nonetheless insufficient to account for the legal order. Following Philip Pettit, he 
draws the distinction between joint action and group action, arguing that the legal order is 
a group action that structures itself by monitoring itself. Yet, Lindahl adds further, the 
monitoring specific to the legal order is structured authoritatively256. Authorities, in the 
name of the collective, monitor the actions of participants, ensuring they engage in tasks 
aimed at fulfilling the collective goal and take active measures to secure that joint action is 
consistent over time257. 
With this, it is reached an understanding of boundary setting as the exercise of a collective 
legal order that seeks a normative point. Next, Lindahl claims that legal orders acquire a 
particular identity that endures over time because they draw boundaries. Following Paul 
Ricoeur’s distinction between ipse-identity and idem-identity258, Lindahl distinguishes two 
types of collective identities in the legal order. Collective idem-identity means sameness: 
the legal order has a collective character that endures over time. By establishing 
boundaries through normative expectations, the legal collective marks its opening and 
closure259. Yet this also signals its peculiar character, for it makes manifest the specific 
way in which the legal order regulates human action260. Collective ipse-identity, on the 
other hand, refers to the collective’s sense of self, its collective selfhood. From the point of 
view of participants in the legal order, ipse-identity refers to how they understand 
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themselves as part of a WE261 (shorthand for “we the group”). From the point of view of 
the collective, ipse-identity means collective self-reference: it involves a WE that refers 
reflexively to itself as a collective capable of forming intentions, holding beliefs262, and 
taking decisions.  
Let us observe the interplay of these elements in an example from criminal law. Lindahl 
explains that when a theft occurs, there is an interruption of idem-identity in terms of the 
continuing expectations that participants uphold. A theft makes visible what was before 
invisible: participants’ normative expectations and thus legal boundaries. A theft also 
makes visible the selfhood of the collective. Participants do not engage collectively as an 
aggregation of individuals, but as a WE and as a WE, they do not consider this 
disappointment of expectations legal263. The collective character and the collective self are 
two different aspects made visible by the theft. As stated, the theft also makes visible 
boundaries, or the domain of legality and illegality. The theft may also make visible 
boundaries as limits, if the theft is an a-legal behaviour, for the a-legal challenges how 
boundaries should be drawn. Now, if the theft is just simple illegality, by punishing it the 
WE achieves consistency, thus securing the normative point. A-legality will become 
important in the last part of this chapter, where it is elaborated on Lindahl’s third category, 
aside from boundaries and limits; fault lines. Now it is necessary to revisit the idea of 
constitution. 
While Lindahl’s concern is not to provide a specific analysis of constitutions, he 
nonetheless singles out their main characteristics. One of them is that they empower264. 
They open up new sets of practical possibilities under law from the perspective of a 
constitutional WE, which seems entailed by understanding the constitutional order as 
enabling, as it was seen. In this regard, Lindahl considers the constitution as a first person 
plural concept, characterised as the master rule265. As a master rule, it governs the 
establishment of boundaries, that is, of what is enabled. Put another way, these new 
possibilities arise as the WE sets boundaries, for boundaries both exclude and include new 
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forms of practical possibilities. Here it is attained the basics for understanding 
constitutional identity: it is a collective phenomenon by which a WE organizing political 
power enables new social practices that emerge by a process of setting boundaries, thereby 
establishing its own idem-identity and ipse-identity.  
In sum, this theory generates two important and interrelated implications. First, acts of 
exclusion and inclusion are the outcome of setting boundaries or the emergence of 
constitutional identity, and second, they single out a collective practice and a collective 
subject whose identity depends on them. Broadly understood, constitutional identity 
connects a WE’s drawing of boundaries with the process of enabling its idem-identity and 
ipse-identity, which involves acts of inclusion and exclusion. The constitutional order 
denies minorities the ability to shape what is legal/illegal, yet includes them by assuming 
they are participants266. This means minorities are included and excluded in terms of both 
the idem-identity and ipse-identity of the constitutional order. In the next section, the focus 
is on one aspect of the identity of the constitutional order, its criminal law. The aim is to 
understand criminal law as part of a political process geared towards 
reproducing/transforming the identity of the constitutional order. 
3.2.2 Criminal Law and Constitutional Identity 
In this section, I examine the recent debate in EU law concerning constitutional identity 
and the place criminal law has within it. There is a reason for examining the debate in the 
EU, for though it may seem shocking, there are insightful parallels in the relation between 
member states and the EU, and indigenous peoples and the state of which they are part. If 
self-determination is something that matters for these groups and if it is vanishing by 
becoming part of a larger group, then this is something both have in common. 
Furthermore, because the decline of self-determination is an issue that concerns the debate 
of constitutional identity, the parallels are stronger still. True, indigenous peoples self-
determination has not been formally recognised and member states’ sovereignty is less 
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than fully self-determined, and shrinking as the EU expands. Yet in both cases, this has not 
diminished so much as strengthened their claims for self-determination. Therefore, both 
cases fit well with the idea of a conflictual constitutional pluralism267. Of most interest for 
this section, both cases exhibit an interaction between two WE who seek to maintain their 
own idem-identity and ipse-identity by claiming exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law. 
The notion of constitutional identity has emerged progressively in EU law since the 
inclusion of the “national identity” clause in the Maastricht Treaty268 and its reformulation 
in the Lisbon Treaty269. This is the progression of the so-called identity provision. 
However, the idea is older, tracing its origins to German constitutional history270 and 
presumably in Sieyes’s distinction between constituted and constituent power271. In current 
debates, constitutional identity takes the form of a constitutional doctrine, as the identity 
provision in Lisbon progresses into the judicial arena. In other words, constitutional 
identity has become a doctrinal concept, once the identity clause becomes justiciable in 
courts272. A gap then seems to appear between the more philosophically-oriented concept 
of identity taken from Lindahl and its less theoretical cousin, the doctrinal concept. 
Certainly, whereas for the latter, an issue or conflict implicates constitutional identity 
conditional on a provision being justiciable, for the former there might be an unrelated 
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provision or no provision at all (a purely political phenomenon unregistered in the legal 
domain), implicating constitutional identity. It is urged adopting the philosophical view 
because the doctrinal concept approaches the issue so narrowly as to overlook what matters 
most: that the identity clause levels out the interaction of several WE. 
The reason for the narrowness of the doctrinal concept lies in its method, one that 
privileges the constitution over the constitutional order. Indeed, most approaches to the 
doctrinal understanding of constitutional identity focus on judgements of courts, statutes or 
treaties273, and as a consequence only on the constitution274. Here it is examined the 
doctrinal concept of constitutional identity as an aspect of the identity of the constitutional 
order. Because the focus is the latter, it is followed Pietro Faraguna’s analysis of 
constitutional identity, for he considers it through the lens of the constitutional order. 
Indeed, by considering not only court rulings, relevant treaties and enhanced cooperation 
agreements, but also cases in which the unanimity rule still applies, national Parliaments’ 
reasoned opinions and opt-outs from common frameworks275, Faraguna incorporates into 
the analysis issues of wider relevance to the political organisation of power, thus providing 
a more comprehensive assessment of the identity provision. Fundamentally, it vindicates 
the more philosophically-oriented notion of constitutional identity. 
As a doctrinal concept, authors have been struggling to provide an interpretation of the 
identity provision and judicial practice. Some suggest that it is possible to interpret 
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constitutional identity as national identity276. Yet, as Bogdandy argues, the Lisbon Treaty 
rephrased the provision in such a way that it seems clear that constitutional identity cannot 
be taken to mean just national identity277. Outside of the EU debate, it has been suggested 
that constitutional identity is a dialogical concept278. Specifically, with eyes towards the 
USA279, these scholars do not regard the concept as a dialogue between different WE, but a 
form of self-dialogue within a single constitutional order. An important contrast appears 
then between theorizing in reference to the USA and EU. Differentiating both is important, 
for the type of case it is being considered involves the existence of at least two collectives 
claiming to be at least relatively self-determined. Accordingly, the key difference that 
makes the EU the focus lies in the kind of independence states have within it. Certainly, in 
the case of the EU, all states predated the EU and are still regarded as independent; this 
singles out precisely the characteristic under consideration in the parallel with indigenous 
peoples, for like member states they were independent well before European colonisation.  
Returning to Faraguna, he interprets the identity provision as facilitating differentiated 
integration. That is, in the face of the political, cultural, and socio-economic diversity of 
member states, a model for the accommodation of differences is the best fit as a model of 
integration 280 in which member states enter the EU in different and complex ways. There 
is no unique model of integration that suits every member state equally well. According to 
Faraguna, the identity provision in Maastricht was part of an overall strategy aimed at 
striking a balance between the jurisdiction of the EU and that of member states281. 
Maastricht, for instance, established specific opt-outs from regulations and declarations for 
                                                
276 See Leonard Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon’ (2010) 6 Utrecht 
Law Review 43-44; Roberto Toniatti, ‘Sovereignty Lost, Constitutional Identity Regained’ in Alejandro Saiz 
Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Llivinia (eds.), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration 
(Intersentia 2013) 63; Jose Luis Marti, ‘Two Different Ideas’ (n 274); Elke Cloots, National Identity in EU 
Law (OUP 2015) 168-170. 
277 Armin von Bogdandy and S. Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under 
the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1427; also Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the 
Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and Community (Routledge 2010) 11-12. 
278 Robert Post, ‘The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Forward: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, 
Courts, and Law’ (2003) 117 Harvard Law Review 8; Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity 
(Harvard University Press 2010) 7. 
279 Jacobsohn considers not only the USA, but also Ireland and India. However, these cases are structurally 
the same insofar for him constitutional identity is a form of self-dialogue. 
280 Faraguna, ‘Taking constitutional identities’ (n 275) 534. 
281 ibid 536. 
 
116 
accommodating differences without denying the integrity of the EU. Lisbon282 follows the 
same strategy. For Faraguna, the United Kingdom opting out of the Euro is one example 
that shows the success of the mechanisms of differentiated integration. This is the place of 
the identity provision. Constitutional identity does not represent a barrier to the EU. On the 
contrary, it facilitates inclusion into the EU283. The identity provision allows member states 
to claim to be self-determined on what supposedly matters most to them. In this light, the 
EU’s expansion is acceptable insofar as it respects constitutional identity.  
Faraguna concludes that constitutional identity comprehends, at this point of the practice, 
matters relative to essential state functions; specifically, matters regarding the regulation of 
the family; internal and external security; and criminal law, among others 284 . 
Understanding criminal law as part of a constitutional identity means that it is a matter 
over which the member state can check the other’s overreaching jurisdiction285. Let us 
examine how this plays out. There are two main ways in which member states and the EU 
have been interacting through criminal law: through “mutual recognition”, the recognition 
of judicial decisions between countries; and through “harmonization”, the modification of 
criminal law in member states by instituting minimal common rules between them. 
According to Valsamis Mitsilegas, previously Lisbon member states resorted to mutual 
recognition over harmonization, in the belief this would impinge less on their power over 
criminal law. However, Mitsilegas shows this was misleading, for the emphasis on 
effective cooperation and implementation of EU policy has altered the criminal laws of 
member states, with particular emphasis on the rights of the defendant286. That is, it has 
harmonized through mutual recognition. In Pupino287, for instance, the European Court of 
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Justice (CJEU) modified the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure at the expense of the 
rights of the defendant288, by extending to cases of non-sexual abuse the possibility of 
testifying under a special procedure previously contemplated only for sexual offences. In 
doing so, the CJEU developed criminal law principles with general application and, as 
Mitsilegas rightly points out, mutual recognition led to an informal harmonization through 
judge-made law289. 
For the present purposes, depicting the expansion of the EU, both formally and informally, 
provides support for the role of criminal law as it emerges in constitutional cases under the 
mantle of constitutional identity. Indeed, as the jurisdiction of the EU grows, constitutional 
identity reaffirms itself and criminal law as some of its fundamental ingredients. Criminal 
law appears as that part of the constitutional order that cannot be deferred without altering 
the idem-identity of the constitutional order. The same holds for ipse-identity, for criminal 
law shows the commitment of the political community to maintaining certain practices 
together. It is noteworthy, however, that the doctrinal understanding of the identity clause 
seems unable to identify a related process concerning the EU, which aids an appreciation 
of its narrowness. Indeed, criminal law also plays a role for the identity of the EU, which 
as a constitutional order aims to be capable of having a constitutional identity. In other 
words, being capable of having its own criminal law. 
What is remarkable here is the similarity between the unity the EU seeks and the unity 
achieved by emerging states, and the role played by criminal law in that process. Indeed, 
the monopolisation of the use of force - and thus the monopoly over criminal law - is 
considered a key component in the process of state consolidation290. Thus, the two-way 
feedback relation reappears again in a historical fashion: the emergence of modern 
criminal law depended on the rise of self-determined states, yet self-determined states 
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depended on monopolising criminal law291. Constitutional identity articulates this two-way 
feedback relation in modern times. What matters is not territorial unity, but the institutional 
unity criminal law contributes to; that is, to the unity of social practices, and thus, of 
meaning. It would seem then, that criminal law is equally fundamental for both member 
states and the EU order for the same reasons, owing to how the WE seeks to enable its 
idem-identity292 and ipse-identity by relying on the operation of criminal law. Hence it is 
unsurprising that the WE, both of member states and the EU, aims to control it internally. 
The EU has indeed become equivalent to the state’s emergence in that respect, and while 
its monopoly over all criminal law might not be observed, in the post-Lisbon scenario there 
is a clear, exclusive jurisdiction on some matters in substantive and procedural criminal 
law293. Now, the EU has the power to harmonise criminal law in the areas of article 83(1), 
what the treaty names “serious crime”, with a cross-border dimension enumerating among 
them terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime striving to achieve the effectiveness 
of EU policy294. 
The point here has not been to provide a thorough examination of EU criminal law, but to 
illustrate how the philosophy of constitutional identity allows for understanding the new 
EU criminal law. From this point of view, it appears that the new powers given by Lisbon 
form part of the process of the EU constitutionalising its own order and as such 
consolidating its own constitutional identity. Consolidating its own identity means, at least, 
to have autonomous power over criminal law, in order to contribute to enabling its identity. 
Mutual recognition and harmonisation are instances of this broader phenomenon. While it 
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might be argued that the effects of mutual recognition on the legal systems of member 
states is an anomaly, given that the jurisdiction of the CJEU is limited by Lisbon to cases 
that have a cross-border character like the aforementioned, this neglects the progressive 
influence which the EU exerts over criminal law. In addition to the examination of 
Mitsilegas, Maria Chaves has suggested295 that the broadness of the definition of organized 
crime in Lisbon provides an “umbrella concept” for the EU to legislate in many different 
areas of substantive criminal law, far beyond what Lisbon actually provides for. Thus, it is 
interesting to note that while constitutional courts make emphatic declarations about the 
need to protect constitutional identity, and that while judicial and political powers 
recognise that criminal law is part of that identity, there is considerable leeway for the EU 
to legislate and promote both formally and informally its own system of criminal law. 
Indeed, the EU also has jurisdiction in criminal law. 
Thus the narrowness of the doctrinal concept comes into focus once more. An over-
emphasis on constitutional identity as a doctrine overlooks the framework in which it takes 
part and its role within it. Indeed, from the perspective of two WE engaged in an 
institutional relationship, it does not seem accurate to state that even this provision is 
subject to a proportionality judgement from the CJEU, for this would systematically grant 
the CJEU the last word on the matter296. The identity provision provides a more flexible 
approach, allowing member states also to have the last word without collapsing into the 
radical view that sees the identity provision as endangering the very existence of the EU. 
On the contrary, as has been shown, the identity provision is part of a political mechanism, 
developed to strike a balance of power between the EU and member states 297  by 
facilitating differentiated integration. The EU is granted jurisdiction over criminal law to 
counter the power of member states over criminal law. In other words, respect for each 
other’s identity is achieved through the identity clause. 
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In sum, the identity provision is a result of the institutional interaction between two WE, 
whose degree of development of constitutional identity is considerably different. Certainly, 
even prior to the EU, member states were constitutional orders whose identity was 
reproduced/transformed by their criminal law. In contrast, the EU is still struggling to 
consolidate its own constitutional identity298. The theory of constitutional identity thus 
elucidates the relationship between what appear to be independent parts of unrelated 
concepts: jurisdiction over two forms of criminal law and the identity provision. Criminal 
law appears as part of the identity of the constitutional order that cannot be deferred. If it 
were, the WE would abdicate the power to shape its own identity. Furthermore, the same 
can be said regarding the identity of the EU, for if member states were to have complete 
power over criminal law, then the EU would not be able to shape its own. 
Applied to relationships between the state and indigenous peoples, this suggests a 
deepening scepticism regarding their accommodation by criminal law. Surely, to 
accommodate them in the ways examined above would necessitate the WE abandoning the 
contribution criminal law makes to its constitutional identity, whilst not accommodating 
them means being integrated into an imposed constitutional order. However, not all 
scholars agree on this last point, for an influential line of argumentation holds that 
indigenous peoples can seek real inclusion in the constitutional order of which they are 
part, even if that order was imposed on them. That is, that the new democratic order can be 
inclusive of minorities. The next section addresses this counterargument. 
3.3. Minorities and Constitutional Identity 
3.3.2 James Tully and Constitutional Diversity 
It might be possible to argue that minorities can come to accept the constitutional order. If 
they can engage with its institutions and advance its ends, then they might accept the 
authority of criminal law when it criminalises their practices, which is to say that once 
included, they might. This requires assuming the position of a participant. Surely, if 
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criminalization is grounded in reasons all participants can share, then even those who 
disagree can still accept that criminalization is legitimate, if justified in the interest of all. 
This Habermasian theory of constitutional inclusion of minorities, while it may accept the 
responsiveness of institutional facts, can claim to be impartially justified, and thus, binding 
upon all299. However, whilst this may be applicable to the case of immigrants, it is not to 
indigenous peoples. As Lindahl argues300, when Habermas intends for them to take the 
constitutional language as their own and thus be included, that is, as participants, it realises 
the WE’s unsuccessful colonial dream during the 19th and 20th century301: to assimilate 
indigenous peoples into western political culture. 
Lindahl has provided a convincing critique of the implications of Habermas’ thought in 
this regard, so it is not necessary to examine his position further. Instead, it is taken issue 
with a less controversial view of constitutional inclusion. An alternative to Habermas could 
place emphasis not on reasons individuals could all share, but on the capacity of the 
constitutional order to make room for cultural diversity.  Rather than emphasising sharing 
norms all individuals have reasons to share, the stress is put on finding common ground for 
dialogue about the ways in which individuals can live together. One influential line of 
argumentation suggests understanding the constitutional order as a mode of dialogue, and 
thus the accommodation of difference as a form of constitutional dialogue. The alternative 
would therefore be a dialogue between different groups who rely on a horizon of common 
meanings given by the constitutional order, but who engage through their own languages 
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and modes of reasoning. The constitution is posited as a flexible tool, which allows 
dialogue between diverse worldviews.  
James Tully has elaborated the most comprehensive defence of such a view. Tully argues 
that the constitutional order can do justice to the demands of those whom have been 
unjustly excluded. Tully claims that constitutions can accommodate cultural diversity, 
insofar as they allow their citizens to negotiate the conditions of their association in 
accordance with an interpretative framework of constitutional practice guided by “…three 
conventions of mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity”302. Tully’s view is 
quite ambitious because he aims to replace the historical constitutional conventions on 
which modern constitutionalism has been erected. Three of these conventions are 
particularly important. First, the convention that assumes the existence of a homogeneous 
constitutional WE303, which implies reducing and even suppressing recognition of cultural 
diversity. Second, the convention that considers modern constitutions the mark of 
modernity and progress 304 , which implies viewing old constitutions as hindering 
development. Third, the convention that calls for political uniformity and seeks to treat all 
citizens identically305, which implies that claims to differential treatment are unacceptable. 
By recommending the rejection of these conventions, Tully seeks to undermine the belief 
that there is a homogeneous WE, that we ought to cherish only the principle of identical 
treatment, and that ancient constitutions impede social progress. 
Tully describes his position not just as an interpretive framework for what could be the 
appropriate interpretation of the constitution, but as providing the components for making 
constitutional dialogue “political”. According to Tully, one can understand constitutional 
dialogue politically insofar as one places emphasis on the procedures by which individuals 
dialogue with others and agree on the bases for social life306. Emphasis lies on the 
procedural aspects of the constitution and not its contents. The divide might be difficult to 
discern, yet it seems true that if dialogue is substantively premised on the conventions of 
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mutual recognition, consent, and cultural continuity, and procedurally premised on the 
principles of constitutionalism307 and democracy308, cultural diversity might be better 
recognized. Both substantive and procedural premises underpin constitutional dialogue, 
and such a dialogue offers a sensible way by which to be more open to recognising cultural 
diversity. Indeed, the values that fuel dialogue would be mutual respect towards each 
other’s cultural backgrounds and avoiding coercion by appealing for consent to the norms 
that should guide future interactions.  
Tully’s theory is clearly sensitive to the plurality of groups that coexist in a single state, 
especially those excluded by the convention of cultural homogeneity, so he is aware of 
processes of exclusion. Moreover, his emphasis on dialogue provides a thinner procedure 
by which to resolve political differences, when compared to Habermas. Tully provides one 
of the best frameworks for interpreting the constitution in order to recognise cultural 
diversity, but it is nonetheless problematic. The claim is that there is a fundamental 
problem in how he conceives of constitutional dialogue, for it obscures how the 
constitutional order seeks to include. The basic problem is that the language of the 
constitutional order underpinning dialogue is in fact the very problem indigenous peoples 
seek to address. It should be stressed that the present claim is not that there is an 
overburdening that results from expecting too much of the constitution309. It is pointed to a 
different problem altogether in relying on the constitution as a basis for dialogue310; it is a 
process of inclusion. 
The point can be substantiated by examining Tully’s approval of Richard White’s “The 
Middle Ground” 311 . Tully understands White’s work as an example of a dialogue 
underpinned by the three conventions that he relies on312. Actually, more than an example, 
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it seems to constitute a central building block of his argument, by showing that dialogue 
can be accomplished. White’s description of relations between the French and indigenous 
peoples around the Great Lakes in Canada shows that accomplishing accommodation of 
diversity took place in a not-that-distant past. After examining detailed historical records 
on the matter, White provides the key insight of his research: that the encounter between 
the French and indigenous peoples in Canada created a “middle ground”, a space that was 
the product of each side’s attempt to understand the other. As a consequence of repeated 
interaction, there emerged a new set of conventions313, which neither side could set aside 
and subject by force the other to their own understandings. Both had to reason and take 
from the other what was necessary to succeed within their own aims314. Now, the idea of a 
middle ground out of which common and hybrid practices emerge does not 
straightforwardly support what Tully believes, although it seems compatible with two WE 
engaging in interactions under the conventions he recommends. Yet, this under-
determination is precisely the problem, for the middle ground is also compatible with other 
forms of social interaction. More pointedly, the middle ground can be a relation of 
domination.  
It is worth asking why the middle ground can be a relation of domination. It seems that, 
first of all, White is right to claim that, in some cases, indigenous peoples actively shaped 
the social space they shared with Europeans in North America. Certainly, there might have 
been instances of coordination and cooperation between indigenous peoples and 
Europeans, and even well-intended efforts to understand each other 315 . History 
demonstrates, however, that these interactions were episodic. To be sure, what White 
describes was a strategic kind of interaction where Europeans and indigenous peoples 
understood each other in terms of need and thus were impelled from necessity to interact in 
meaningful ways. Out of this interaction and their “creative misunderstandings”316 , 
something new emerged. However, one can accept the hybridity of practices and at the 
same time deny that what emerges is a social practice where both parties agree on the 
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terms of cooperation 317 . Perhaps the problem is that White uses the word 
“accommodation” as a historian interested in showing the hybridity of social practices, 
whilst Tully uses it as a political theorist to provide an evaluative framework for social and 
political interaction. Whereas for White, the middle ground might admit asymmetric 
relations between indigenous peoples and imperial powers, that is, that there is no less 
middle ground just because one party dictates the organisation of the relation, Tully would 
understand the middle ground as an instance of constitutional accommodation. 
One of the fundamental problems surrounding this usage of the term “middle ground”, as 
Philip Deloria noted in White’s work, is that it presupposes a relation in which indigenous 
peoples and Europeans were more or less the same in terms of negotiating power318. 
Becoming part of the fur trade system, for instance, could be said to have been in the 
interest of both Europeans and indigenous peoples. This may be true, but by participating, 
indigenous peoples became part of a larger SS of international trade, with its own logic and 
institutional demands; which as it was seen in the case of the EU, pull towards a particular 
kind of unity of socio-cultural practices. However, the middle ground is not only silent 
about the asymmetry of power between those who engage in dialogue. More importantly, it 
says nothing about who has the power to shape and establish the institutional structure that 
emerges over time, which determines in the long run how that relation takes place319, and 
who dictates its terms. It may be seen then that the problem is that the middle ground not 
only neglects existing asymmetries in power, but more importantly, the institutional 
structuring that underpins the interaction between the WE. White is interested in a 
historical case in which there was no common institutional framework, but this is not the 
present situation of indigenous peoples. What indigenous peoples currently face is a 
constitutional order, already organized and possessing a non-deferrable constitutional 
identity. 
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Indeed, it is the “common” institutional dimension which lies beyond the middle ground, 
and which was not present at the beginning of European and indigenous peoples socio-
cultural interactions. Common social practices began with the expansion of the fur market, 
in which both indigenous peoples and European were engaged. Yet, through such 
interactions, indigenous peoples became part of the SS of European capitalism, and even 
though dependence on market relations with Europeans did not arise immediately, they did 
create dependence in the long run. It was already suggested the expansive nature of the 
market in terms of social practices. Just as in the case of the EU, dependence was not 
primarily an economic phenomenon, but rather a political one, for that dependence 
occurred within a process in which settlers consolidated as a WE. Once consolidated, it 
viewed the other as merely a part of itself, and thus established an institutional relation 
accordingly. Indeed, after the period of treaties both in Canada and the USA, indigenous 
peoples came to be ruled by the institutional structures of the British Empire and the new 
American revolutionaries respectively through the treaty system320321. This institutional 
relationship, which is still present today, established indigenous peoples as incorporated 
peoples, as a part of the constitutional order. It included them, and by force. 
So, the key aspect neglected by Tully, that is, that indigenous peoples have already been 
included in a constitutional order and have to find their way through, entails the language 
of the constitution. Constitutional dialogue, as Tully sees it, uses the constitution in a way 
that can maximize its potential to resonate with the demands of minorities, yet with this 
move it neglects not only relations of power. Fundamentally, he neglects the institutional 
framework of politically-organized power; in a word, the settler’s constitutional order. 
Indigenous peoples might have shaped certain practices when they interacted with 
Europeans, but it was the Europeans who included and excluded them from shaping the 
new constitutional order. As a consequence, indigenous peoples were deprived of their 
lands, collective self-determination, and culture. From this point of view, treaty-making 
marked the institutionalization of their inclusion and exclusion. Of this, Tully is, of course, 
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aware322, but he gives no clue regarding how to come to terms with this. Tully is then 
unable to retain a critical edge against that which he obviously aims to criticise: the 
constitutional order as a mechanism for the assimilation of indigenous peoples, because it 
seeks to include them. 
Tully’s reliance on constitutional dialogue ends up missing the fundamental point of 
indigenous peoples struggle: its political character. To a certain extent, the approach of 
interpretive conventions depoliticises their political struggle. Indeed, the convention of 
consent is precisely what is at issue for indigenous peoples, but this cannot be dissolved 
into a convention that gives meaning to constitutional dialogue. Self-determination cannot 
be achieved through constitutional dialogue; it represents, on the contrary, the interruption 
of such dialogue. Engaging in constitutional dialogue is a second best judicial engagement, 
in the absence of a political response. It does not suffice to adopt new conventions to 
interpret the constitution, when what is called for is a new constitutional order that makes 
space for two WE. Breaking traditions by formulating new conventions for understanding 
constitutionalism323 drawn from that tradition itself neglects that if indigenous peoples 
dialogue constitutionally, this owes to an imposed cultural common background which 
cannot be avoided324. Whilst indigenous peoples may have shaped the form of the 
dialogue, this falls short of seeing them as the subjects of that language, when equally they 
could be seen as subjected to it.  
3.3.2 Distinguishing Collective Self-Determined Agents From Cultural Distinctiveness  
It has been attained a theory of constitutional identity that accounts for the processes of 
constitutional exclusion, which impede indigenous peoples from shaping the legal/illegal, 
and inclusion, which implicitly considers them assimilated as participants. It appears that 
                                                
322 Tully is clearly aware of this problem, for he describes the authoritative traditions that gave shape to the 
idea of constitutionalism as having a European character informed by the self-understanding of white, 
middle-class males. Tully, Strange Multiplicity (n 235) 45. On this, see Mary Ellen Turpel, ‘Aboriginal 
Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences’ (1992) 6 Canadian Human 
Rights Yearbook 3-45. 
323 Tully, Strange Multiplicity (n 235) 57. 
324 On the strategic use of legal and constitutional vocabulary by indigenous peoples, see Avigail Eisenberg, 
Reasons of Identity: A Normative Guide to the Political and Legal Assessment of Identity Claims (OUP 2009) 
5. For a case in point, see Rhiannon Morgan, ‘Advancing Indigenous Rights at the United Nations: Strategic 
Framing and its Impact on the Normative Development of International Law’ (2005) 13 Social and Legal 
Studies 481. 
 
128 
insofar as the constitutional order assimilates by creating the appearance of participants, 
resistance to it does not seem unreasonable. This has implications for criminal law, for 
given it is part of the identity of the constitutional order, acceptance of the latter entails 
acceptance of the former. In other words, it involves accepting the constitutional order as 
subject and subjected, and this is precisely what indigenous peoples contest: being 
subjected to a constitutional order of which they are not its subjects. Now, having 
acknowledged the specificity of the position of indigenous peoples, grounded in their 
particular claims to collective self-determination, the question is how the constitutional 
order should respond to them. Here enters Lindahl’s second component of the constitution: 
constitutional restraint325. 
Constitutional restraint centres on a key concept introduced by Lindahl, the concept of a-
legality. This deserves considerate attention. According to Lindahl, a-legal behaviour is not 
simply illegal behaviour. Although a-legality may manifest itself in the form of the illegal, 
it is not just mere illegality. Recall the notion of boundaries and limits. Boundaries and 
limits establish expectations and separate what is legal from what is illegal. Yet a-legality 
challenges how those boundaries are drawn: a-legality represents a fault-line. In contrast to 
limits, which in some way reaffirm boundaries, a-legality or fault-lines challenge those 
boundaries themselves326. According to Lindahl, there are two main ways in which the 
constitutional order can respond to the a-legal: either by resetting the boundaries of the 
constitution by rendering legal what is deemed illegal, or desisting from drawing 
boundaries at all327. This is the distinction between weak a-legality and strong a-legality, 
and when it is strong, it calls for allowing that which cannot be orderable328. That is, strong 
a-legality demands the restraint of boundaries, and thus, of the constitutional order itself. 
This is what Lindahl means by constitutional restraint: collective self-restraint in drawing 
the boundaries that confer identity. It should be noted that this is not a complete 
renunciation of collective identity. Certainly, Lindahl does not reject completely the kind 
of reciprocity defended by Habermas and Rawls, but seeks to enhance their frameworks by 
including the possibility of constitutional restraint, thereby acknowledging what has been 
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unjustly included and excluded from the constitutional order. Constitutional restraint 
acknowledges that which resists being part of the WE. Thus, it acknowledges there is an 
irreducible plurality that cannot be overcome through constitutional dialogue 329 . 
Constitutional restraint then diversifies the ways in which the constitutional order can 
respond. Otherwise, there would be no choice but to impose the logic of reciprocity, 
meaning that indigenous peoples would be forced to play by the rules imposed on them as 
the mechanism to struggle for what they seek, and be satisfied with what they may obtain 
from courts responsive to a WE which is not theirs. 
According to Lindahl, if a-legality limits the circle of reciprocity, then all that can be 
expected in a case of strong a-legality is limited reciprocity330. Constitutional restraint 
accomplishes limited reciprocity by suspending itself, for this limits the reciprocity the 
constitutional order is premised on. In turn, suspending the constitutional order allows 
negotiating an exit from that order331. Let us illustrate with two examples the difference 
between weak and strong a-legality. A case of weak a-legality would be that of immigrants 
who seek recognition from the state through illegal means. Immigrants may very well 
intend to revise the unequal distribution of opportunities by seeking, for example, special 
rights and differentiated treatment, in which case they would not challenge how boundaries 
are drawn. However, were they to do so illegally332, they might seek to reset the boundaries 
in order to have the same opportunities enjoyed by everybody else. In other words, weak a-
legality seeks equal recognition within the boundaries of the existing WE in order to reset 
them. That is, they aim at extending the actualization of the values embedded in the social 
practices of the WE they seek to join, which is already committed to an equal distribution 
of opportunities. It follows that this can be accomplished by resetting boundaries, and thus 
extending the legal over the illegal. 
In contrast, a case of strong a-legality, according to Lindahl, occurred when the U’wa 
indigenous group, occupied the construction sites of an international corporation333 in 
                                                
329 Lindahl, ‘Democracy’ (n 319) 110-111. 
330 ibid 113. 
331 Lindahl, ‘Recognition’ (n 310) 228. 
332 On the case of illegal immigrants, see Hans Lindahl, ‘Border Crossings by Immigrants: Legality, 
Illegality, and Alegality’ (2008) 14 Res Publica 117. 
333 Lindahl, Fault Lines (n 250) 64. 
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Colombia. The U’wa sought access to their lands, while rejecting the notion that what they 
wanted was self-determination. For the U’wa, that would mean claiming an internal space 
within the sphere of international law, a space they consider illegitimate “A right to 
‘internal’ self-determination is literally internal to international law. In this strong sense, 
the U’wa enter the construction sites of Ecopetrol from a place that is outside of 
international law...”334. Facing strong a-legality, the appropriate response of the legal 
system cannot be to draw other boundaries, for this would mean appealing to the 
relationships of reciprocity the system provides. The appropriate way of responding would 
have been the suspension of criminal law335, for this would have opened up a space outside 
the logic of reciprocity to what cannot be orderable within it. 
Lindahl has provided an interesting alternative by which the constitutional order can 
respond to the demands of indigenous peoples in their engagements with criminal law. 
However, two further specifications need to be made in order to capture the particularity of 
the claims of indigenous peoples in this domain. That is, given that it is being considered 
the implications of Lindahl’s approach within criminal law, it is argued that they do not 
apply as broadly as it seems. The first specification concerns discriminating between 
collectives and individuals, and the second discriminating between collectives. The first is 
necessary to single out collectives, thus ensuring analytical objectivity, and the second 
because not every collective is just by virtue of being a collective entitled to constitutional 
restraint. Concerning the first specification, Lindahl’s theory is problematic. Because the 
distinction between weak and strong a-legality is couched in terms of that which can or 
cannot be made compatible with the WE’s own practical possibilities, it does not single out 
the type of subject that appears to the WE as a-legal. That is, it does not discriminate 
between that subject being an individual or a collective. Equally, this might be a virtue of 
Lindahl’s theory in the sense that by leaving the type of subject open, it is more responsive 
to a diversity of claims. However, for the present approach, the incapacity to single out a-
legal collectives would pose a serious problem, since it is being considered how two WE 
interact in the domain of criminal law. 
                                                
334 ibid 64. 
335 ibid 258. 
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Thus it becomes necessary to formulate in a slightly different way the distinction between 
the two forms of a-legality. In contrast with Lindahl, it is argued that a key difference 
among these cases lies in the nature of their agency; that is, whether they comprise a 
collective or not. Not every a-legal seeks to challenge the unitary WE. Certainly, as has 
been seen, immigrants, on the contrary, seek to join the WE. However, if they join, they do 
so on the WE’s terms. That is, if they seek integration, they will be integrated not as a 
collective, but as individuals. They would become part of the WE they join, and they may 
come to claim from within this is ‘WE’. Otherwise, they would challenge the unity of 
social practices, which is neither what they seek nor what the WE would allow. Thus, 
immigrants’ claims for increased funding for language learning or housing do not amount 
to claims of collective agents that dispute the exclusive political power of the WE. This 
remains true even if they seek this through the illegal. When they appear as illegal, these 
are instances of weak a-legality, and they do not warrant constitutional restraint. 
In contrast with these cases are those claims made by collectives. Collectives are entitled to 
reproduce/transform their socio-cultural practices and exhibit a collective nature in their 
political organisation. They may not seek to be integrated or if they do, they might seek 
integration while preserving their collective organisation. These are cases of strong a-
legality. Overlooking the different nature of the agency of those who appear to the WE as 
a-legal leads to a constitutional restraint response only towards aggregations of individuals, 
and as a consequence, it may justify constitutional restraint for the sake of respecting 
singularity qua singularity. Yet this would again make invisible that the justification of 
constitutional restraint is due to the collective nature of the agency of those who appear to 
the WE as a-legal. Accordingly, no consideration would be given to the collective and 
political claims of indigenous peoples as indigenous peoples. Moreover, it would also 
make invisible the legitimate entitlement of the WE to claim the socio-cultural 
reproduction/transformation of their identity, for it does not seem appropriate to suspend 
its identity just in case an aggregation of individuals claim to be diverse. Discriminating 
among these cases is fundamentally important for the present approach, for what it seeks to 
vindicate is not the a-legal as a-legal, but the claims of indigenous peoples who appear as 
a-legal to the WE. 
The second specification is equally important. Lindahl seems to suggest that every instance 
of strong a-legality entails the interaction of two collectives. Even if it is not questioned 
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whether the type of subject that appears to the WE as a-legal is collective, it should be 
questioned why, if it is, it should be entitled to the reproduction/transformation of its socio-
cultural practices. To attribute a collective nature to what appears as a-legal in its strong 
variant, raises the question of how we distinguish, as we should, between the far-right 
Norwegian terrorist collective led by Anders Behring Breivik 336 and indigenous peoples. 
In both cases, there are collectives that claim to be diverse, yet this does not justify 
constitutional restraint for Breivik. Certainly, whilst Breivik appears illegitimate for the 
WE, indigenous peoples should not. Here it becomes necessary to provide a normative 
justification for the claim that not every form of collective a-legality ought to be 
accommodated by constitutional restraint.  
For the modified morphogenetic approach, the a-legal behaviour of Breivik does not 
challenge the WE, but only reaffirms its unity. Why then do indigenous peoples challenge 
the WE? The claim here is that there is a normative foundation the WE recognises as 
justifying itself as an independent constitutional order, and this is the principle of 
collective self-determination. Self-determination relates the claims of indigenous peoples 
to how the WE describes itself: a self-description of a WE as being self-determined. 
Granted, there are different degrees of self-determination. However, it is one thing to 
recognise different degrees of collective self-determination and another completely to 
ascribe this to what is possibly a collective which is as yet not self-determined. It appears 
from this perspective that in assessing whether the other is a self-determined collective, the 
WE applies its own understandings on the matter. As it has been seen, there is no other 
way, for the WE cannot locate itself outside of the social practices which give meaning to 
its self-description as self-determined. It seems quite clear that indigenous peoples meet 
these self-understandings, whilst immigrants and Breivik do not. For the WE, that may 
exercise self-determination to any degree, it would be illegitimate to consider itself as non-
independent, as part of another WE that dictates the four dimensions of the legal form. 
Indigenous peoples would agree. It turns out then that by appealing to the same social 
practices by which the WE describes itself as a self-determined collective, the WE can 
attempt to resolve this conflict not by an empty promise, but by suspending its collective 
identity. That is, by exercising constitutional restraint. 
                                                
336 Lindahl suggests a Jihadist is also an inhabitant of the a-legal, analogously to Breivik, ibid 69. 
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This is the aim of constitutional restraint: the suspension of criminal law as it applies to 
strong a-legality. On the one hand, it suspends the inclusionary, assimilatory power of the 
reproduction/transformation of socio-cultural life, driven by the institutional facts of the 
WE of which indigenous peoples form part. On the other hand, it also secures a space for 
the larger WE for the reproduction/transformation of their socio-cultural life through their 
institutional facts. This would allow indigenous peoples to enjoy what they once had: 
collective self-determination to enable their own socio-cultural practices337. It should be 
noted, however, that whilst suspending the constitution is not a definitive solution, 
nonetheless it may offer the ideal context for negotiating between both WE. The next two 
chapters aim to explore how the WE handles the encounter between these two forms of a-
legality in criminal law. Chapter 4 examines weak a-legality, whereas Chapter 5 explores 
what conditions the WE would have to meet in order to do justice to strong a-legality. 
                                                
337 Holder Cindy, ‘Democratic Authority From the Outside Looking in: States, Common Worlds and 
Wrongful Connections’ (2011) 5 Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CRIMINAL LAW AND CULTURAL DEFENCE 
The overall purpose of this chapter is to explore more closely how criminal law and its 
critical function, as part of the identity of the constitutional order, engage with weak a-
legality. This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 explores three interrelated 
themes; the relationship between criminal law and the constitutional order; how criminal 
law can be seen as addressing meaning; the key values that structure the critical function 
and that allow observing how it engages with weak a-legality. Section 2 explores the 
accommodation of weak a-legality within criminal law through cultural defences, seeking 
to identify the limits of the pluralism that can be recognised in criminal law. 
4.1. Criminal law and the Constitution 
4.1.1 The Relationship Between the Constitution and Criminal Law  
Chapter 3 claimed that criminal law was part of the identity of the constitutional order, yet 
did not examine the implications of this view for the relationship between criminal law and 
the constitutional order. It now behoves us to enquire into this relationship. Some have 
argued338 that this relationship is just constraining, that is, that the constitution just places 
limitations on criminal law. More specifically, the claim is that the constitution sets forth 
principles that constrain the legitimate content of criminal law. Accordingly, any 
inconsistency with the constitution entails the illegitimacy of criminal law. While this view 
has something important to say about the relationship between the constitution and 
criminal law, but it would be a mistake to believe that this is all there is to say about it. 
That is, this view becomes problematic once it grants that all there is to say is that the 
constitution limits punishment. If this view is not supplemented, there is risk of assuming a 
deductive understanding of the relationship between criminal law and constitutional law, 
according to which criminal law just is a specification of constitutional law. The deductive 
                                                
338 See Marcus Dubber and Tatjana Hornle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach (OUP 2014), see 
references at 108; also Benjamin Berger, ‘Constitutional Principles’ in Marcus Dubber and Tatjana Hornle 
(eds.), Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (OUP 2014) 424. 
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understanding assumes the constitutional WE is maximally coherent339: the WE cannot 
have an unconstitutional criminal law. As a consequence, there is an assumed consistency 
between criminal law and the constitution and the limits of criminalisation are understood 
statically. If criminal law is consistent with the constitution, then it follows that it is 
legitimate; if not, then it should be made to fit constitutional requirements. There is 
nothing else to be said. 
This is an impoverished understanding of criminal law and the constitution that certainly 
does not represent the relationship in its complexity. This is not only because it assumes 
that punishment exhausts criminal law. More importantly, seeking justifications for the 
limits of criminal law in constitutional language leaves criminal law with a derivative task. 
An attentive reader would note that the main reason this follows is because the deductive 
view lumps together constitutional law with the constitutional order. However, the 
relationship is between the constitutional order and criminal law, thus the latter need not 
follow logically from the former. Dependence exists between criminal law and 
constitutional law, but also between criminal law and the constitutional order. It is 
undeniable that there might be even logical relations between both, but that relationship 
cannot be reduced to logical relations alone. Indeed, for the same reasons it is a mistake to 
understand the constitutional order only as constraining, it is also a mistake to understand 
criminal law as merely limited by the constitution. Criminal law is institutional, which 
makes it irreducible to constitutional law. This is no surprise for if both are institutional, 
then the relationship between them is also. Criminal law and the constitutional order have 
been, historically, mutually dependent, and this involves accepting that criminal law might 
develop that order in ways that resist exhaustion in terms of constitutional law. Criminal 
law has certain independence from constitutional law, yet it also remains dependent on it. 
Let us explore more closely this institutional relation. 
An institutional relationship between the constitutional order and criminal law means 
rejecting exhaustion in terms of a hierarchical relation, thus while accepting there might be 
hierarchical relations it rejects, it amounts to a complete description of the relationship. 
More specifically, such a relation means recognising that historically, criminal law might 
                                                
339 The idea of coherence is grounded in a one-sided image of enlightenment values that obscures how other 
values are also part of criminal law, see Nicola Lacey, ‘In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, 
Philosophy and Social Sciences in Criminal Law Theory’ (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 358-360. 
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have followed a different trajectory, and thus, that it may be relatively autonomous from 
constitutional law in the way that it develops its own social practices and, therefore, its 
own meanings of what are its limits. How is this even possible? A positive answer to this 
question can be illustrated with an example from the UK. The fact that there is no codified 
constitution illustrates better the connection between criminal law and the constitutional 
order. Take the uncontroversial view that the limits of criminal law can be understood with 
reference to individual rights340. That is, that respecting individual rights has an important 
bearing on the legitimacy of criminal law and, therefore, in identifying some of its limits. 
From this point of view, it seems that the Human Rights Act provided criminal law with a 
new institutional ground for fixing its limits. However, it would be mistaken to believe that 
these rights became limits only from 1998, for this would imply that before the reception 
of the Act, no such rights would have been legally and judicially recognised. 
If the rights established by the Human Rights Act are those whose content is derivable in 
part from the ECHR, then the process by which they came to limit criminal law is as old as 
the UK’s subjection to the authority of the ECHR341. One should note, however, that again 
this would be clearly an understatement, for individual rights existed well before that in the 
UK. Certainly, if rights are part of the conditions that decide how subjects and the 
subjected frame their legal interactions, then rights have been part of the constitutional 
order of the UK since its inception342. This is true even if they figured only minimally – for 
instance, when recognized for certain privileged social classes - for inclusion in the 
constitutional order has undergone expansion throughout constitutional history, from 
merely a few to an increased population. However, the recognition that right-based limits 
to criminal law predate the UK joining the ECHR does not deny that they did acquire a 
different character with the reception of the Act343. This is because a new institutional fact 
                                                
340 See Malcolm Thorburn, ‘Constitutionalism and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ in Duff et al (ed.), The 
Structures of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 101. 
341 For an overview of cases, see A.T.H. Smith, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998: The Constitutional Context’ in 
Jack Beatson and Tony Smith (eds.), The Human Rights Act and the Criminal Justice and Regulatory 
Process (Hart Publishing 1999) 3, 4. In general, see Anthony Lester, ‘Human Rights and the British 
Constitution’ in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds.), The Changing Constitution (OUP 2007) 70-101. 
342 Adam Tomkins, Public Law (OUP 2003) 6-7; see, for instance, the legal history of the recognition of the 
idea of liberty in British common law, in Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution: Texts 
and Materials (CUP 2011) 744-748. 
343 On some relevant criminal law cases from the reception of the Act, see Andrew Ashworth, ‘A decade of 
human rights in criminal justice’ (2014) 5 Criminal Law Review 325. 
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entered the UK. As a consequence, new “limits” were adopted, even if not fully worked 
out, or not as strongly as many thought they would be. The Act certainly shaped the 
constitutional understanding of criminal law in the UK. 
What this example shows is that criminal law is able to formulate its own understandings 
of limits, and that it is an open question whether they may be derived implicitly from 
constitutional law. Criminal law depends on the constitutional order, yet it develops its 
own modalities and thus its limits may not necessarily follow from constitutional law. The 
example of the UK shows that rights can work as limits to criminal law, regardless of 
whether they are explicitly recognised in the constitution. That is, there can be limits to 
criminal law in terms of constitutional rights not explicitly recognised in constitutional 
law. Limiting principles may be considered part of the constitutional order, even if they 
have no explicit constitutional status. This view is not sceptical of the constitution 
providing limits; it does not suggest that making limits explicit in a catalogue of 
constitutional rights would play no role. On the contrary, they may limit criminalisation. 
Explicit constitutional provisions about rights can provide limits to legislation at the stage 
of deliberative political reasoning, and even more so if that is coupled with a strong form 
of judicial review. However, the present approach does suggest that criminal law may 
develop its own forms of limits, even if constitutional law is not explicit about it. 
4.1.2 Criminal Law and Meaning in the Constitutional Order 
The institutional relationship between criminal law and the constitutional order can be 
specified further by exploring it from the point of view of the ipse-identity and idem-
identity of the constitutional order. Drawing on Chapter 2 and 3, it is possible to assert that 
the WE requires the critical function to be non-neutral. In other words, that as SS it should 
be meaning-responsive and axiological-responsive to the social structures and meanings of 
their participants. To this extent, the critical function assists in enabling participants’ 
conceptions of the good, which they may endorse and seek to realise by choosing options 
regarded worthy by the WE. In other words, the critical function contributes to enable the 
idem-identity of the constitutional order, for those conceptions have meaning within the 
social practices of the WE. There seems to be, then, a connection between the idem-
identity and ipse-identity of the constitutional order, which can be better understood by 
examining criminal law’s contribution to meaning. 
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The framework this thesis has been employing emphasises meaning. It understands 
criminal law as engaging not with purely external displays of human behaviour, but with 
its meanings and the social practices from which they originate. At this point, it is 
necessary to broaden Lindahl’s understanding of both ipse-identity and idem-identity to 
refer not just to legal expectations, but also to meanings and social practices more 
generally, while retaining the distinction. It appears that by directing attention to idem-
identity and ipse-identity, it can be better developed the idea that defences contribute to 
values are shared by a ‘we’. At the same time, it is possible to attain a deeper grasp of the 
role of criminal law for the broader social practices on which it depends, and why this 
contribution appears to be necessary. 
From the point of view of idem-identity, by reproducing/transforming socio-cultural 
practices, criminal law enables, meaning and social structures to remain available for 
subsequent cycles. Specifically, in the way participants understand themselves in terms of 
the values they seek and the interactions they engage in. Thus, the ‘we’ that Chapter I 
referred to can be better understood as the idem-identity of the WE: the meanings that 
comprise its collective character. However, the ‘we’ can also be understood as the ipse-
identity of the WE: the collective agent in the form of a constitutional order that deliberates 
and decides over its idem-identity. The suggestion is that, in principle, because organising 
collective life is political, transforming meaning is also political, and thus it should be the 
result of the political deliberations of ipse-identity. However, from this point of view, 
crime prevents that transformation is effected through ipse-identity. In other words, when 
individuals engage in crime, they propose a transformation in social practices that 
arrogates what they are not entitled to, namely, the political transformation of meaning. 
Crime arrogates the position of the WE. Therefore, by institutionalising alternatives and 
consequences, criminal law addresses individual arrogations of the entitlement to 
transform idem-identity. 
Criminal law contributes to the political transformation of idem-identity through the WE’s 
ipse-identity, that is, as an activity that “we” do together. Criminal behaviour thus 
represents an arrogation of what lies in the WE’s legitimate sphere of action. More 
specifically, criminal behaviour involves an individual arrogating the normative power to 
legislate his own case, and therefore the form of the social practices that guide present and 
future social interactions. Thus, the place the offender arrogates is not only the role of the 
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legislator. Given that criminal law is part of the identity of the constitutional order, in 
legislating criminal law the offender occupies its place. Here, it appears that there is an 
individual occupying a space, which it seems is the very type of agency that appears to the 
state in the form of illegality and weak a-legality. From this point of view, illegality and 
weak a-legality, in the form of individual criminal behaviour, appear as an illegitimate 
arrogation and thus applying criminal law works also as a legitimate way of transforming 
meaning. It bears emphasis that criminal law is in a sense self-referential or autonomous, 
for it does not aim generally to ensure that meaning is transformed in any other case. As it 
has been seen in Chapter 1, criminal law only assures that meaning is not transformed by 
what is defined as criminal behaviour. 
On this framework it could be asked why the contribution of criminal law is necessary, for 
given its power and resources it seems obvious that after crime, the state remains powerful 
enough to continue to dictate how individuals should interact in their social practices. 
There is some truth to this view: perhaps there could be another kind of criminal law, one 
less harsh and more humane, yet it is not possible to address these concerns here. The 
present concern is working out the implications of emphasising meaning for understanding 
criminal law. Vincent Chiao has challenged similar views of criminal law that place 
emphasis on meaning, demanding they show why criminal law is necessary to that end344. 
This challenge needs to be responded to. Emphasis on meaning is warranted insofar as it is 
considered the fragility of socio-cultural life345. Its fragility is not the fragility of the 
physical world, which in one sense appears completely stable and in another sense, in 
constant atomic decay and renewal. Its fragility is not the fragility of its participants, for 
even if individuals are naturally fragile, the social world they inhabit may be far more 
resilient. The fragility of the social, accordingly, is neither the objective fragility of the 
physical world nor the subjective fragility of human beings. It is a collective or 
intersubjective fragility, and it is at this level that it can be understood why ‘something’ 
like criminal law is necessary. The next chapter explains through examples how criminal 
law counters the fragility of the social, but before that, it is necessary to get a better grasp 
of what this fragility is. 
                                                
344 Vincent Chiao, ‘A Response to Professor Kleinfeld’s Reconstructivism: the Place of Criminal Law in 
Ethical Life’ (2016) 129 Harvard Law Review 260. 
345 The present account, in any case, differs substantially from the neo-Hegelian view of Kleinfeld, see 
‘Reconstructivism: the Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life’ (2016) 129 Harvard Law Review 1485-1565. 
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It is noteworthy that the collective fragility of the social is not just the fragility exposed in 
the likelihood of a future criminal behaviour, and thus the inability to prevent all its 
occurrences. True, a criminal behaviour represents a failure in how the WE assures 
members that social practices are reproduced. Yet even in the face of criminal behaviour, 
individuals expect criminal law to express how they ought to interact in their social 
practices in the not too distant future. This is not only because punishment or sanction 
becomes likely in cases of departures from the ‘ought’, but also because individuals expect 
no change in their social practices in the way crime puts forward. In other words, they do 
not expect criminal behaviour to impose new social practices, and thus change the 
meanings that they have. Social reality has meaning, which is what criminal law addresses, 
thereby revealing that it depends on the practical attitudes of its participants. If the 
practical attitudes of participants change, if they change their attitudes, motivations, 
intentions and beliefs, then they will become different participants, and the practice and its 
meanings will change accordingly346. Thus the critical function is a matter of meaning 
because it aims to counter the possible re-articulation of social practices implicit in 
criminal conduct347. 
4.1.3 Choice, Character and Pluralism 
It is now time to examine criminal law’s encounter with weak a-legality, which requires 
giving a more detailed account of the critical function. The focus is on those meanings that 
reveal the constitutional order as institutionalising particular social practices, for they 
disclose criminal law’s encounter with a-legality. From this point of view, the claim is not 
about making explicit the fundamental values internal to the practice of criminal law, but 
                                                
346 Here I must acknowledge a fundamental philosophical influence on these thoughts, Robert Brandom, 
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Harvard University Press 1994). 
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those meanings that make explicit how the WE came about as a particular order. Surely, 
some of these values are also fundamental for understanding criminal law as a practice. It 
would appear it is no coincidence that I adopt the traditional view that modern criminal law 
has liberal foundations. Yet this is not approached in terms of an intellectual history, but by 
focusing on how historically, criminal law contributed to the social construction of persons 
as autonomous individuals. The aim is to achieve in the following a broad understanding of 
the meanings used in such social construction, in order to detail later how they play out in 
the case of cultural defence. The focus is on three meanings: individual autonomy, 
individual character and individual pluralism. Let us start with the first. 
In considering the common features of the idea of autonomy in criminal law, it appears 
that autonomy has as its object the individual person. When autonomy matters in criminal 
law, it matters for individuals, not for collectives. In other words, as it was seen, individual 
autonomy for the practice of criminal law helps define its object as a subject; namely, as an 
individual agent. One of the key components of the standard description of an individual 
agent seems to be an individual who is rational or otherwise sensitive to reasons348. This is 
clearly manifest in current criminal law practices, where the legal ascription of blame 
involves assessing individual choice349. Thus, autonomy fixes its meaning because it takes 
as its object an individual agent, that is, an individual who makes choices350. Choices made 
by an agent sensitive to reasons are taken as the paradigm of those actions that an agent 
can be made responsible for. Following Nicola Lacey, this framework for assessing human 
behaviour can be named capacity-responsibility 351 . Yet, as Lacey has stressed, its 
importance must be nuanced. True, intended individual actions have a place at the centre 
                                                
348 This seems to be the standard approach for understanding the human person in criminal law theories. See 
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of criminal law. Indeed, they may be able to explain and justify a considerable part of 
criminal law, most straightforwardly when it deals with agents’ intended actions. However, 
it is one thing to claim this centrality and quite another entirely to assert that this is the 
only focus of criminal law.  
As Lacey suggests, there are many cases in which it is difficult - if not impossible - to 
distinguish conceptually capacity-responsibility from character-responsibility; that is, the 
kind of responsibility that attaches not to intended actions, but to the individual’s 
character352. Certainly, the criminalisation of actions performed negligently and more 
generally of non-intended actions already shows criminal law’s detachment from capacity-
responsibility. Fitting non-intended actions within criminal law leads one to inquire into 
alternatives concerning what is doing the explanatory and justificatory work, and this is 
where individual character comes in. Offences of strict liability, presumptions and 
prisoners’ post-release control measures seem hardly respectful or even interested in the 
intended mental states of the offender. The same may be said concerning excuses like 
provocation, necessity, coercion, diminished responsibility, and voluntary intoxication. 
What seems more important in these cases are those character traits that may lead the 
individual to behave irresponsibly, and thus to criminal behaviour. These cases put 
individual character traits at the forefront, as impediments to the responsible exercise of 
agency. It seems then that character needs to be recognised as an equally important part of 
criminal law353. No renunciations of agency are needed, for they remain important even 
when character is at the forefront. Certainly, character traits matter because they allow for 
the singling out of individuals who are not reliable in the exercise of their agency; they are 
irresponsible agents. Criminal law’s resources in constructing the subject need to be 
expanded, for here it considers not a rational individual, but concrete individual 
                                                
352 For the many connections between character and responsibility, see Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd, 
‘Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence’ (2011) 3 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 147. 
353 It even seems possible to reconstruct all criminals in this way, that is, as considering criminal prohibitions 
grounded in the failure of adequate motivation. See Richard Brandt, ‘A Motivational Theory of Excuses in 
the Criminal Law’, Roland Pennock and John Chapman (eds.), Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII (New York 
University Press 1985) 165-198. It is worth noting that character matters also more generally, for proving 
that an individual has committed an offence, as well as during sentencing. For an examination of English 
law, see Mike Redmayne, Character in the Criminal Trial (OUP 2015).  
 
143 
dispositions, habits and motivations and how they impinge on the exercise of responsible 
agency354.  
Finally, the last meaning is tied to the history of the secular constitutional order, an order 
that defines itself as tolerant and plural. The claim here might prove controversial, but it is 
supported by good reasons and historical evidence. The claim is that when moral pluralism 
becomes a respectable value, it follows on from the history of toleration, which took 
individuals and their choices as bearers of value. When the cultural defence appears later in 
time, it does so within a context of valuable moral pluralism, thus conditioned to 
individuals making valuable choices. This was seen in Chapter 2 as conditioning the 
provision of special rights. For the liberal order, autonomous choices are not valuable per 
se, but only when they aim at valuable options. Now, historically, in terms of the 
orientation of the meanings adopted by the nascent constitutional order, which were 
inspired by Enlightenment political thought355, there is an emphatic contrast with what 
moderns sought to leave behind. As Perez Zagorin recounts, what the old order left behind 
was thought of in terms of superstition, tradition and persecution356. In contrast, the new 
order was thought of as committed to reason, freedom and tolerance357. That moderns 
sought this contrast does not mean that they succeeded in creating a social order expunged 
of religious ideas 358 . On the contrary 359 , Enlightenment ideas developed from the 
                                                
354  On the importance of character for the history of England’s criminal law, see Martin Wiener, 
Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, law, and policy in England, 1830-1914 (CUP 1990) Chapter 2. For the 
revival of character in the UK, see Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interest, and 
Institutions (OUP 2016) Chapter 3. For the revival of character theories in US criminal law theory, see 
Thomas Andrew Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in American Legal Thought (CUP 2014) 427-
434.  
355 To be sure, at least the part of it associated with that historical period, for as historians show, there were 
several Enlightenments, and thus, many different schools of political thought associated with that period; see 
James Schmidt, ‘What Enlightenment Project?’ (2000) 28 Political Theory 734; James Schmidt, 
‘Misunderstanding the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’: Venturi, Habermas, and Foucault’ (2011) 37 
History of European Ideas 43: James Schmidt, ‘Enlightenment as Concept and Context’ (2014) 75 Journal of 
the History of Ideas 677. 
356 Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton University Press 2003) 
290-292. 
357 Pluralism and religious tolerance was thought of as consistent with and following on from the idea of the 
autonomous person. See Peter Gay, Enlightenment: An Interpretation, Volume II: The Science of Freedom 
(Alfred Knopf 1969) 399. 
358 On the contrary, Enlightenment ideas developed from foundations laid down by religious scholars; see 
Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume I and II (CUP 1978); also Stephen 
Tierney, Religion, Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650 (CUP 1982). 
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foundations laid down by religious scholars, thus political and constitutional thought about 
freedom and agency was also deeply shaped by religious thought. Now, this contrast must 
be understood not only in terms of a change of meaning, but also in terms of a change in 
social practices that took place at that time. The fundamental change here consists in the 
separation of the church from the state, more precisely, the separation of religion from the 
state. Surely, historically religious tolerance facilitated the growth of religious pluralism, 
and thus created a suitable context for the growth of secular pluralism when religion 
receded and secularism took its place. In other words, it is possible to consider that the 
origins of modern secular pluralism were located in the social practice of religious 
toleration360.  
Historically, practices of religious toleration 361  strengthened pre-existing religious 
pluralism, facilitating the emergence of modern political and value pluralism. It should be 
noted that tolerance did not precisely foster diversity, but rather paved the way for enabling 
a context favourable to its growth. Let us briefly review some historical evidence from 
England, which was at the forefront of these matters in Europe. By now, it should not be 
surprising to observe that criminal law was related to this process; changes in criminal law 
corresponded to changes in the form of the constitutional order and vice versa. Certainly, it 
is widely recognized that a key factor in the expansion of toleration practices was the 
enactment of the “Toleration Act” in 1689. The Act contributed to decriminalising 
religious pluralism362, in the sense that it removed criminal law by exempting Protestant 
                                                                                                                                              
359 Actually the relationship might be closer. For an argument that secularism was an outcome of Christian 
political thought, see Marcel Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion 
(Princeton University Press 1997). Concerning secularisation, for an argument that this process was built and 
transformed from the rubber of Christianity, see Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (MIT 
Press 1985) and Michael Allen Gillespie, Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago University Press 2008). 
For the distinction between secularism and secularisation, see Bryan Turner, Religion and Modern Society: 
Citizenship, Secularisation and the State (CUP 2011) Chapter 7. Also see below (n 376). 
360 Zagorin, How the Idea (n 356) 7. 
361 One should note that religious practices of toleration were already present during the early European 
Middle Ages. That is, religious toleration drew on pre-existing social practices, see John Laursen and Gary 
Nederman (eds.), Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 1998) Part I.  
362 Non-compliance was threatened with imprisonment. The Act de-criminalised ‘recusancy’, that is, not 
attending to religious service or failing to conduct the service according to the Anglican religious tradition. 
Previous to this Act, the Act of Uniformity (1559) sanctioned the infringement of those duties with fines and 
imprisonment. The Toleration Act, of course, neither decriminalised all related criminal law nor all religious 
or non-religious doctrines. Certainly, not all doctrines benefited from the Act; for example, Catholics and 
atheists were not exempted from fulfilling those rites. However, the Act marks a process of institutionalising 
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non-conformists from compliance with certain religious rituals of the Church of 
England363. Whilst the Act did not foster cultural diversity directly, more moderated 
institutional religious persecution had important implications for social practices364. This 
seems to confirm the methodological principle of social holism, for given that there is a 
two-way feedback relation between criminal law and broader social practices, either 
transformation or reproduction are to be expected. In this case, this led to unanticipated 
social and cultural transformation. 
Fundamentally, decriminalisation contributed to transform fulfilling religious duties in an 
individual choice365, and thus aided, in the long run, the formation of a context for the 
toleration of practices based on individual choice. True, the Act did not thoroughly 
embrace either the ideal of tolerance or cultural diversity366. Nonetheless, the Act was in 
step with important changes in Europe, as well as in England: the Act itself contributed to 
separating state and religion by fragmenting and pluralising religious power367; the 
                                                                                                                                              
the separation of religion from the state, which seemed even to change how English Catholics were later 
perceived. According to some historians, following the Glorious Revolution Catholicism was no longer 
persecuted, but treated with a form of ‘qualified intolerance’; see Geoff Baker, ‘Northern Catholics and the 
Manchester Jacobite Trials of 1694: a ‘Refined Piece of Villainy’? (2013) 50 Northern History 257-271. 
363 It must be noted that the Act lacked an underlining purpose to establish civic equality between religions, 
see Justin Champion, ‘Toleration and Citizenship in Enlightenment England: John Toland and the 
Naturalization of the Jews, 1714-1753’ in Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (eds.), Toleration in Enlightenment 
Europe (CUP 2000) 133-156. Certainly, as it is well known this Act was more a matter of political conflict 
and strategy than an intended change to realize toleration, see Richard Ashcraft, ‘Latitudinarianism and 
Toleration: Historical Myth Versus Political History’ in Richard Kroll et al (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and 
Religion in England, 1640-1700 (CUP 1992) 151-177. 
364 The same might be possible to find in Scottish culture around the same years, especially after the failed 
Jacobite rebellion, which rendered important parts of Scottish culture forbidden. Interesting is to note that the 
British Empire considered highlanders “savages”, and treated rebellious Scotts the same as the Spanish 
empire did with the indigenous population in America, and later the nascent South-American independent 
states, see Neil Davidson, The Origins of Scottish Nationhood (Pluto Press 2000) Chapter 8; Colin Calloway, 
White People, Indians, and Highlanders: Tribal Peoples and Colonial Encounters in Scotland and America 
(OUP 2008). For the Chilean case Jose Bengoa, Historia del Pueblo Mapuche: Siglo 19 y 20 (Ediciones Sur 
1996). 
365 Benjamin Kaplan, Divided By Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern 
Europe (Harvard University Press 2007) 348-349. 
366 Notice that while in England before the Education Act (1944) the Catholic Church could not set up 
schools, in the millet system of the Ottoman empire no such impediment existed, see Nasar Meer and Tariq 
Modood, ‘Religious pluralism in the United States and Britain: Its implications for Muslims and nationhood’ 
(2015) 62 Social Compass 530, also John Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England 1558-
1689 (Routledge 2013) 11-12. For a discussion of the millet system and its difficulties, see Will Kymlicka, 
‘Two models of pluralism and tolerance’ (1992) 15 Analyse & Kritik 36. 
367 For the argument that diversity empowered a conception of a civil state, see Kirstie McClure, ‘Difference, 
Diversity, and the Limits of Toleration’ (1990) 18 Political Theory 361-391; for the argument that religious 
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consolidation of the state-form368 that replaced pre-modern administrative institutions369; 
changes in demography, particularly in urban centres; and market expansion, to the 
detriment of the household economy370. This signals once again the importance of markets, 
now for the rise of tolerance. Indeed, not only is there historical evidence of this 
connection371, but also experimental evidence that suggests the mutual reinforcement 
between increased tolerance and market expansion372. That is, market expansion and trade 
facilitated and reinforced practices of toleration, which in turn facilitated and stabilised 
markets and trade.  
Changes also appear in the meaning of legitimation, from kings claiming divine rights to 
elite assent, and later, to relatively popular assent. Following Charles Taylor, these 
changing social contexts and the rise of practices of toleration may be interpreted as a 
process in which religion loses its prominent institutional place within the state. As a 
consequence, the progressive retreat of religion from public life correlates with the further 
growth of different ways of life373, pluralism and diversity374. As tolerance increases and 
markets separate from religion, the state starts turning towards a more secular outlook. It 
follows that what is of interest here is less secularism as a political doctrine375, and more 
                                                                                                                                              
toleration threatened the power of the Church because it pluralized acceptable religious belief, see David 
Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (OUP 2007) 76-77. 
368 Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (Sage 1984) 9-10. 
369 Note that the industrial revolution is standardly dated as beginning in 1760, shortly after the rise of 
toleration practices, Gregory Clark, A Farewell To Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World (Princeton 
University Press 2007) 198. 
370 See Alan MacFarlane, The Origins of English Individualism (CUP 1978). 
371 See Henry Kamen, The Rise of Toleration (World University Library 1967). 
372 Empirical research shows positive correlations between economic growth and increased toleration, see 
Niclas Berggren and Therese Nilsson, ‘Tolerance in the United States: Does economic freedom transform 
racial, religious, political and sexual attitudes?’ (2016) 45 European Journal of Political Economy 53. 
Furthermore, some have argued that such a correlation can hold only if markets are not neutral towards 
preferences. Yet, what seems to follow from the non-neutrality of the constitutional order is that markets 
cannot be neutral neither, see Iain Hampsher-Monk, ‘The Market for Toleration: A Case Study in an Aspect 
of the Ambiguity of Positive Economics’ (1991) 21 British Journal of Political Science 42. For the meaning 
of market neutrality, see A. T. O’Donnell, ‘The neutrality of the market’ in Robert Goodin and Andrew 
Reeve (eds.), Liberal Neutrality (Routledge 1989) 39-60. 
373 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press 2007) 2-3. 
374 This is the standard position of those who describe modernity as a process of social differentiation, among 
them Durkheim, Parsons, Taylor, Habermas and Luhmann. 
375 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford University Press 2003) 1-
3. 
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secularisation as a form of institutional change376, as a progression towards expanded 
markets and economic growth inspired by Enlightenment ideals377. It bears emphasis that 
the process from which tolerance and pluralism emerge is framed in terms of individuals 
making valuable choices, and this is important to bear in mind, for a key contribution to 
modern pluralism was the individualising effect of religious pluralism. Other social and 
cultural processes, of course, strengthened this process, as has been seen. However, the 
point remains that as religion loses its place, secular forms of pluralism expand, without 
changing this framing on individual choice. 
In modern times, pluralism has a prominent role in the self-description of states, at least 
during the second half of the 20th century. Now, the scope of participants in the 
constitutional order has been greatly expanded, which suggests that those who could have 
a voice started to shape the political public sphere and, accordingly, managed to 
accomplish diverse forms of legal recognition. Pluralism has now become legalised as part 
of the modern institutional order. This commitment to pluralism brings the promise of 
enhanced freedom, the freedom to choose the kind of life the individual wants378. 
However, at the same time this freedom seems to be severely limited through criminal law 
because only some options are considered valuable. Examining cultural defences premised 
on the history of modern pluralism, it is possible to identify with sufficient clarity that 
what are defined as valuable options establish limits to what can be the object of such a 
defence. In what follows, cultural defences are examined mainly through cases from the 
common law world. 
                                                
376  Thus, this specific conception of secularisation is immune to some of the current critiques of 
secularisation theory, which hinge on the decline in religious believers; Paul Heelas, ‘Challenging 
Secularization Theory:  the Growth of “New Age” Spiritualities of Life’ (2006) 18 The Hedgehog Review 46. 
For an overview of secularization and its critics, see Jose Casanova, ‘Rethinking Secularization: A Global 
Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 18 The Hedgehog Review 7. 
377 On this understanding of the Enlightenment, see Joel Mokyr, ‘The European Enlightenment and the 
Origins of Modern Economic Growth’ in Jeff Horn et al (eds.), Reconceptualizing the Industrial Revolution 
(MIT Press 2010) 65-86. 
378 This kind of pluralism is, of course, compatible with the fact of increasingly standardised ways of life. See 
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage 1992) 132. 
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4.2. Criminal Law and Weak A-Legality 
4.2.1 Cultural Defence 
Most western modern states have become more or less committed to respecting diverse 
ways of life and thus can be described more or less as pluralist. In some cases, this has 
become not only the dominant self-understanding for majorities, but also for minorities as 
well. In multicultural societies, like Canada, UK and USA among others, states promise to 
accommodate the claims of minorities and recognise the value of cultural diversity, even 
when the opposite is happening within criminal law. The accommodation of minorities’ 
claims to recognition seems to be accepted in broad terms, whilst rejected particularly 
when this may involve justifying harm to others’ property, bodies or interests. This, 
however, is not strictly true, as it was seen: criminal law’s responsiveness to diversity has 
been shaped by and has shaped the development of the history of secularisation and the 
pluralisation of acceptable ways of life, processes that framed acceptable worldviews in 
terms of individuals choosing valuable options. Chapters 1 and 2, identified some 
responsiveness in the WE’s commitment to the principle of retribution and to respect for 
autonomous, valuable choices.  
Within this framework, criminal law engages with weak a-legality, and it appears, 
preliminarily, that criminal law seeks to integrate weak a-legality. Criminal law entails 
integration in the sense that it makes weak a-legality part of an axiological-responsive and 
meaning-responsive practice of which citizens are already part. Structuring individual 
choice in terms of institutional alternatives and consequences involves treating the weak a-
legal as individually accountable for what he has done379. Weak a-legality demands a 
redrawing of boundaries that criminal law cannot provide; the critical function seems 
inflexible. However, the claim to redrawing resonates with the history of secularisation 
embedded in some parts of the institutional framework of the constitutional order and its 
criminal law. Accordingly, the demands of weak a-legality can be translated as a demand 
for relaxing criminal law insofar as it claims for recognition of cultural diversity, a modern 
instance of the value of pluralism. This makes sense in that the response of the critical 
function tends to be reduced in practice, when it targets the weak a-legal. Reduction is not, 
                                                
379 Christopher Kutz, ‘Responsibility’ in Jules Coleman et al (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 557. 
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however, immediate or automatic. There are three ways in which criminal law assesses 
weak a-legal behaviour in order to determine the possibility of reduction. To this extent, 
the approach introduces a note of scepticism regarding the potential of cultural defences. A 
number of scholars have claimed that CD is the main expression of pluralism and the 
recognition of cultural diversity in criminal law, and that it should be extended far beyond 
its actual reach. Such hopes will be contested. In particular, it is argued that expectations of 
accommodation through CD should be diminished, once it is examined the three ways in 
which the reduction of punishment is achieved. 
First of all, a clarification of terminology is in order: what is a CD? A CD is a defence that 
an accused presents in a criminal trial and which aims to obtain a reduction of punishment. 
Dundes Renteln is without doubt the one who has most thoroughly investigated this topic, 
so her work is taken as representing the field. Renteln starts by defining culture as a system 
of meaning that allows people to adapt to their environment and to communicate with each 
other380. She criticises the post-modern conception of culture, according to which culture is 
nothing more than relations of power that marginalise women381. Renteln holds, on the 
contrary, that empirical research shows that culture is not necessarily detrimental to 
women. More importantly, for Renteln, post-modernists understand culture as being too 
malleable and this leads them to overlook how culture influences human cognition382. 
Culture influences cognition by acting as a motivational force that explains and propels 
human action383. Culture enters the human mind through processes of socialisation, which 
                                                
380 Alison Dundes Renteln, The Cultural Defense (OUP 2004) 10. 
381 Renteln, The Cultural Defense (n 380) 11. See more on this conception in Chapter 1. 
382 ibid 11. 
383 Renteln, The Cultural Defense (n 380) 14; Harvard Note, ‘The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law’ 
(1986) 99 Harvard Law Review 1310; John Lyman, ‘Cultural Defense, Viable Doctrine or Wishful 
Thinking’ (1986) 9 Criminal Justice Journal 115; Malek-Mithra Sheybani, ‘Cultural Defense: One Person's 
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UCLA Asian Pacific American Law Journal 51; Diana Chiu Diana, ‘Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, 
Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, Multiculturalism’ (1994) 82 California Law Review 1100-1103; Sharon 
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Jeroean Van Broeck, ‘Cultural Defense and Culturally Motivated Crimes (Cultural Offences)’ (2001) 9 
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‘Delimiting the cultural defense’ (2007) 26 Quinnipiac Law Review 124; Gordon R Woodman, ‘The Culture 
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Dundes Renteln (eds.), Multicultural Jurisprudence: Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense 
(Hart Publishing 2009) 18; Emmanuel Ceva, ‘Toleration, Respect, and Cultural Defence’ in Gideon Calder 
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Renteln calls enculturation. This is the process by which values and norms shape the 
individual’s mind and behaviour, instilling predispositions to act384. These culturally-
shaped predispositions explain individual’s behaviour 385 . One should note that 
enculturation is not assimilation. Assimilation occurs when the “whole culture” is taken as 
guidance for action. Instead, enculturation is consistent with different cultural sources, thus 
allowing individuals to internalise the culture of the host country while preserving the 
culture into which the individual was previously socialised386. Thus, even if enculturated in 
culture A, the individual might maintain the customs387 of culture B.  
Criminal law, argues Renteln, cannot ignore these culturally-shaped predispositions to act: 
taking them into account is a matter of justice. The concern is whether it is just to demand 
that an individual X change his behaviour to fit the content of the host country’s culture388. 
Majorities do not face that demand389 and it would be unjust to require it only from 
minorities. What underlies the argument is that disregarding the particularity of cultural 
backgrounds would be a breach of equality390, leading to unjustified discrimination391. Yet 
not only non-discrimination and equality serve as grounds for CD. There are at least two 
                                                                                                                                              
and Magali Bessone and Federico Zuolo (eds.), How Groups Matter: Challenges of Toleration in Pluralistic 
Societies (Routledge 2014) 153-155. 
384 Renteln, The Cultural Defense (n 380) 12. 
385 ibid 14. 
386 ibid 13. This is supported by studies which show that in USA, where Renteln bases her study, ethnicity 
and religion have become individual options. Options about ethnicity need not be an either/or situation, for 
individuals can adopt many different simultaneous identities; see Mary Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing 
Identities in America (California University Press 1990). 
387 Renteln, The Cultural Defense (n 380) 14. 
388 ibid 17. 
389 ibid 18. 
390 Equality can be used both to argue in favour of CD, as realising equality, or against CD, as a breach of the 
principle of equality before the law. For rejecting CD on the grounds of equality, see Valerie Sacks, 
‘“Indefensible Defense” Misuse of Culture in Criminal Law’ (1996) 13 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 542-545; Chiu, ‘Cultural Defense’ (n 383) 1121; Julia Sams, ‘The Availability of the 
Cultural Defense as an Excuse for Criminal Behavior’ 16 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 350-351; Doriane Coleman, ‘Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma’ 
(1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 1152; for accepting CD on the ground of equality, see Harvard Note, ‘The 
Cultural Defense’ (n 383) 1300; Lam, ‘Culture as a Defense’ (n 383) 52; on defending CD based on equality, 
yet limited by an anti-subordination principle, see Leti Volpp, ‘Mis-Identifying Culture: Asian Women and 
the cultural defense’ (1994) 17 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 97-98; James Sing, ‘Culture as Sameness: 
Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal Law’ (1999) 108 The Yale Law Journal 
1878; Donovan and Garth, ‘Delimiting the cultural defense’ (n 383) 123.  
391 Renteln, The Cultural Defense (n 380) 187. 
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other grounds: reduced culpability, for individual X did not know that doing A was 
unlawful392, and the right to culture393. These grounds support CD’s basic aim: to reduce 
punishment. Renteln’s proposal of CD works as a partial excuse394, for while punishment 
is considered appropriate it should also be proportional to the individual’s culpability395. 
Let us see how this applies by using a particular example. 
The focus is the US case, People v. Kimura (1985), one of the classics examples of CD. 
The defendant, Fumiko Kimura, a Japanese American who lived in California for several 
years396, was charged with the murder of her two children. When Kimura found out that 
her husband had been unfaithful to her, she committed oyako-shinju, parent-child suicide, 
by drowning herself and her children in the sea. The children died while she survived. It 
was argued that Kimura’s actions were based on a different worldview; some of the six 
psychiatrists who examined her testified in court that Kimura was temporarily insane, 
arguing that she failed to distinguish between her own life and the lives of her children. 
Initially, Kimura faced a death-sentence, however, she was sentenced to one year in jail, 
five years of probation and “psychiatric counselling”397. For commentators, this could only 
be explained by the cultural evidence the defence provided for the defence of insanity398, 
stressing the distinctive cultural background of the offender. Having a different cultural 
background seemed to the court sufficient to regard the offender as not sufficiently 
culpable to deserve full punishment.  
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The aim in the following is to identify in CD three ways in which criminal law assesses 
weak a-legal behaviour, in order to determine whether punishment can be reduced. First, 
by relating agency and social determinism, it is observed how freedom and culture are used 
to construct a notion of choice that wavers between portraying the individual as either 
rational and fully blameable or irrational and non-blameable. Second, by relating character 
and excuse, it is observed how criminal law reduces the WE’s response when the agent is 
seen as a reasonable person. Third, by relating pluralism and the exclusion of groups it is 
observed first, that insufficient integration may lead to the reduction of punishment, and 
second, the limits of pluralism recognised by criminal law. 
4.2.2 Agency and Social Determinism 
In the CD literature, there are two incompatible perspectives on human agency that follow 
from two incompatible accounts of culture. These accounts of culture have been examined 
in Chapter 1, though here the focus is on their implications for understanding human 
agency. The first perspective, while considering that cultures are systems of meaning, 
emphasises their capacity for motivating and explaining human action 399 . This 
motivational force turns upon describing cultures as coherent, non-contested and 
homogeneous systems of meaning. William Torry develops one of the most sophisticated 
accounts of this kind, providing at the same time an empirical foundation for CD. Torry 
claims that because cultural backgrounds determine the conduct of individuals, they should 
not be held completely criminally responsible400. He explains this form of cultural 
determination through what he calls “cultural compulsion”. Torry holds that there are 
cultural imperatives that command certain actions to take place. These cultural imperatives 
are driven by the causal force of cultural backgrounds, which have the effect of culturally 
compelling action. According to Torry, cases of cultural compulsion emerge from 
processes of social identification and group-belonging401. Individuals belong to groups, 
identify with them, and as a consequence are compelled to act in certain ways. Kimura is 
                                                
399 Broeck, ‘Cultural Defense’ (n 383) 8; Renteln, The Cultural Defense (n 380) 11-12; Kay Levine, 
‘Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Culture: A Sociolegal Perspective on Cultural Defense Strategies’ 
(2003) 28 Law and Social Inquiry 43; Woodman, ‘The Culture Defence’ (n 383) 11. 
400 There are other, more extreme versions of this claim: some consider that individuals are not free because 
their actions are genetically determined; see Nela Gordon, ‘The Implications of memetics for the cultural 
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Japanese, identifies as Japanese, and is compelled to act as a Japanese. Torry claims that 
his theory remains true even if the command is not equally obligatory for all, or if 
members are not all equally susceptible to them402. Criminal punishment, he argues, 
requires that individuals are free403, yet cultural compulsion proves otherwise and therefore 
renders those actions less deserving of punishment. 
It bears emphasis that the theory of cultural compulsion cannot be true if cultures are taken 
to be incoherent, contested404 and heterogeneous, as post-modernist scholars portray them. 
Culture cannot be a causal force in the explanation of behaviour if it refers to a loose and 
inconsistent aggregation of social norms. First, it would not be possible to explain 
someone’s actions if culture is incoherent, for this would make it impossible to identify 
which cultural norms are doing the causal work. Second, if culture is contested at every 
step of the process of identification, then this would problematise explanations of how 
socialisation processes enculturate. Third, if culture is heterogeneous, then there would be 
no particular reason to believe that Kimura was motivated to act the way she did. No 
doubt, if Japanese culture is incoherent, contested and heterogeneous, a cultural 
compulsion would be hardly ascertainable. For Torry, and anyone who holds that culture 
provides causal motivations, such as Renteln, culture is regarded as relatively coherent, 
non-contested and homogeneous. 
Nonetheless, Torry’s use of the qualifier ‘relatively’ seems questionable, for in developing 
a causal explanation of action, he slides towards a view that requires cultures be ‘totally’-  
not relatively - coherent, non-contested and homogeneous. If one accepts that cultures may 
be described in such a way, one implication of Torry’s view, which he himself tries to 
avoid, is that if there are causal mechanisms at play, then it is not that there is little room 
for freedom, but no freedom at all. In effect, if there are psychological laws that govern 
human actions, then social determinism would be true if mechanisms of social 
identification are true405, and thus members of minorities could not be made responsible406. 
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Accordingly, if members of minorities cannot be held responsible, then criminal law has 
no object. Thus, an objectifying attitude407 is appropriate, and if so, the appropriate legal 
response would be education, medical treatment or permanent confinement. Torry claims, 
however, that his view is not socially deterministic, for he claims culture determines 
human action only probabilistically. It is not clear whether this would make the response 
non-objectifying408. Nonetheless, if true, this would be grounded on an indeterminist view 
of agency that is, at least, equally as implausible as social determinism. The problem seems 
to be that whilst Torry aims to develop an empirical-based view of agency, the grounds he 
offers are fundamentally metaphysical. More importantly, metaphysical and empirical 
questions, while important, seem inadequate to address the practical question concerning 
the meaning of human social practices of ascribing responsibility and holding agents to 
account409. 
Perhaps what is wrong with this view is Torry’s conception of culture. Post-modernist 
thinkers on culture have appropriately contested this view, as it was seen in Chapter 1. 
According to the post-modern conception, culture is not a coherent, non-contested and 
homogeneous system of meaning410. Cultures cannot be essentialised411, for this would 
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involve accepting an unjust distribution of power that renders women vulnerable412. The 
post-modern conception can reject social determinism413, because by taking cultures to be 
non-coherent, contested and heterogeneous systems of meaning, they remove the grounds 
for the causal argument to work. Additionally, they also reject the relativism that 
accompanies social determinism 414 . Certainly, if individuals are to be considered 
irresponsible because of their cultural compulsions, this means that their subjective beliefs 
about right and wrong can be imposed upon the WE415. Yet, if individuals are responsible 
for what they believe and choose accordingly, then they can be made responsible, and then 
relativism falls apart. 
Now, understood as an account that supports a certain view of agency, the post-modern 
conception is also problematic in that it runs too close to Torry’s determinism. Certainly, 
in rejecting social determinism, the post-modern conception takes agents to be free 
because culture is non-coherent, contested and heterogeneous. That is, it is a non-coherent, 
contested and heterogeneous culture which holds a space for the exercise of individual 
agency416. The post-modern conception of culture aims at preserving the idea that culture 
influences behaviour, while retaining room for responsible agency. On the one hand, they 
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need the idea of influence, for otherwise they would not be able to make sense of the need 
to change unjust relations of power embedded in traditional cultures. For if cultures do not 
influence behaviour, then there is no reason to change them. On the other hand, they need 
to retain a strong sense of agency to reject social determinism. If it were true that 
individuals are not responsible given their cultural upbringings, then neither changing 
relations of power without resort to coercion nor the exercise of responsible agency would 
be possible.  
Post-modern conceptions of culture lead one to divide those who come from free cultures 
and those who do not. Had Kimura adopted the way of life of Californians, she would not 
have been able to afford a CD. Nor is it the case that any culture does the job. Kimura 
adopted a coherent, non-contested and homogeneous culture, as it seems was the case, and 
thus she was not regarded as a fully-responsible agent417. The western world to which 
immigrants arrive is a culture described as non-coherent, contested and heterogeneous and 
by virtue of being such, the responsible exercise of agency becomes possible. This 
argument runs on the idea that western culture provides individuals with options418, so that 
individuals can be made responsible for their choices. Post-modern culture is not only 
more appealing, but necessary for agency. Conversely, cultures that provide fewer options 
increase deterministic fears. Once immigrants adopt western culture, which is presumed to 
occur once considerable time has passed, they become free agents. In the meantime, 
individuals such as Kimura cannot be regarded as full agents; hence she should not have 
been convicted.  
Both structuralist and post-modern theories of culture agree that when certain descriptions 
of culture obtain, individuals are completely socially and culturally-determined. It thus 
seems they are holding onto the same mistaken assumption, for both, structuralist and post-
modernist, socio-cultural practices are external. They play a role only in ascertaining under 
what conditions an action could be free, regardless of the participant’s understanding. For 
the determinist, culture is a context which causally motivates individuals to act because 
options are not available from the start, whereas for the post-modernist, culture is a context 
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that makes actions indeterminate, because there are no causal pathways linking individual 
actions to the social context. It appears that both theories regard socio-cultural practices as 
either facilitating or constraining. Neither side acknowledges them as enabling. The post-
modernist ends up agreeing with Torry that if Kimura comes from a non-post-modern 
culture, she should be considered compelled. Thus, it seems that criminal law is not really 
as pluralistic as it is portrayed, for both approaches, by failing to consider culture as 
enabling, fail to describe CD as a practice internal to a WE.  
There is a consequence both approaches must pay: they make the court’s ruling a mystery. 
Certainly, both why Kimura was not sentenced to death and, conversely, why she was not 
absolved become unexplainable. For if she was blameworthy because she belonged to a 
culture that provided a reasonable range of options, then she should have been sentenced to 
death. If she did not, then she should not have been convicted. The judge is in no position 
to explain either alternative, regardless of whether he adopts the post-modernist or the 
structuralist approach, for neither of them can clarify the reasons that support the middle 
position, of reduced punishment. Granted, there was an interest in punishing Kimura based 
on the need to reproduce/transform meaning for subsequent cycles, but absent a sound 
internal justification, the court failed to communicate to participants persuasive reasons 
and offer proper guidance. Needless to say, it also failed to address Kimura as an agent. 
The next section addresses what might have explained the ruling at the level of excuses.  
4.2.3 Character and Excuse 
On one count, researchers of CD seem to be in agreement: they all seem to agree that 
culture plays a motivational role in explaining individual action. Because of this, 
adequately explaining culture becomes important for criminal law. As it has been 
examined in the previous section, one basic assumption for criminal responsibility is the 
availability of valuable options; that is, options that could have been chosen by a free 
person. Accordingly, any factor that diminishes one’s rational capacities for deliberating 
over and choosing options diminishes the degree of liberty with which they are taken. 
Motivation is one of those factors and, as such, conditions blameworthiness419. Formulated 
in this way, this is a cause-based account of motives: motives are causally relevant for 
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criminal responsibility, especially for excuses420. Certainly, provocation, duress, necessity, 
coercion, diminished responsibility, insanity, automatism and voluntary intoxication all 
involve some form of mental impairment which impacts choosing valuable options. Yet, 
because the focus is no longer the agent, fully considered as an agent responsive to 
reasons, it is necessary to turn to another ground on which to justify responsibility: 
character. 
One may consider that the cause-based accounts of motivations are defective, for 
individuals are not just passive recipients of their environment, but also have capacities of 
their own and can act based on reasons. Culture is not a causal force, but more generally a 
normative force 421 which includes not only causes, but also reasons as figuring in 
individual’s practical reasoning. Reasons involve not just dispositions, but also the set of 
normative considerations, moral or legal, that justify individual actions422. Because the 
individual is sensitive to these normative considerations, he can choose which reasons to 
act on, and as a consequence be seen as responsible for this choice. From this point of 
view, culture is not a mere fact with causal properties. Culture involves an evaluative 
judgement about the values the agent should conform to. Scholars claim that excused 
actions are excused not because they follow causally from a set of cultural facts; rather, 
excuses are justified in that the culture in question evaluates the action as permissible or 
even obligatory423. 
This leads to reason-based accounts of excuses. Reasons-based accounts of motivation 
appeal to idealised conditions concerning how Kimura would have acted, if she had been 
motivated by the appropriate set of reasons. Its focus is on the kinds of constraints that 
prevent an agent from engaging in normal, practical reasoning424. The cause-based account 
sees Kimura not as choosing to follow her culture, but as causally motivated by her 
traditions. In contrast, on the reasons-based account of motivation, Kimura judges her own 
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culture, evaluates it and concludes with an “ought”425: she ought to commit oyako-shinju. 
This account fits with the preconditions taken as necessary for holding someone 
accountable. Certainly, it appears that what matters is not whether the conduct was 
causally compelled or not, but that the person was not sensitive to the reasons underlying a 
criminal prohibition. Kimura’s choice and the values it upholds are the problem, not her 
motivation per se426. Let us consider an example with other excuses, for the point applies 
more generally. 
Take provocation, a doctrine that in common law jurisdictions allows lessening 
punishment for intentional killings. Whilst the grounds for identifying its rationale differ, 
one standard requirement is to have acted under the description of a reasonable person427. 
The requirement means that not any event would justify a loss of self-control or 
interference with practical reason so as to ground the defence, but only those which would 
move a reasonable person to act in the way the offender did. Thus, whilst a nazi person 
with nazi dispositions would not be considered reasonable if his motivation were explained 
in nazi doctrine, it is generally accepted in the western world that provocation can be 
grounded on the husband’s knowledge that his wife is being unfaithful to him, for it is 
deemed reasonable for a man to have such a reaction. This shows that underlying this 
defence, there is more than a mechanistic examination of the capacity to act. There is also 
an evaluative judgement, according to which only a subset of cases of loss of self-control 
would be acceptable for the defence. And here enters character, for what defines a person 
as having a good character is what allows for the identification of what is reasonable, for it 
seems that a person of good character would be a reasonable person. 
It is standard for character to be taken not as a transient response to changes in the 
environment, but some form of lasting disposition which arises in response to some states 
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of affairs428. Yet, criminal law seems uninterested in enquiring comprehensively into the 
individual’s life in order to identify those who have good and bad characters. Certainly, it 
seems it would not matter even if it was possible to prove that X’s character cannot explain 
why he did A, or that X has a good character. In this sense, it does not matter whether 
doing A was due to X’s enduring dispositions or if it was just a fleeting emotional 
response. Character operates more as a locus for the values the WE cares about than a 
permission for the state to enquire into X’s character. A person’s particular character 
matters less than the general norms of conduct which describe a person of good character. 
In other words, character is a model for what could be appropriate choice, and thus a 
connection emerges between excuses and substantive conceptions of the good; a 
connection that most criminal law scholars seem to accept. True, this connection is clearer 
on conceptions that implicitly reject the neutrality of criminal law429. Within other more 
liberal frameworks, such as the work of Michael Moore, to the extent they define 
provocation as a failure of practical reasoning, how criminal law evaluates the offender 
according to a model of character is rendered invisible. Yet, to the extent Moore accepts 
character as part of criminal law430, he recognises that criminal law singles out aspects of 
persons not fully explainable in terms of a failure of practical reason, and thus he should 
further recognise that relying on character connects criminal law and the good life.  
Excuses aim to realise particular values that depend on substantive conceptions of the 
good, and this becomes the frame for assessing weak a-legality, casting a different light on 
what happens with immigrant minorities in claiming CD. When criminal law addresses 
citizens, it does not require an overall change in their motivations, for they are taken to 
have the corresponding motivations for civil life. Certainly, shared social practices are the 
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ground for such a demand, for they have supposedly shaped citizens’ motivations and 
characters. Yet, when addressing minorities criminal law demands not only conformity 
with legal prescriptions, but also with the social practices that citizens take for granted. 
Thus, criminal law demands of immigrants what it does not demand from the majority. An 
agent, as part of the political community, has a good character because he has dispositions 
to act in the ways permitted by the constitutional WE, or has endorsed the WE’s values and 
acts on those as reasons. This agent would have never countenanced oyako-shinju, and if 
he had, he would have been sentenced - in the USA - to death. In other words, the norms of 
good character are connected with the political and cultural background that shapes 
predispositions and offers reasons for action. Thus, criminal law demands that Kimura not 
just change her behaviour, but further, she must change her conception of the good by 
taking up a role as a participant in the social practices of the WE of which she is now part. 
Once a participant, the WE would expect Kimura to endorse new values and beliefs, those 
not to be found in the cultural background that explained her motivation. Moreover, the 
WE would expect Kimura to adopt the moral norms that underlie good character, and thus, 
to become a reasonable person. 
In sum, character depends on the forms of sociality that arise in a particular political 
community. Kimura’s reasons and dispositions to act would have been different, had she 
endorsed different values. If she had, she would have acted differently: she would have 
conformed to the law of the political community. It is worth remarking here upon how 
criminal law constructs agency. The premise is that Kimura’s agency expresses values not 
upheld by the constitutional WE. Yet, if she were not treated as an agent, if there were no 
freedom in Kimura’s decision to act, she would have been considered culturally 
determined, and thus completely excused. Instead, modern criminal law treated Kimura as 
a meaningful agent rejecting determinism, yet did not fully discard the mechanistic view, 
for she was not regarded fully sane; actually, she was obliged to undergo psychiatric 
counselling. In the same way as provocation, by punishing Kimura she is made 
individually responsible for her actions, and thus asked to change the motivations she had 
for doing what she did. She is asked to join the WE, and thus to endorse the WE’s 
practices and values: to become assimilated into the WE. In other words, she is asked to 
become a reasonable person, a participant that seeks the good inside her new WE. 
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4.2.4 The Impossibility of Radical Pluralism  
Defenders of CD view criminal law as open to accepting wider considerations of values 
and ways of life as standards that bear on judgements of responsibility431, concluding that 
criminal law has been pluralised. Indeed, some scholars consider that CD can expand 
indefinitely, thus dissolving the critical function. They ascribe to the WE an unlimited 
capacity to recognise cultural diversity. However, scholars seem to overlook that the 
concept of person has not been redefined; individual agency and individual character still 
frame how institutions assess criminal responsibility. It may be true that criminal law has 
been pluralised, in the sense that it has expanded what options are valuable. However, this 
has taken place mainly through expanding a prior individualistic frame. One may sound a 
note of pessimism about CD. James Sing432 holds that CD fits the defence of provocation. 
Sing claims that the criteria used to assess whether someone is reasonable requires 
considering the offender’s cultural background. Otherwise, the offender would be 
understood as part of “us”, thereby reducing the recognition of pluralism. Indeed, without 
reliance on the offender’s cultural background, the jury and the judge would construe 
reasonability from what is reasonable for them. Thus, they would excuse Kimura if she 
were to fit with what is reasonable from their point of view. In other words, if a reasonable 
American had acted in the same way, then Kimura could have claimed a complete 
excuse433. This means that Kimura, according to Sing, would be treated according to the 
values of the American majority, which is precisely what CD challenges. That is, Sing 
claims that CD allows the offender to be treated according to the values and practices of 
his own cultural background. Supposedly, this would mean that criminal law recognises 
cultural pluralism. 
Sing raises an interesting point concerning the conditions that would have to be met for 
judicial consideration of the offender’s cultural background, and thus for a full recognition 
of cultural diversity in criminal law. Assume that Sing is right, and that criminal law is 
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capable of recognising pluralism, and examine the case of Kimura. One may ask in the first 
place, how can Kimura’s cultural background be considered? Sing assumes the American 
jury would be capable of judging correctly how another culture would understand what the 
offender did. However, there is compelling evidence that in this sort of assessment the jury 
systematically construes negative stereotypes in understanding the other434. It appears an 
American jury would not do the work; something else would be needed. Thus, to avoid 
prejudice and lack of knowledge on the part of the jury, and assuming it is possible to 
identify Japanese cultural experts, would it suffice to replace the jury with experts? No, it 
seems, insofar as the judge would be in the same position as a non-expert in Japanese 
culture, which would necessitate a Japanese judge435. Criminal proceedings are in principle 
public, and so should the public at large have the authority to call the offender to account, 
should the trial be conducted according to Japanese rules of criminal procedure? It 
deserves emphasis, however, that even a trial conducted in this way would be shallow, if 
the social practices which criminal law contributes to436 were not Japanese. As it was seen 
in Chapter 1, whether criminal law aims at coordination, reformation, restoration, 
retribution, deterrence or ratification, it needs to rely on the customs and social practices of 
its participants in order to be minimally effective. It results that without enculturating 
Americans into Japanese socio-cultural practices, all the above modifications would not be 
sufficient, and yet this proposal would seem to go too far.  
The point of this reductio is that by considering these stronger conditions, there is a shift 
from evaluating an individual’s conduct to the standards on which evaluations are based. 
More specifically, this signals a turn from evaluating the individual’s conduct to whether 
there is a collective claim to the rules which are used to evaluate what he did. Certainly, 
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these stronger conditions progress from making the criminal law more responsive to 
pluralism, to deferring to another collective’s rules on which the cultural background 
supervenes. In other words, it converts pluralism into deference towards another WE. 
However, because this implication remains obscure, so do the WE’s claims, and thus the 
proposal of radical pluralism becomes fundamentally inconsistent with possessing 
responsive institutions and, more generally, with collective self-determination. It also 
replaces the critical function with something else, for by transposing different social 
practices, it detaches criminal law from the practices it draws on and the practices it 
contributes to. It should be remarked upon that this move does not render the defence 
radically subjective437, because it is controlled by Kimura’s set of subjective beliefs, but 
rather it detaches and reattaches criminal law to another WE. Thus, it is a move that 
undermines the critical function. The problem is that anything short of adding the stronger 
conditions will not be sufficient to satisfy Sing’s ambitions. Yet such a proposal is not only 
unrealistic, but lacks any reasonable justification.  
It is the WE’s cultural and social background that provides the context in which the judge 
and the jury decide what is reasonable438. A quick review of CD cases confirms that the 
excuses are provided only when the subject is regarded to have acted as a reasonable 
individual439 from the perspective of the WE440. In this way, criminal law applies equally 
both to members of the WE, the citizens, and also to immigrants, even if for the former the 
values criminal law reproduces/transforms are not foreign in the sense they are for those 
like Kimura. For citizens, the values the constitutional WE is committed to are familiar; for 
Kimura, they are not. For citizens, reasonability is familiar; for Kimura, it is not. Some 
have suggested things should be this way. Some consider that if criminal law is understood 
as a form of instruction on the national concepts of right and wrong441, then it sets legal 
                                                
437 Held and Fontaione, ‘Culture as an affirmative defense’ (n 415) 246. 
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conformity as a duty owed to the nation442. It seems to follow that immigrants have a duty 
to assimilate443, as it is incumbent on them to master the WE’s social practices. If they do 
not, then there would be no reason to establish a CD in their benefit. Surely, if they are 
responsible for breaching their duties, then no reason would support the claim for reduced 
punishment. However, while it might be true that there is a justified interest in immigrants 
adopting the WE’s social practices, individual pluralism is also recognised as an important 
value guiding institutional facts. Indeed, even if there is an interest in Kimura being better 
enculturated, it does not generally follow that any form of coercive assimilation can be 
legally imposed. It does not follow then that criminal law should not be responsive. On the 
contrary, there are reasons that support the view that criminal law should be responsive, 
especially for the weak a-legal. 
4.2.5 Distinguishing the Other and the Limits of Pluralism 
Related to the problem of how much pluralism criminal law can recognise, scholars seem 
unable to offer a principled distinction between those who should and those who should 
not be afforded a CD. This is so since it seems natural that CD may be applicable to all 
individuals and all groups equally, even sub-cultures like gang cultures. Nonetheless, it 
seems necessary to justify discriminating between the case of Kimura and a gang-member, 
in order to include the former yet exclude the latter. Let us see how the problem appears. A 
basic justification for CD is the appropriateness of blame. One important motivation for 
the need for CD is that punishment fits the defendant’s blame. CD’s role seems to be 
epistemic, for it provides the knowledge needed in order to judge whether this is the case. 
If correct, any attempt to discriminate between offenders by relying on the principle of 
blameworthiness fails. Certainly, emphasis on blame imposes the general requirement that 
criminal punishment be proportionate to the seriousness of the wrong, and this remains 
valid regardless of how the defendant was motivated to act. Because blame requires 
individualised justice, basing CD on individual blame fails to discriminate between 
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members of different groups 444 . Moreover, by being applicable to any person the 
specificity of CD is lost, and the defence itself is rendered meaningless. 
This incapacity to discriminate among offenders has a practical implication for the 
plausibility of CD. Indeed, if punishment tracks blame, then there is no reason to exclude 
gang members from it. Indeed, they might have been motivated by their gang-culture, in 
the same way a member of a minority-culture would. Whether Kimura is Japanese or 
whether she belongs to the Yakuza of California makes no difference for the purposes of 
blame. One of the aims of CD is to avoid the ethnocentrism of mainstream culture, yet if 
CD may also benefit Kimura from Yakuza, this would cast serious doubt on its plausibility 
as a defence. To avoid the gang paradox, as it will be called, CD must be able to 
discriminate and not give support to any person, regardless of the group to which he 
belongs445. However, the predicament CD faces is to be able to offer a principled rationale 
for such discrimination. For one thing, as Renteln explains, members of sub-groups like 
gangs are not radically different from mainstream society. If those groups can generate 
their own rules of belonging and behaviour, they might be considered radically different. 
Because this might entitle Kimura from Yakuza to a CD, Renteln considers that this would 
oblige neither judges nor juries. Yet, the same could be said of members of minorities: 
neither do their claims oblige judges nor juries. What then justifies discriminating between 
both, between Kimura from Yakuza and Brevik, and between immigrants and other 
minorities? Radical pluralism seemingly cannot offer sufficient guidance in these matters. 
An alternative would be to argue that only those entitled to the right to culture are entitled 
to a CD, for this would supposedly exclude Kimura of Yakuza and Brevik. Yet not all 
those entitled to a right to culture are entitled to a CD. Consider immigrants who have been 
living for many years in the USA. Let us say Kimura was born in Japan but lived in 
California from as early as she remembers. She may still preserve some of her parents’ 
social practices, yet she has also adopted those of the USA. If she meets the conditions to 
be considered enculturated, should she be entitled to CD?  She may well be entitled to 
                                                
444 Almost every theorist is committed to this consequence; Kim, ‘Blameworthiness’ (n 392) 223; Lacey, 
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‘positive action’ in case of ethnic discrimination, which is especially relevant since she 
might be a descendent of a Japanese imprisoned in the USA’s Japanese ‘internment camps’ 
during the Second World War. However, if she has indeed chosen to become a member of 
Yakuza, it seems she should not be entitled to a CD. It should be noted that cause-based 
excuses do not register differences between Kimuras, for the motives which matter are 
those that can figure in causal explanations, and they would figure in both cases. Reasons-
based excuses come close but they seem also insufficient, for in both cases Kimura could 
have acted out for reasons that would have motivated anyone to act; for instance, out of 
loyalty or friendship. These can be normative reasons, yet they seem insufficient for 
singling out the property of being part of an undesirable group not entitled to a CD. 
There is a third alternative to this quandary. This understands CD as premised on a conflict 
between cultures, that is, as a cultural clash. Jeroen Van Broeck develops this alternative. 
Broeck builds CD upon the notion of cultural offense446. The idea is that (i) in a culture X 
doing F is an offense (ii) individual A because he is a member of X has the duty to punish 
or sanction the transgression that F represents (iii) doing G as a response to F, while 
permitted in culture X, is considered criminal in culture Y, which is where A commits the 
crime. What matters according to Broeck is that for culture X, doing F is accepted as a 
transgression447, which means that the individual must have acted out of the values of 
culture X448. Once the individual A is acting out of the values of his culture X then it 
follows, according to Broeck, that what explains CD is a clash of cultures: X acts out of 
values that are inconsistent with the values of the majority of culture Y. In the case of 
Kimura, these conditions are met. (i) Kimura’s husband committed an offense against her 
honour; (ii) Kimura’s culture, also Japanese, sanctions that offense because this would be 
necessary for her to regain her honour; (iii) finally, Kimura commits oyako-shinju, which 
while a crime in California, is seen with sympathy by Japanese culture449. Thus, the 
framework is of no help here, for Kimura from Yakuza could also meet the conditions, 
granted the substitution of the group “Japan” by “Yakuza”; Kimura would still be able to 
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act from the values of Yakuza, if they also regarded what her husband did as 
impermissible. Therefore, not even the best available framework provides sufficient 
criteria for discriminating among groups. 
In sum, the alternatives explored by scholars of CD do not provide a plausible, principled 
argumentation for the exclusion of gangs. More generally, no account offers a principled 
distinction, so long as the focus remains on the principle of individual blame. Because of 
this focus, proponents are drawn to reason that what matters is the factual existence of a 
group that upholds a set of values, whichever they may be. It is noteworthy that they 
appeal to the group’s values as part of an explanation of the member’s conduct in light of 
individual blame, but not as having normative force. In effect, it might be the case that 
Japanese culture does value oyako-shinju, but the broader point concerns whether or not it 
is permitted for that collective subject. In other words, what should be considered is the 
group as a self-determined collective and thus a source of political authority, a connection 
which is not fully drawn out just by considering the culture of a group. This move makes 
salient not whether an action was approved by Japanese culture, but what is right conduct 
for Japan. In effect, it is considered what the Japanese, as a self-determined collective, 
decide should or not be permitted. It becomes clear that the issue is no longer only about 
the interaction between cultures, but fundamentally concerns a political interaction 
between groups. The question becomes clear: why should it matter for the constitutional 
WE of the USA, which upholds a culture in their territory according to which oyako-shinju 
is a serious crime, what the constitutional WE of Japan consider should be permitted? 
Whether or not the USA ascribes value to Japanese norms would constitute an expression 
of its own collective self-determination, but concerning groups that exist within a self-
determined collective, the issue is more complex. At this level, the real problem of the 
incapacity to discriminate among groups becomes apparent: whilst some minorities might 
be entitled to self-determination, it seems clear gangs are not. Whilst some minorities are 
entitled to dictate how social life ought to be, gangs clearly are not. Finally, it is possible to 
observe within criminal law the relevance of the criterion for distinguishing groups: the 
entitlement to collective self-determination. The problem is that this now necessitates an 
argument on the nature and reach of collective agency and collective actions, but the 
literature either does not consider them or does so but too late, at best, as an unprincipled 
corrective to the scope of CD. Certainly, all that figures in their reasoning is individual 
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agency, individual character or individual pluralism. Scholars should start from the outset 
with a clear understanding of collective actions and collective entitlements for clarifying 
what is at issue in CD when it engages with a-legal behaviours. 
Since scholars do not start in this way, they end up unable to respond to the gang paradox, 
and thus are unable to offer a principled basis for a differentiated treatment of the 
particular needs of the minorities that claim for recognition from the legal system. Indeed, 
none of the accounts examined can offer sound principles on which to discriminate, firstly: 
between individuals and groups; and secondly, between cases of a-legality and simple 
cases of illegality. This, however, is not to deny the worth of scholarly work on CD, for 
this has the merit of identifying the challenges and grounds for excusing offenders in cases 
in which criminal law seems to reach the limits of the pluralism it can recognise. Surely, 
most accounts can be seen in this light: Macklem and Gardner450, in considering the kind of 
social pluralism that provocation can recognise; Nuotio451 and Lacey452, in recognising the 
critical function; Matravers and Phillips, in defending mainstream culture453; Greenawalt454 
and Lyman, in recognising the role of shared values upheld by the state455; Waldron, in 
suggesting the fundamental interests in freedom456.  
Now, to the issue at hand: where there are no self-determined collectives interacting there 
is no deference to identify; yet CD have made salient cases that diverge from mere 
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illegalities and which can be understood as instances of weak a-legality. As it was seen, 
this is because they are particular claims to recognition of cultural diversity that resonate 
with historical secularisation and the pluralisation of acceptable ways of life. Resonance is 
given in terms of relaxing punishment according to three different rationales by which 
criminal law assesses the weak a-legal. First, criminal law assesses the case in question 
through the lens of structuralist or post-modernist theories of culture. This has 
consequences for whether the agent can be seen as responsible or not. Second, criminal 
law assesses whether the agent can be seen as a reasonable person from the point of view 
of the meanings of the WE. Third, criminal law assesses the level of integration of recently 
arrived immigrants. It seems characteristic of recently arrived immigrants to be 
insufficiently exposed to the practices of the host country, which may make it difficult for 
them to conform to criminal law. That is, if there is no reasonable opportunity for 
integration, then there is reason to believe that immigrants might face a situation of unfair 
opportunity for choosing valuable choices, which may justify reducing punishment. 
Significantly, the connection between exposure and social practices point to the difference 
between integration and lack of integration into those social practices. Whereas immigrants 
might claim they have not been sufficiently integrated into the host’s social practices, 
members of gangs cannot457. Obviously, members of gangs cannot claim insufficient 
exposure. On the contrary, if they have chosen that membership, there might be even more 
reasons to increase punishment458.  
In sum, while pluralism seems to introduce a tension, this is only an appearance, for what 
are broadly defined as valuable individual choices establish limits to potential objects of 
accommodation in criminal law. This, as it has been argued, does not mean that criminal 
law cannot or should not be responsive. However, to the extent weak a-legality does not 
aim to challenge criminal law but seeks to be better integrated, they have no recognised 
political status and thus the survival of its culture is left to the individual marketplace of 
ideas. It was possible to identify, nonetheless, a three-fold rationale for reducing 
punishment for cases of weak a-legality: (1) whether the agent is determined or not, with 
consideration given to two alternative conceptions of culture; (2) whether the agent can be 
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seen as a reasonable person (1); (3) whether the agent had a reasonable opportunity to 
integrate459. Importantly, these rationales may figure independently from each other. Thus, 
(2) the agent may be seen as a reasonable person without being integrated, or (3) the agent 
may be insufficiently integrated even if he were unreasonable, or (1) he might be 
unreasonable and sufficiently integrated, yet culturally determined. 
Scholars researching CD have recognised the much-needed cultural sensibility that CD 
brings to criminal law460, yet as it was seen, they have systematically overlooked the 
connection between the claim to access culture and the political claim to be collectively 
entitled to it, and how this is expressed in criminal law. This has led them to overlook how 
limited a pluralism the WE actually recognises. It has been examined how criminal law 
engages with weak a-legality, or minorities who though they claim to be accommodated, 
do so as individuals seeking integration. Now it is time to examine how criminal law 
engages with strong a-legality, for in contrast they might not seek not integration, and 
whether they do so or not, they seek integration as a self-determined collective. To the 
extent CD represents a form of integration, it cannot be an appropriate response to the 
demands of indigenous peoples. Moreover, it is premised upon the institutional alternatives 
and consequences of the critical function, thus is neither able to register their claims nor to 
recognise them as political. The next chapter examines how criminal law may address the 
demands of strong a-legality; that is, in a way which at least recognises the collective and 
political character of their claims. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CITIZENSHIP AND THE SUSPENSION OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3 it was argued that criminal law aims at reproducing/transforming two 
different domains of the identity of the constitutional order, its idem-identity and ipse-
identity, and Chapter 4 went on to sustain that neither of these domains is put into question 
when the WE encounters weak a-legality. On the contrary, weak a-legality seeks to be 
included in the WE. Integrating weak a-legality would achieve equality. Criminal law is 
part of this process of integration, insofar as it treats persons as responsible individual 
agents. By so doing, criminal law contributes to reproduce/transform the idem-identity and 
ipse-identity of the WE. In contrast to weak a-legality, strong a-legality does not seek 
integration or integration only, but more fundamentally to attain collective self-
determination 461 . When criminal law encounters strong a-legality, the situation is 
qualitatively different in comparison with weak a-legality. Surely, what differentiates weak 
a-legality from strong a-legality is that the former has as objects individuals, whilst for the 
latter it is self-determined collectives. In encountering strong a-legality, the WE engages 
with another WE. Thus, when drawing boundaries through criminal law and thus including 
the other within itself, the WE simultaneously deprives the other of the mark of its 
constitutional identity. Accommodating means inclusion and the denial that indigenous 
peoples are self-determined. 
Chapter 5 examines how criminal law engages with strong a-legality in light of how 
criminal law achieves integration. Whilst integration has been examined in general, it has 
not been detailed how and why it is needed. It is argued that criminal law integrates by 
shaping citizenship, and how the need for integration makes accommodating another WE 
impossible. For this purpose, it is necessary first to explore more closely the ways in which 
criminal law integrates, that is, how it contributes to the idem-identity and ipse-identity of 
the constitutional order. We can examine how criminal law integrates by observing the 
relationship between criminal law and citizenship. Given that citizenship is one of the 
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fundamental ways by which the WE sets its boundaries, seeing how criminal law shapes 
citizenship will show how criminal law draws the boundaries of the political community. 
Second, it is also necessary to develop a broader understanding of integration. For this 
purpose, it is argued that a political community requires abstract and material integration 
of participants as a condition for the existence of that community. Because criminal law is 
required to integrate into the WE, the accommodation of indigenous peoples’ demands are 
impossible. However, the chapter identifies a key condition for them to achieve self-
determination: that they access to their own penal practices462. In other words, an 
independent penal practice is necessary for indigenous peoples to achieve self-
determination, independent of the WE which they are part of. 
This chapter is divided into 4 sections. Section 1 examines the debate on criminal law and 
citizenship through the views of Nicola Lacey, Antony Duff and Peter Ramsay. Section 2 
draws out the implications of these views holding, basically, that criminal law shapes 
citizenship. Section 3 examines two cases that illustrate how criminal law contributes to 
shaping citizenship and thus integrates into the political community. Section 4 concludes 
on the impossibility of accommodating indigenous peoples practices within criminal law. 
It is remarked upon the reasons which have led the thesis to reach that conclusion, and 
recommend suspending criminal law as a condition for devolving self-determination to 
indigenous peoples, for this would allow them to have an independent penal practice. 
5.1. Citizenship and Criminal Law 
5.1.1 Criminal Law, the Subject and the Subjected 
Citizenship and community are closely-related concepts. By community, it is alluded to 
participants having something particular in “common”463, namely, the social practices they 
engage in. The purpose of employing the idea of community is to allow the observation 
that moral values do not vanish once the state centralises political power through its 
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institutions. That is, when political communities transition to the modern form of the 
constitutional order, moral values are still present in it.  In the following, the idea of 
political community is employed in order to emphasise the presence of moral values within 
the constitutional order. Now, the modern idea of political community is understood in 
terms of citizenship. Characterising an individual as a “citizen” means considering them a 
member of a political community, giving rise to a particular kind of tie464 between them 
and the group. From this tie emerges the recognition of both rights and duties 
corresponding to members and the group, which include civil, social and political rights. 
This tie may be characterised in terms of two interrelated domains: active citizenship or the 
condition of subject, and passive citizenship or the condition of subjected. These domains 
are set within a broader context, as it was done with criminal law and the constitution. The 
implication of this move is to conceive of citizenship beyond legal and moral rights 
existing between the individual and the group465. Citizenship is a general tie that unites an 
individual with a political community. In other words, by becoming part of the 
constitutional order as a citizen, citizenship entails membership of the WE’s social 
practices.  
Read in this way, citizenship’s meaning depends on a social practice that includes cultural 
and moral values and which contributes to that social practice on which it depends466. It 
appears that there is no such thing as “the” institution of citizenship, for citizenship 
involves membership in multiple and different levels of the socio-cultural practices of the 
WE. Within these levels, the examination is narrowed down to how citizenship is shaped 
by criminal law and figure out the implications. The focus is on examining the beginning 
of a CS cycle, that is, how these cultural values enable the meaning of citizenship from 
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within criminal law. For these purposes, it is employed Lacey’s description of the political 
community of modern western states. The main reason for choosing Lacey is that she 
develops understandings of criminal law quite compatible with the framework developed 
in this thesis. Lacey understands membership within the political community in terms of a 
combination of liberal and communitarian values467, values that help to define citizenship. 
This is not only a good description of the values embedded in the practice of citizenship, 
but also provides a suitable narrowing of the domains of issues that are the focus here.  
Lacey understands the political community in terms of how it becomes justified, mainly in 
terms of the community’s self-description as sharing liberal and communitarian values. 
While in principle both forms of values seem to oppose each other, they may also be seen 
as closely related. More specifically, Lacey reunites the liberal value of individual 
autonomy with the communitarian view of the social constitution of the individual. Lacey 
does this by claiming that individual autonomy depends on the relationships individuals 
have with others, for those relationships define their basic interests468, among them, their 
interests in living an autonomous life. This allows for reconciling a version of 
utilitarianism, focused on social utility, with the Kantian maxim that persons should be 
treated with equal respect. Amid this description enters the role of criminal law. If 
individual autonomy depends on the social relationships that define human interests, then 
individuals would not be used as means if criminal law contributes to the maintenance of 
those relationships without which they would not be autonomous. Yet, criminal law 
appears at the same time as a form of social utility, for Lacey denies that it469 is a good in 
itself: it must be socially useful. Criminal law aims at preserving the social order where the 
values individuals share as members of a political community can flourish470. Criminal law 
maintains the relationships members care about471. It appears that this form of social utility 
cannot be understood just as an aggregation of individual welfare. The set of social 
relationships that define individuals’ basic interests is built around sharing the same values, 
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values that in turn contribute to forming the political community472, the community of 
citizens. 
According to Lacey, criminal law is committed to protecting the values of the 
community473, which leads, as it was seen, to the proposal for a critical function within 
criminal law, a democratically-legitimated function474. Now, Lacey does not provide a full 
political justification for the authority of these shared values, yet rightly considers that the 
community settles democratically which values should be protected by criminal law475. 
Lacey then characterises the community not only in terms of the liberal and communitarian 
values members are supposed to share, but also in how members associate, deliberate and 
change the terms of the association as they consider fit. Thus, it appears that insofar as the 
social order construes political authority, the community is also a political community476. 
Here, there is a shift from the values shared by the community to how that community 
forms and makes its decisions. This emphasis, by considering political authority in terms 
of democratic authority, can link with Antony Duff’s views on the political legitimacy of 
criminal law477. 
Antony Duff, like Lacey, also starts by combining a liberal-communitarian view of the 
political community, considering that the fundamental value of autonomy is socially 
constituted478. In this area, Duff’s ideas of citizenship can be seen as extensions of Lacey’s. 
Duff has further developed the idea of democratic community and how it becomes 
legitimate. According to Duff, the question is how criminal law claims to bind its 
members, suggesting to move beyond merely asserting that there is a community of shared 
values. If criminal law is legitimised democratically, then this implies it is more than a 
mere procedure for arriving at correct decisions, with the implication that epistemic 
                                                
472 Lacey, State Punishment (n 467) 173-174. 
473 Ibid 183. 
474 Ibid 185. 
475 Ibid 185. 
476 Ibid 175. 
477 RA Duff, ‘A criminal law for citizens’ (2010) 14(3) Theoretical Criminology 293-309. 
478 RA Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (OUP 2001) 54-55; RA Duff, Answering for 
Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2007) 44-45. 
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conceptions of democratic legitimacy are insufficient479. Duff considers that criminal law 
binds its members because they are citizens480; that is, because they can be seen as the 
“subject” of criminal law. Underlying democratic legitimacy, there is a connection 
between being subjected to the law and being the subject of law. Democratic authority is 
said to make law legitimate because the law is self-willed: the subject of democratic 
authority is said to impose rules on itself481.  
Citizenship is the key, understood as inclusion in the sphere of those who get to 
democratically deliberate and decide. In other words, by participating in the WE’s ipse-
identity, one is entitled to shape its idem-identity. Membership in the political community 
becomes a condition for the legitimacy of criminal law, for inclusion as a citizen means 
that they are regarded as the ‘subject’ of criminal law. This line of argument leads Duff to 
endorse a republican conception of citizenship, “For a republican, law must be our law as 
citizens, a ‘common’ law that we make for ourselves, not a law made for us and imposed 
on us by a sovereign; citizens must be able to understand themselves as authors as well as 
addressees of the law…”482. In sum, the criminal law of citizens is not imposed from 
above, because they are themselves not only subjected to criminal law, but also their 
subject483.  
                                                
479 For an influential defence of a qualified epistemic version of democratic authority, see David Estlund, 
Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton University Press 2008). 
480 Duff, ‘A criminal law’ (n 477) 300. 
481 This is the idea advanced by Habermas, Facts and Norms (n 217); similarly Charles Larmore, The Morals 
of Modernity (CUP 1996); also John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1996); and 
Charles Taylor, ‘Cross-purposes; the Liberal-Communitarian Debate’ in Nancy Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism 
and the Moral Life (Harvard University Press 1987) 178; Michelman, ‘Law’s Republic’ (n 249). 
482 Duff, ‘A criminal law’ (n 477) 301. 
483 Ibid 301; also Marcus Dubber, ‘Criminal Law between Public and Private Law’ in Duff et al (eds.), The 
Boundaries of Criminal Law (OUP 2010) 211-212. For a general outline of a republican criminal law, see 
Philip Pettit, ‘Republican Theory and Criminal Punishment’ (1997) 9 Utilitas 59-79; Philip Pettit, 
‘Criminalization in Republican Theory’ in Anthony Duff et al, (eds.) Criminalization: The Political Morality 
of Criminal Law (OUP 2014) 132-150. Significantly, this casts republicans as inheritors of Hegel, for he and 
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5.1.2 Criminal Law and the Construction of Citizenship 
Considered generally, criminal law contributes to defining who and under what conditions 
one may be regarded as citizen. Certainly, citizenship appears partially constructed by 
criminal law, insofar as criminal law diminishes or suppresses the status of citizenship. I 
consider two ways in which criminal law contributes in constructing citizenship: abstract 
citizenship and material citizenship. Duff develops the conception of abstract citizenship, 
while using different words, by clarifying how citizens can be regarded as non-members. 
This can occur in different ways: linguistic, factual and normative. The substance of Duff’s 
argument is devoted to explaining non-membership normatively, in order to reject the 
notion that criminal law is justified when it treats individuals as non-members. According 
to Duff criminal law construes membership when it treats individuals in ways consistent 
with the values shared by the community, and non-membership when it does not484. 
Criminal law thus construes non-membership when it denies treatment as a member of the 
community of values; for instance, when it aims merely to incapacitate the offender. This 
is so because criminal law would treat individuals as being outside of the community, and 
thus as not entitled to claim to be treated according to the set of values with which the 
community would treat their members. Merely treating individuals as objects to be 
incapacitated denies treating them as autonomous individuals, as individuals who can 
reflect on their choices and have a particular responsibility for their character, and thus as 
members of the community485. 
What Duff says here needs to be qualified. Certainly, when criminal law treats offenders as 
a danger that needs to be prevented, they are not considered bearers of rights; non-
members cannot claim the value rights express. However, when criminal law only seeks to 
deter, it need not define the individual as a non-member. True, when criminal law treats 
individuals as members of the community, it aims to communicate and engage with them 
as citizens, but this may also be when it aims to deter them. There is a reason why Duff 
emphasises communication. As it was seen, Duff develops his theory by understanding 
criminal law as a process of communication between individuals who are considered 
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agents and who can guide their conduct by recognising reasons486. Yet, treatment as a non-
member does not mean treating X as someone who lies outside of the community. Treating 
someone as a non-member would entail a complete absence of the meanings shared by the 
political community: it would mean treating him as a force of nature. It appears, then, that 
treating someone as a responsible individual agent is not an empty designation, for it 
requires that criminal law treats them as a participant in the WE’s practices. This should be 
stressed, for there are ample, less humane alternatives available to the WE, which could be 
pursued if the individual is not considered an agent487. So long as this is not the case, even 
if deterred they remain treated as members488. As a result, abstract membership is 
compatible with imprisoning the deterred, if that is premised on treating him according to 
the values of the political community.  
Abstract citizenship can be seen as a concept that aims to make explicit the moral values 
shared by the community, because these meanings are part of the practice that contributes 
to the social construction of citizenship in terms of how the subject treats the subjected. 
Abstract citizenship does not refer to any set of specific rights or social circumstances of 
citizens. Citizenship is abstract in the sense that it considers the general faculties of 
sensibility to reasons as a basis for defining citizenship, without making a further argument 
concerning the social conditions that make it a real capacity for action. In this regard, 
abstract citizenship mirrors the ideal of formal equality489, the weak sense of agency 
underlying criminal law I explored in Chapter 4. True, Duff in no way ignores material 
circumstances490, but they are better addressed by specifying the conditions that enable 
citizens as individual agents. Ramsay has specified these conditions by connecting them to 
                                                
486 Ibid 79-81. 
487 See Levy, ‘Cultural membership’ (n 407) 153. Also, suggesting the permissibility of treatment as an 
enemy, see Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez, ‘Enemy Combatants Versus Enemy Criminal Law: An Introduction to 
the European Debate Regarding Enemy Criminal Law and Its Relevance to the Anglo-American Discussion 
on the Legal Status of Unlawful Enemy Combatants’ (2008) 11 New Criminal Law Review: An International 
and Interdisciplinary Journal 529-562. 
488 Perhaps this may not be the case when the individual is killed, as in countries where the death penalty is 
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489 Peter Ramsay, ‘Responsible Subject as Citizen: Criminal Law, Democracy and the Welfare State’ (2006) 
Modern Law Review 45. 
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the historical emergence of the welfare state and thus to T. H. Marshall’s famous 
classification of rights into civil, political, and social491.  
For Ramsay, civil, political and social rights not only point to the conditions of agency, but 
also to what space there is for justified criminalisation. To this extent, Ramsay’s view can 
be seen as extending both Lacey’s insights into justified criminalisation and Duff’s 
conception of public wrongs, insofar as he further fleshes out citizenship in material terms 
or specific domains of rights. For Ramsay, these rights form the environment in which 
criminal law develops492, and their breach defines the scope of wrongs committed against 
the political community493. It appears that criminal law shapes citizenship, both in terms of 
the reasons for criminalisation grounded on the protection of citizenship, and the kind of 
treatment that an offender is supposed to receive. The point in using Lacey, Duff and 
Ramsay, however, concerns the connection between the treatment given by criminal laws 
and the meanings shared by the political community. That is, that possession of these 
rights implies the abstract condition under which citizens become agents and the material 
circumstances under which members are enabled to participate and deliberate as subjects. 
Both dimensions help to explicate how criminal law shapes citizenship by specifying how 
it treats members. 
5.2. Integrating Citizens in Theory 
This section draws a broader connection between citizenship and integration, illustrating 
how criminal law takes part in it. In the previous section, it was argued that criminal law 
shapes membership both abstractly and materially, in terms of the kind of treatment it 
renders to citizens. In other words, membership of the political community means that 
individuals would need to be treated by criminal law both as abstract citizens, addressed as 
agents, and also as material citizens, addressed in terms of the possession of political, 
social and civil rights. It becomes necessary, it seems, to clarify how to understand the 
status of the prisoner within this framework. Above it was stated that even in prison and 
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neoliberal states in which criminal law construes citizenship in terms of vulnerable agents. See Peter 
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without liberty, the individual can still be considered a member. Put differently, the fact 
that individuals have their rights to liberty - in particular, freedom of movement rights - 
suspended, does not mean they are not considered citizens in the broad sense it has been 
understood in this chapter.  
It seems that only on a narrow conception of citizenship are prisoners excluded from the 
political community. However, as shown above, if imprisonment meant the loss of 
citizenship in the broad sense, this would mean criminal law does not address individuals 
as sensitive to reasons and worthy of respect. Yet, the fact there are constraints on how to 
treat prisoners suggests that they are regarded at least as members. This implies that it 
would be imprecise to say prisoners have lost completely the condition of citizenship, even 
if this entails having suspended certain political and civil rights. Surely, not all political 
and civil rights are suspended: freedom of expression494, property rights and the right to 
life are, among others495, rights that they can still claim. Because prisoners have suspended 
many, yet not all of their rights, this status can be designated as conditional citizenship496. 
In conditional citizenship, the values that comprise the WE and the treatment criminal law 
supposedly provides reflect a broader connection between the subjected and the subject. It 
reflects that the offender is still a member. 
Conditional membership provides a way to begin disclosing the need for integration into 
the WE, as shall be seen. Criminal law treats an agent not as a material citizen if it does not 
recognise any of their entitlements to participate in public and private domains of the 
political community; namely, any civil, political or social rights. On the contrary, if 
criminal law treats an agent as a material citizen, then it reflects that individuals are being 
                                                
494 Freedom of expression is partly a civil, yet also a political right, and is extended to prisoners; see Eric 
Barendt, ‘Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom Under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2009) Indiana 
Law Journal 852. For the political nature of freedom of expression, see Habermas, Fact and Norms (n 217) 
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See Vivien Stern, ‘Prisoners as Citizens: a Comparative View’ (2002) 49 Probation Journal 130-139. 
496 Ramsay names this a condition of suspended citizenship. See Peter Ramsay, ‘Voters should not be in 
prison!: The rights of prisoners in a democracy’ (2013) 16 Critical Review of International Social and 
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integrated, for integration means at least to be entitled to treatment as a material citizen. 
Not surprisingly, this understanding is related to crime rates. To the extent that an 
important area of crime can be explained by insufficient social and civil integration, crime, 
while representing an individual failure, also more importantly signals a political failure. If 
responsibility for crime is at least in part political, then the political community, instead of 
criminalising citizens, should make equally available opportunities for them to become 
active members, to improve their social and private conditions so they can participate 
freely and as equals in the public domain497. This would strengthen the WE and reduce 
crime. It is in line with this interpretation that Ramsay’s view on the abolition of 
punishment should be understood498. Whilst this is certainly not the point of view of 
Lacey499 and Duff, it seems they nonetheless would agree with the claim that the better 
members are integrated into society, the less reasons there will be for crime and thus 
punishment. Ramsay designates his view democratic retributivism, for it aims to realise the 
authority of rights by punishing those who have denied, through crime, their existence500. 
Ramsay seems to consider the justification of criminal law symmetrical to the degree that 
social conditions realise both abstract citizenship and material citizenship501. It follows that 
all citizens should value political equality502, for realising political equality means being 
better integrated into the dimensions of citizenship503. Therefore, the stronger the political 
community, the better integrated its members, and the need for punishment lessens. 
Accordingly, the less integrated members, then the greater risk of increased crime, and 
thus social fragmentation and conflict. 
                                                
497  For a discussion of different models of criminal justice systems as more inclusionary or more 
exclusionary, see Nicola Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in 
Contemporary Democracies (CUP 2008).  
498 Perhaps Lacey and Duff would not agree here, for Ramsay adopts a predictive point of view, aligned with 
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499 Lacey certainly agrees with criminal law being socially “useful”. 
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Dialogic Community at Dusk’ (2014) 1 Critical Analysis of Law, 318.  
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Now, one may contest whether there is reason to believe that there is a risk of social 
fragmentation and conflict. However, it suffices to point to considerable research 
evidencing how criminal law contributes to excluding people from a variety of domains, 
social, civil and political504. If these domains are part of the conditions for social, civil and 
political rights, then mass incarceration - because it is massive – assists in undermining the 
political community505. Something similar occurs with immigrants, who can also be seen 
as enjoying a form of conditional citizenship. Part of what is problematic about the 
emergence of new criminal law offences that target immigrants is that they make 
integration difficult, if not impossible506. Lucia Zedner has examined the new immigration 
offences 507 , their exclusionary ambition and almost xenophobic tone 508 , whereby 
integration of immigrants is rendered unattainable 509 . Now, as suggested above, if 
integrating immigrants and socially deprived citizens can contribute to strengthening the 
political community, then for strategic reasons a solution would be to provide the kind of 
goods and services that make non-integration less likely. Surely, improving social, health, 
educational and police services would improve their social opportunities and thus diminish 
                                                
504 Timothy Black evidences in the USA that one third of released prisoners go back to jail in six months; 
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Migrandi: Criminalization of Immigrants and the Basic Principles of the Criminal Law’ (2014) 8 Criminal 
law and Philosophy 635-657.  
507 Lucia Zedner, ‘Is the Criminal Law Only for Citizens? A Problem at the Borders of Punishment’ in Katja 
Aas and Mary Bosworth (eds.) The Borders of Punishment: Migration, Citizenship, and Social Exclusion  
(OUP 2013) 46. 
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social discontent, thus preventing fragmentation510. Suggesting the sufficiency of social 
and economic integration leads us to wonder whether it has been overlooked something 
important; that is, the political components of citizenship. After all, if providing sufficient 
goods and services prevents social conflict, then active citizenship seems inconsequential. 
However, there is a fundamental problem in this strategy, for it overlooks the many levels 
at which passive and active citizenship are mutually dependent. 
In historical terms511, passive and active citizenship emerged and have grown together, so 
that if they have been mutually dependent, there is little reason to consider that today 
citizens can have one but not the other. Diminishing passive citizenship seems to diminish 
active citizenship, and the absence of the latter may lead to an absence of the former. As 
Bellamy stresses with regard to immigrant integration, immigrants’ interests are at stake if 
they are denied space as active citizens. In effect, political participation in the political 
community and the benefits of living in a state that affords a possibly better future are 
mutually dependent. What make countries appealing for immigrants, Bellamy suggests, are 
their living conditions; yet, these are also political achievements512. Seen in this way, 
integration appears in a different light. Surely, it is in immigrants’ best interests to be 
integrated into the political community, but it is also in the best interests of citizens 
themselves. Active citizenship is as central as passive citizenship, for the benefits which 
adhere to the latter were obtained during the historical course of a progressive 
strengthening of active citizenship513. Passive citizenship can neither emerge nor be 
sustained without a strong active citizenship. 
This examination of prisoners and immigrants makes explicit the need for integration in 
general. Certainly, the same conditions that lay the groundwork for diminishing crime rates 
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and preventing immigrant social fragmentation are those which make active citizenship 
stronger. These are the conditions that have made historically possible the kind of society 
citizens need for having meaning. In other words, the connection between citizens being 
better integrated, with the rights and social conditions which make them members of the 
political community, and social fragmentation is premised on members being integrated 
into the practices and values of the constitutional order514. Undoubtedly, it is because they 
are expected to share those values and practices that there is the belief that the more 
integration, the less crime and social fragmentation. Seeing weak a-legality in this way, 
strengthens the case for the WE to seek greater integration515, and the same applies to 
prisoners. The need for integration makes visible another kind of relationship between the 
WE’s idem-identity and ipse-identity. It has been argued earlier that the WE relies on the 
social practices of its participants and that these are necessary for them having meaning, 
but now it also appears that guaranteeing citizens’ living standards is also at stake. The WE 
needs citizens not only to master its social practices, but more importantly to engage 
robustly in shaping its ipse-identity. 
Now, it may be observed the dependence between active and passive citizenship, in terms 
of how attaining concrete standards of living relies on integration into the WE. The WE 
requires robust democratic participation, because what participants value and believe 
worthy of respect depends on the political practice of strong active citizenship. Standards 
of living are conceptualised in light of particular social practices that are understood from 
an internal perspective, for it is the participant’s point of view that continuously 
reconstructs the institutional facts they inhabit516. Participants need to understand and 
identify with their social practices in order to fulfil their role as active citizens517. As 
highlighted above, the political community is also a moral community embedded in 
particular cultural meanings; without endorsing these, there is little reason to believe the 
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participant might undertake such an active role. Understanding integration as endorsing the 
meanings and social practices of the WE makes democracy workable. Of course, this 
includes integration into the idem-identity of the constitutional order, which requires, at 
least, having the capacities to be regarded as equal. For this would involve, at least, having 
the capacities necessary to develop as a participant in the political community, and thus, to 
integrate into the WE’s ipse-identity.  
Citizenship, both abstract and material, shows the need to integrate citizens, prisoners and 
immigrants into the political community, to obtain the social practices that give meaning to 
members’ lives and their standards of living. This, in turn, comes directly into tension with 
the claims of strong a-legality, which typically seeks to fragment the political community. 
They do not seek to attain political equality, understood as an individual right to participate 
in the active citizenship of the WE518. Surely, they might be individually politically equal, 
yet fail to be collectively equal, which is what they seek to attain: collective political 
equality. It seems the WE cannot have active citizenship without the 
reproduction/transformation of the practices members rely on for giving meaning to what 
they do. And the WE cannot defer its criminal law, for criminal law integrates by shaping 
abstract and material citizenship, thus contributing to enable the idem-identity and ipse-
identity of the WE. It appears that indigenous peoples have an important interest at stake in 
aiming to prevent their practices being undermined by another WE’s criminal law, and 
thus to access their own penal practices. In other words, as a condition for indigenous 
peoples’ self-determination they need to be independent from another WE’s criminal law, 
for this is necessary to reproduce/transform their idem-identity and ipse-identity. Insofar as 
they have a practical interest in being self-determined, they have an interest in having an 
independent penal practice. 
5.3. Integrating Citizens in Practice 
The cases this section presents aim to elucidate the importance of having an independent 
penal practice as a necessary condition for indigenous peoples’ self-determination. More 
specifically, the cases illustrate how a WE treats minorities when they seek to draw their 
own boundaries, and thus, they show examples of how penal practices, and therefore 
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criminal law, shapes citizenship when two WE interact. This is important to bear in mind, 
given that neither of these cases, especially the first, is a case that concerns directly 
criminal law. They relate to criminal law insofar as they demonstrate how minorities 
engage in drawing the boundaries of their communities by way of their penal practices. 
The first case, Hoffer, shows how a community defines its boundaries through their penal 
practices, and what would happen in the case of interference in this domain by another 
WE, which sets its own boundaries. The second, Thomas, shows how the WE defines the 
boundaries of a minority through criminal law, and how in doing so it depoliticises both 
what the WE is doing and the claims of indigenous peoples. In order to appreciate criminal 
law’s contribution in these cases, it is necessary to adopt a broad understanding of criminal 
law in terms of penal practices519 under the lens of the modified morphogenetic approach. 
The approach, however, might fail to convince a sceptic that the cases shed light on 
criminal law. Yet, even if the sceptic remains unconvinced, this does not disprove that the 
examination of penal practices concerns much of what would standardly be designated as 
criminal law. That is, even if the rules of the minority do not appear as “criminal law”, 
their penal practices can be characterised in more or less the same ways as it would be the 
basic elements of state criminal law. This is because both contribute to shaping 
membership. 
The above brings out an important implication, which follows from adopting a broader 
understanding of criminal law. A broader point of view, focused on penal practices, makes 
it possible to identify when the state interferes with what would be another WE’s criminal 
law, and therefore, with its identity. In contrast, a narrower point of view would fail to 
identify what would fulfil the same function as state criminal law within a minority. Thus, 
it would fail in identifying interferences with their penal practices, and thus how through 
them they define their citizenship. The narrow view inevitably fails because 
transformation/reproduction is understood from the point of view of the larger WE, which 
has judicial overview for the minority’s practices. This seems natural, for courts cannot 
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avoid understandings based on their own meanings. Thus, the cases illuminates why there 
can be no self-determination if the relationship between the WE and indigenous peoples is 
understood in terms of constitutional dialogue, for apparently trivial changes might have 
massive consequences for indigenous peoples’ practices. To this extent, the cases elucidate 
the broader implications of indigenous peoples’ dependence on a WE that seeks to 
transform/reproduce their constitutional identity.  
5.3.1 Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren et al v. Hofer et al 
Broadly considered, in the Canadian Supreme Court case, Lakeside Colony of Hutterian 
Brethren et al. v. Hofer et al., the Court recognised the Hutterites, as a religious minority 
group, as having a weak form of self-determination. The facts of the case were the 
following: as a member of the Hutterites community, Hofer decided to sell what was 
regarded as a part of the collectively-owned property of the group. This was considered as 
an important wrongdoing committed against the community. Initially, they tried to punish 
Hofer in the particular Hutterite way; sentencing him to separation from the community for 
a short period of time. However, Hofer did not accept his punishment and was expelled 
from the community. As a consequence, he was considered as having lost any proprietary 
interest in the land. Hofer sued the Hutterites, alleging the expulsion was illegal520. In 
examining the Court’s argumentation, Denise Reaume reveals that the Hutterites combined 
the requirements to be part of the community with the legal requirements of Canadian 
contract law521. Members entered by consenting to abide by the “constitution” of the 
community. Thus, Hofer entered the community by consent, and had access to the 
communally-owned property by accepting the rules of entry. When Hofer and others were 
expelled, the Supreme Court agreed with the community and thus considered they had no 
more interests in the property because there was a justified breach of a contractual 
obligation522.  
                                                
520 Denise Reaume, ‘The Legal Enforcement of Social Norms: Techniques and Principles’ in Alan Cairns et 
al (eds.) Citizenship, Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives (McGill-Queen’s 
University Press 1999) 181. 
521 Reaume, ‘The Legal enforcement’ (n 520) 180. 
522 Ibid 180. 
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Reaume agrees with the Court’s ruling that Hofer accepted the terms of the contract, and 
thus, the consequences of non-compliance523. By employing a social contract theory, 
Reaume adopts the perspective of the individual as the basic unit of meaning. However, 
while initially the case seems nothing out of the ordinary, it provides an entry into how 
membership is shaped by penal practices. Naturally, in order to register this, it is necessary 
to adopt a different approach. The modified morphogenetic approach allows for framing 
the case in terms of a mutual relationship between criminal law and the organization of 
political power (the constitutional order), and it identities the contribution of the former to 
the boundaries of the latter. It approaches membership of Hutterites as a process of social 
construction in terms of boundary setting. Preliminarily, upon this framework, it appears 
that the Hutterites’ penal practices shaped their membership, for by evaluating Hofer’s 
conduct and attaching certain consequences to it, they reproduced/transformed their 
cultural meanings and social structures for subsequent cycles. As a result, they managed to 
preserve their idem-identity and ipse-identity.  
Let us examine more closely this alternative explanation of the case. In Hofer, there is a 
property owned by a collective under the condition that members endorse its 
“constitution”. Once one is considered a member, they can access the land, obtain material 
benefits from harvesting and undertake other activities, which allow them to achieve a 
spiritual completeness by engaging in traditions shared by other members. The Hutterites 
are a very close community: all its members share, more or less, the same fundamental 
values and together engage in collective practices that give meaning to what they do as a 
community. Thus, the collective has an idem-identity and ipse-identity. Now the plaintiff 
appears, intending to sell what he deems his part of the property without agreement from 
the community. From the point of view of the Canadian WE, the intention to sell a minor 
part of a very fertile land is a trivial matter. Certainly, it amounts to an event occurring 
within the private sphere, a matter concerning individual rights and economic benefits. 
However, it is not trivial for the community. According to them, a serious offence is 
committed, for significantly, Hofer intended to reset the boundaries of the community. 
From the point of view of the community, the transgressor is doing two things. First, he is 
transgressing the terms of the collective idem-identity of the community, an ingredient of 
                                                
523 Ibid 184. 
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which are the expectations of what it means for members to live together. Community 
members’ property rights are seen as permissions for engaging in sacred collective work, 
and thus define what they expect and value in the actions of others when they labour on the 
land together. The offender thus challenges the meaning of the group’s fundamentals 
values, that the land should be harvested collectively, and the meanings that follow from 
collective labour. Second, he also transgresses the terms of the collective ipse-identity. By 
seeking to sell his part of the property without agreement from the community, the 
offender arrogates the position of the community’s WE; that is, the group’s position as the 
legitimate subject entitled to organise collective social life. This remains true regardless of 
the offender’s intention. Certainly, even if he did not intentionally aim to negate the WE’s 
authority, he nevertheless did so in trying to divide its collective property. 
There are many elements at play here that together resemble a particular penal practice524. 
First, there is a moral, cultural and political community, social practices and meanings that 
the group seek to make available for subsequent cycles. Second, there are the basic terms 
of citizenship, in both their active and passive dimensions: the duties and rights to 
participate and deliberate collectively and the benefits of the collective endeavour, and 
thus, something close to a constitutional order. But what kind of penal practice might be at 
play here? Perhaps the group has a different penal practice, one without prisons525. Third, 
the offender arrogates the position of the constitutional WE. Fourth, the rules that handle 
                                                
524 Paul Roberts would of course contest whether this is criminal law, since for him, if there is no centralised 
governmental authority, then there is little reason to call these rules legal, thus Hutterites would not only lack 
a criminal law, but hardly have something like it. Yet, as Fernanda Pirie has contested, it should not be 
pushed too far the demand for an existing centralised governmental authority as a condition for 
characterising rules and practices as legal, and thus, as these practices, as penal practices similar to state 
criminal law. The position of the thesis would be a middle ground between Roberts and Pirie, in terms of the 
following four propositions: first, centralisation can be decentralised without loosing the idea of unity. 
Markets and sub-state autonomies show centralised political power can be decentralised. Second, this does 
not imply that in a context of governmental centralisation, the law needs to be characterised in the same way 
as in a non-centralised context. Third, the existence of a form of political organisation suggests law is 
connected with domination, yet contrary to Pirie, the law cannot be understood independently of social 
practices. Fourth, domination need not deny the connection between law and cultural meanings, and thus, it 
need not deny a moral interpretation of those relations of domination. It appears that even if Roberts is right 
in that this is not criminal law, it would still be the case that it fulfils similar functions for the minority and 
thus share with the law the fact that both are penal practices,. See Simon Roberts, ‘After Government?: On 
Representing Law Without the State’ (2005) 68 The Modern Law Review 1-24; critiquing the centralisation 
thesis, see Fernanda Pirie, ‘Law before Government: Ideology and Aspiration’ (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 207-228. 
525 One should note that current criminal law incorporates alternatives to imprisonment, like paying a fee or 
community services, so this would not be as controversial as it first appears. 
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the conflict evaluate the meaning of the offender’s actions, and by implication they might 
remove the initial non-conditional status of the offender. It seems that there is a critical 
function at work. Indeed, what the individual has done is evaluated with reference to 
members’ passive and active citizenship, which may result in a redefinition of the status of 
the offender. Fifth, this form of critical function is triggered by a wrongdoing committed 
against the political community. All these elements in this penal practice are also typical of 
state criminal law, which - even if insufficient to convince a sceptic that this is criminal 
law- should at least be sufficient to convince them that this is a penal practice as state 
criminal law is and, thus, that it can provide information about the shared features both 
have in common. Fundamentally, both responses shape their membership. 
The Hutterites’ penal practice shape their membership in the way it defines conditional 
citizenship and delineates how offenders are to be treated. In the present case, the 
community’s rules prescribe that the offender be sanctioned by having to eat and praise 
separately from the community for a certain time. By accepting this “punishment”, the 
individual would be reconciled with the community; he would regain his status as a citizen, 
and be treated accordingly. Significantly, punishment is voluntary, for the offender need 
not accept it. Yet, neither conditional citizenship nor expulsion from the community are 
voluntary: these rules are coercive526. Indeed, in Hofer the offender did not accept the 
“offer”; he was subsequently expelled from the community and accordingly lost his 
proprietary interest in the land. From Hofer’s perspective, it is possible to interpret what he 
did in rejecting “punishment” as refusing reconciliation with the community, but also as 
denying the meanings upheld by the group, and denying his membership. It appears there 
is meaning-responsiveness, for to engage in this practice the member needs to master its 
meanings; otherwise it would not be possible to understand the practice, for instance, that 
by accepting the “offer”, the offender is assigned a status of conditional membership. 
Moreover, not only does this procedure involve the meanings of the group, but engaging in 
                                                
526 It is noteworthy that both Hutterites and Canadians regard the consequences of punishment as “coercive”: 
it is the group that decides whether and in what conditions a member is characterised as a conditional citizen, 
and what kind of treatment will be given to members who fall into that condition. “Punishment”, for the 
Hutterites, puts members in a situation of conditional membership, which involves being divested of certain 
possibilities for action and being prescribed to engage in others. This is certainly different from 
imprisonment in Canadian jails. However, coercion need not entail coercive enforcement. Thus, if prisoners 
go voluntarily to prison, this would not make imprisonment any less a part of criminal law. On distinguishing 
coercion from coercive enforcement, see Robert Hughes, ‘Law and Coercion’ (2013) 8 Philosophical 
Compass 231-240. 
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it also advances the community’s ends. Surely, by expelling the member, the WE assures 
that in subsequent cycles, decisions about property are to be collective and deliberative; 
that is, that transformations of idem-identity should be effected by the WE’s ipse-identity. 
Thus, there is also axiological-responsiveness. 
Now, suppose a future case involving the Hutterites in which the Canadian Supreme Court 
reverses its position and considers that property cannot be collective, and thus, that any 
member can sell part of the land as an individual owner. It seems that this would not entail 
considerable transformation in the community’s practices, for it would just be a “trivial” 
change in the way property is understood. One should note, however, how this would bear 
on the Hutterites’ penal practice and thus on how they draw their boundaries. It appears 
that the Hutterites’ penal practice has lost its capacity for construing membership. 
Certainly, countering individual arrogations of the WE in matters of collective property 
ownership would prove ineffective, for this would no longer be regarded as a crime. Their 
rules can neither transform the meaning crime conveys, nor reproduce the meanings 
outside of crime for subsequent cycles. Now, if the individual does not accept the “offer”, 
he can still unilaterally sell and fragment the community’s property. The community 
becomes externally reorganised, for non-compliance with the community is redefined as 
compliance. It appears to members that if, in subsequent cycles, they individually aim to 
sell the property, they will be able to do so without any institutional consequences.  
This penal practice might still offer some guidance for subsequent cycles, but as part of the 
CS, relying on the values and individual attitudes of its members. Certainly, collective 
agreement for fragmenting property and individualising labour is no more necessary for 
transforming meaning; meaning can change unilaterally and individually. Perhaps this can 
lead to understanding property solely as individually-owned, thus undermining the 
religious and collective meaning that harvesting had before the ruling. Perhaps the 
community would turn secular and thus either be assimilated into the rest of the Canadian 
population or transformed into a new community. This would be a revolution for the 
community, a fundamental transformation of its idem-identity and ipse-identity, their 
social practices and meanings. All of these transformations would be consequences of the 
Canadian WE’s interference in the Hutterites’ response to crime. As Chapter 4 argued, the 
social world is collectively fragile, for it depends on participants’ intentions, attitudes and 
dispositions to engage in certain social practices to enable having meaning. This is what 
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penal practices aim to counter in cases of crime, and what the WE would be deprived of, if 
another WE were to interfere with what appears to be a trivial matter. A similar revolution 
might result if Canadians were unable to apply their criminal law. Surely, if property were 
no longer protected by criminal law, it would still be protected by other legal SS, but this 
would still bring changes in the idem-identity of the Canadian WE. If it became non-
criminal to take property by force and without consent, this would redefine this practice 
and thus the meanings criminal law previously played a part in reproducing/transforming. 
It would also redefine the ipse-identity of the Canadian WE, and thus endanger both active 
and passive citizenship. 
Finally, in consideration of how things would be if the case were decided differently, it can 
be observed better how constitutional dialogue unfolds. Consider the case as it was 
actually decided. To some extent, the Canadian legal system allowed for connecting two 
different sets of practices of different groups, creating the appearance of agreement 
between them. Furthermore, this did not necessarily contradict a constitutional dialogue 
premised on mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity, as long as the parties 
relied on the language of the constitutional order guided by these new conventions. 
However, first, there was no agreement, just the appearance of dialogue. This appearance 
was created by the fact that the community’s decision was compatible with Canadian 
property law; that is, with how the Canadian legal system understood valuable options. Yet 
whereas for the Hutterites, an individual not accepting the offer of punishment involved 
setting boundaries by expelling a member from the community, for the Canadian legal 
system there was just a breach of the contractual rules the individual had consented to. 
That is, whilst for the Hutterites, the issue was fundamentally public because it implicated 
their citizenship, for Canadians, it was nothing more than a private dispute over the breach 
of a contractual obligation527. Second, when the Hutterites engaged in the legal dispute, 
they did so because they had no other choice: having been placed inside the Canadian WE, 
they were compelled to participate. If this is constitutional dialogue, then it seems quite 
shallow in intercultural terms, for both communities are doing completely different things. 
Not only did the meanings they reproduced differ significantly, but so did how they 
understood their interaction. 
                                                
527 Reaume, ‘The Legal Enforcement’ (n 520) 181. 
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It appears that the Hutterites, as with any other political community, require an 
independent penal practice in order to be able to define the identity of their constitutional 
order, given its contribution to idem-identity and ipse-identity. The WE cannot renounce to 
their penal practices, for in so doing, it would renounce both drawing its boundaries and 
construing citizenship through it. The WE needs an independent penal practice; 
independent, that is, from another WE. 
5.3.2 Thomas v. Norris 
5.3.2.1 Citizenship and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
Now, let us consider a case in which the Canadian Supreme Court was not in agreement 
with the minority and how - by setting the boundaries of the WE -neither the indigenous 
peoples’ claims to self-determination, nor the political character of the WE’s denial, were 
registered. This occurred in the Canadian Supreme Court case, Thomas v. Norris528. In this 
case, Thomas, a would-be member of the Coast Salish indigenous nation, sued members of 
the community for battery, assault and false imprisonment. The facts considered by the 
Court were the following: the Salish community decided to make Thomas a member 
motivated by Thomas’s wife, whose aim was to resolve some personal problems they had 
as a couple529. The Salish required that certain, specific conditions be met in order to gain 
recognition as a member530. Basically, the potential member would need to undertake 
practices including fasting and flagellation. Against his will, Thomas was taken from his 
home at night, flagellated and forced to fast. The rite was supposed to take a few hours, yet 
Thomas started to feel ill and was driven to the hospital to check his condition. His health 
was not in danger and he was able to leave the hospital shortly thereafter. 
                                                
528 [1992] 2 C.N.L.R. 139 (B.C.S.C.) 
529 The Salish held also that they were aiming at Thomas’ well-being. Notably, some believe that integration 
is so important that not being integrated is cast in terms of harm; see Corey Brettschneider, ‘Equality as a 
Basis for Religious Toleration: A Response to Leiter’ (2016) 10 Criminal Law and Philosophy 542-543; also 
Brian Leiter, ‘Reply to Five Critics of Why Tolerate Religion?’ (2016) 10 Criminal Law and Philosophy 555, 
drawing their conclusion in light of Wisconsin v Yoder. So, it seems reasonable to believe that the community 
held the belief that through the initiation, they would spare the would-be member from harm, just as Leiter 
and Brettschneider would if Amish children were integrated into the USA’s social practices. 
530 Not unlike western rites of naturalisation for immigrants. For a comparative perspective on the practices 
of naturalisation in Europe, see Rainer Baubock et al (eds.), Citizenship Policies in the New Europe 
(Expanded and Updated Edition, Amsterdam University Press 2009). 
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Following these events, Thomas sued the members of the tribe, which replied, mainly, that 
the rite was within the scope of rights under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, and thus 
protected from state interference. In principle, indigenous peoples rights under Section 35 
are exempted from Section 1 of the Constitution Act531, which grants the Canadian state 
the possibility to subject rights to limits by laws that “… can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.”532. However, the Supreme Court, relying on its previous 
ruling, R. v Sparrow533, considered that indigenous peoples rights were not absolute534. 
Accordingly, Canadian law can establish legitimate limitations. Reaume suggests the 
standard the Court took for limiting those rights that “…only those practices consistent 
with laws of general application can attract the protection of Section 35.”535. In other 
words, notwithstanding that indigenous peoples rights are exempted from Section 1, they 
are nonetheless subjected to the same kind of limits any right would be; namely, limits that 
all Canadians would accept as part of a free and democratic society.  
Close examination of the Court’s reasoning is relevant, for it elucidates how the states 
which indigenous peoples find themselves in typically deny their self-determination, 
without acknowledging this as a political event. This illustrates, more broadly, the 
asymmetric interaction between two WE, when there is no collective political equality 
between them. Certainly, relations between indigenous peoples and states appear in stark 
contrast with the relations between EU member states. Whereas in the latter, the 
relationship is one in which there is, more or less, collective political equality between the 
WEs, in the latter there is none. The first important issue to bear in mind is how Canadian 
institutions frame the case. The task under Section 1 requires, first, identifying a breach of 
rights, and second, whether that breach is justifiable or not, yet the first stage is decisive, 
for it frames both alternatives and consequences.  
                                                
531 Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law (second edition, Irwin Law 2000) 464. 
532 Canadian Charter of Rights, Constitution Act 1982 Part I. 
533 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 160.  
534 In truth, the Court did not rely on Sparrow as a precedent for this case, yet did employ something close to 
the Sparrow test in order to limit, in this case, indigenous peoples rights. Thomas Isaac, ‘Individual Versus 
Collective Rights: Aboriginal People and the Significance of Thomas v. Norris’, (1992) 21 Manitoba Law 
Journal 625. On the conditions set by the Sparrow test, see Monahan, Constitutional Law (n 529) 464-469. 
535 Reaume, ‘The Legal Enforcement’ (n 520) 192. 
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The Court starts by considering all affected parties as Canadians citizens, including 
indigenous peoples. It thus frames the case explicitly as one involving membership. 
Indeed, Section 1 of the Canadian Charter takes as basic two sets of considerations: the 
individual rights of Canadians and Canadian democratic decision-making. In other words, 
passive and active citizenship, and thus, idem-identity and ipse-identity. When the 
Canadian Charter extends the conditions of a just society “to all” Canadians, it draws the 
WE’s boundaries upon the unity of what are considered his practices. Even though 
indigenous peoples are recognised in the Canadian constitution as collectives, by including 
them within the boundaries of Canadian citizenship, their self-determination is denied. 
Surely, by including them and Thomas, the Court denied that they could include Thomas 
and exclude Canadian Courts. The Court considers there to be only one constitutional 
order. Upon this argumentation, the Court considered that Thomas’ rights were breached 
by the Coast Salish practice of citizenship. 
Now consider the very particular role that criminal law played in this case as part of the 
second prong of the task under Section 1; that is, whether the breach of rights was justified. 
It is notable that the constitutional order frames the issues it confronts similarly to how it 
was characterised criminal law in Chapter 1, as structuring individual choice in terms of 
institutional alternatives and institutional consequences. It appears now that the 
constitutional order does the same when it draws the boundaries of membership. 
Institutional alternatives are structured around individuals and their interests, so it is no 
surprise that the Court understands the case in terms of individual rights. More to the point, 
it seems that given how the issue implicates the terms of citizenship and thus the identity 
of the constitutional order, the application of criminal law should necessarily follow. 
Criminal law would be, from the point of view of the constitutional order, a constitutional 
consequence. However, this is not necessary. As has been seen, citizenship involves 
multiple relations, regarding many other forms of legal and non-legal relations. The 
suggestion is not then that any issue concerning citizenship implicates criminal law, for the 
constitutional order may respond, as it did in Thomas, with tort law. Now, it could be said 
this seems to undermine the present argument, for initially it was discussed criminal law as 
part of the constitutional order, and now it is discussed tort law.  
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By way of reply, one could make the challenge that there is a stark distinction between 
torts and criminal law536, yet this is unnecessary. Surely, criminal law did enter the Court’s 
reasoning. However, it did not do so as SS, but as part of CS. Based upon the 
aforementioned encompassing conception of citizenship, the Court considered that there 
was a breach of rights, yet the question remained whether that breach was justified. 
Indigenous peoples rights are a fundamental concern, for as rights they may work as 
justifying the breach of individual rights. Thus, it is pivotal to determine whether in this 
case, it is possible to identify a concurrent right. Here enters criminal law, shaping both 
Canadian and indigenous peoples citizenship. The Court considered that even if there were 
an indigenous peoples right to practice such a rite, the practice did not survive the 
introduction of the Criminal Code into the Canadian legal system in the early 19th century. 
That is, in determining the boundaries of the Coast Salish rights, the Court appeals to what 
passing the criminal code signified for all Canadian citizens. The new WE, through that 
code, established new forms for protecting rights. That is, the passing of the code, by 
criminalising certain setbacks to individual rights, afforded protection to all Canadians537. 
Accordingly, the breach of Thomas’ rights was not justified. 
What stands out here is the different kind of criminal law to that which scholars are 
accustomed to in standard cases of criminalisation. In standard cases, criminal law operates 
as a SS: there is a court that decides whether a person has committed a crime, given a 
certain base of evidence. Yet in Thomas, the Court shaped its legal reasoning considering 
criminal law not as SS. If the Court had done so, then members of the Salish would have 
been indicted, but they were only made responsible for a tort538. Instead, the Court uses the 
WE’s criminal law as part of CS, and thus criminal law becomes part of the case. Notice 
how this move starts depoliticising indigenous peoples’ claims, for their rights can be 
                                                
536 From a modified morphogenetic perspective, it seems that torts may also play a role in CS and SS cycles, 
if the focus shifts from ‘shared values’ to social practices. For a similar approach, see Lindsay Farmer, 
‘Criminal Law as an Institution: Rethinking Theoretical Approaches to Criminalization’ in Duff et al (eds.), 
Criminalization: the Political Morality of Criminal Law (OUP 2014) 86; proposing a master principle for a 
strict difference between both, see, among others, Marcus Dubber, ‘Criminal Law between Public and 
Private Law’, in Duff et al (eds.), The Boundaries of Criminal law (OUP 2010) 191-213; also Ambrose Lee, 
‘Public Wrongs and the Criminal Law’ (2015) 9 Criminal Law and Philosophy 167. 
537 The Court considered the initiation ceremony was “contrary” to criminal law and not the exercise of an 
indigenous right, see Isaac, ‘Individual Versus Collective’ (n 534) 624-625. 
538 It cannot be excluded here that the prosecutors decided not to charge them in use of their discretionary 
powers, for the conduct of the accused could be easily subsumed under criminal assault according to section 
265 of the Criminal Code. 
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justifiably restricted in the interests of all Canadians539. Among the Canadians, it is 
possible to find Thomas and the Coast Salish community, so it appears to be also in their 
interests, yet as individual citizens of Canada, their practices can be restricted. That is, the 
restriction of their practices appears justified in the interests of indigenous peoples 
themselves. By including them in active citizenship through Section 1, indigenous peoples 
themselves are taken to be the legislators who place limits to their own rights. As it was 
seen in Chapter 3, the WE considers them - for these purposes - already as participants in 
his practices, which is an implication of having denied their self-determination. Otherwise, 
the Court could have challenged that prior inclusion of indigenous peoples, which of 
course it could not, because in framing the issue in terms of the idem-identity and ipse-
identity of the Canadian WE, the Court already asserted there was only one constitutional 
order. 
5.3.2.2 Repoliticising Indigenous Peoples Rights 
The way the Court used criminal law depoliticised indigenous peoples claims by including 
them in the Canadian WE, which gave the impression that they themselves willingly 
placed justifiable limits upon their constitutional identity. If criminal law confers 
protection on all Canadians, and this includes indigenous peoples, then indigenous peoples 
also willed these limits to their practices. This legal argument appeals to how citizens 
themselves engaging in democratic decision-making can place justifiable limits on their 
rights, including indigenous peoples rights. But there is a previous line of argumentation, 
just in case the argument about criminal law is regarded as flawed. That is, absent the role 
that criminal law played in proscribing indigenous peoples rights, as shown above, it 
would have appeared to the Court that if there was such a right, then the breach of 
Thomas’ rights could have been justified. However, under the alternative line of 
argumentation, the Court could draw upon another consideration to conclude that the 
breach of Thomas’ rights was unjustifiable. 
This alternative consideration appears implied in Section 1, that is, in the kinds of rights 
members would recognise for each other. As it was seen, the critical function contains an 
underlying conception of the good, and it is there because it underlies the constitutional 
                                                
539 Hamish Stewart, ‘Group-differentiated rights: a challenge to penal law’ (2014) 15 Studia Iuridica 
Toruniensia 185. 
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order. That is, conceptions of the good underlie criminal law because it is an institution 
doubly responsive to participants in the constitutional order, which as has been shown, 
emerged in a particular place, Europe, at a particular time, with state centralisation. These 
conceptions of the good guide the selection of rights that individuals recognise each other 
as having. In effect, according to the Court the initiation practice cannot be a right540, 
because a free individual agent541 would not accept this kind of treatment even if there 
were such a rite. It should be emphasised that this argument depoliticises the claims of 
indigenous peoples, by sustaining that no ‘reasonable’ Canadian would will a norm which 
implied depriving individuals of liberty of movement and physical integrity. Yet it also 
depoliticises the Canadian WE, because it is not the Canadian WE which establishes limits 
to indigenous peoples self-government, but the non-reasonability of the Coast Salish 
community542. Whereas the first argument, the “criminal law argument”, depoliticises by 
including indigenous peoples in the WE, the second argument, the “natural reasonability 
argument”, depoliticises by including them and the WE in humanity. 
Let us repoliticise Thomas by demonstrating the political nature of both arguments. This 
can be achieved in two steps. First, by connecting values to social practices, and second, 
connecting those social practices to the constitutional order. With these steps it appears 
that: first, indigenous peoples values have been undermined by the social practices of 
settlers; and second, that these practices were part of a collective subject, the constitutional 
order. By reproducing/transforming its identity, it is the WE, not criminal law or a natural 
sense of reasonability, which effectively included indigenous peoples and deprived them of 
self-determination. Without these connections, both the criminal law argument and the 
reasonability argument conceal both the inclusion of indigenous peoples and the existence 
                                                
540 Reaume, ‘The Legal Enforcement’ (n 520) 192; Isaac, ‘Individual Versus Collective’ (n 533) 622. 
541 Political theorists generally understand inclusion and exclusion only in terms of individual rights. See 
Arash Abizadeh, ‘Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own 
Borders’ (2008) 36 Political Theory 37-65; Lea Ypi, ‘Territorial Rights and Exclusion’ (2013) 8 Philosophy 
Compass 241-253; Sarah Fine, ‘The Ethics of Immigration: Self-Determination and the Right to Exclude’ 
(2013) 8 Philosophy Compass 254-268; Chandran Kukathas, ‘Why Open Borders?’ (2012) Ethical 
Perspectives 649-675; Maxime Lepoutre, ‘Immigration Controls: Why the Self-Determination Argument Is 
Self-Defeating’ (2016) 47 Journal of Social Philosophy 309-331; Alan Brudner, Constitutional Goods (OUP 
2004) 379; Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured (n 517) 28. 
542 There are, without doubt, colonial undertones in the Court’s reasoning, which it should be noted have 
become institutionalised in Canada. On the colonial remnants of the relation between the Canadian state and 
indigenous peoples, see Mariana Valverde and Adriel Weaver, ‘The Crown Wears Many Hats: Canadian 
Aboriginal Law and the Black-boxing of Empire’ in Kyle McGee (ed.), Latour and the Passage of Law 
(Edinburgh University Press 2015) 93-121. 
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of the Canadian WE. The Court’s alternative consideration avoids confronting indigenous 
peoples self-determination by basing its decision on a seemingly universal repository of 
cultural meanings. Certainly, it seems naturally reasonable that a free individual agent 
would not accept the rite of initiation. Let us accept for the sake of the argument that the 
practice is contrary to this “natural reasonability”, because no reasonable free individual 
would accept such a practice. Why should the political community ascribe authority to 
those principles of natural freedom in defining institutional rights? Importantly, endorsing 
these natural law values implies adopting a natural law approach by which to assess the 
values breached by the Salish community. With this move, freedom as a value is detached 
from social practices, for the natural reasonability of human agents forms the ground that 
explains the authority of freedom. In turn, this presupposes a natural law understanding of 
the political community. 
Natural law theorists543 start from the ‘natural’, practical rationality of human beings and 
then claim it allows humans to take as ends basic goods, the attainment of which allow 
them to flourish544. The theorist might claim that these first principles are known through 
something like intuition, as does Finnis545, or through theoretical reason, as does Murphy. 
Either way, the good becomes independent from social practices. The good is not socially 
constructed but discovered through ‘determinations’ or specifications of more general 
principles rooted in human nature. Not surprisingly, this account aligns with a view of 
institutional facts as merely facilitative or constraining. Importantly, this need not deny 
that it is morally autonomous individuals who are to self-impose the good as an end. On 
the contrary, as Haakonsen has argued, historically the appeal to the morality of an 
autonomous individual was already present in the natural law tradition546. As it was seen, 
                                                
543 Here I consider mainly natural law theorists who develop legal theories grounded in human nature; see 
Murphy, Natural Law (n 191) 1-3. 
544 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Second Edition, OUP 2011) 30; Murphy, Natural Law (n 
191) 3. 
545 True, Finnis considers his view as not intuitive, insofar as he claims intuitions do not require sense-data, 
whilst his theory of “insight” does. However, in this light knowledge and understanding become “automatic” 
or spontaneous and thus analogous to how it is acquired knowledge by intuition. See Finnis, Natural Law (n 
542) 30; John Finnis, ‘Introduction’, in John Finnis, Reason In Action: Collected Essays, Volume I (OUP 
2011) 2-3; for a similar point, see Murphy, Natural Law (n 191) 7-8; on the connection between causation 
and knowledge by intuition, see Alvin Goldman and Joel Pust, ‘Philosophical Theory and Intuitional 
Evidence’ in Alvin Goldman, Pathways to Knowledge: Public and Private (OUP 2002) 74-75. 
546 Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment 
(CUP 1996) 339. 
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criminal law understands agents in terms of morally autonomous individuals pursuing 
valuable options. This points to an important implication for the understanding of 
citizenship. By emphasising the individual benefits of a political association547, the natural 
law theorist not only individualises citizenship; more importantly, conceives of citizenship 
exclusively in terms of individual rights or values, and thus at the expense of the political 
community as subject. Accordingly, active citizenship vanishes as a consequence of the 
rejection of the argument of social construction; the good is no longer socially 
constructed548. 
Now, let us reject the first move. If there were a universal and natural repository of 
meanings, then this would imply that they are external to social practices. Surely, they 
would obtain regardless or independently of social practices, which is what the natural law 
theorist seeks to sustain. However, as it has been seen, meanings depend on social 
practices and thus they can only be internal to them. The value of freedom from harmful 
interferences is achieved from the inside, form the perspective of participants themselves 
who understand the meaning of harm and the value of freedom. Importantly, this relates to 
the idem-identity of the political community and thus with passive citizenship. If social 
practices are understood as facilitative, it is overlooked that the value of freedom from 
harmful interference has emerged within practices that are social and political 
achievements. Of course, this is precisely what the natural law theorist would like to claim. 
By considering the political community merely as an aggregate of individuals that pools 
the common good, it overlooks both the historic social movements that made possible the 
very contexts in which such values have meaning. In other words, the obtaining of those 
contexts was a process of the social construction of reality, and thus, the meanings of 
freedom and harm were socially enabled. 
                                                
547 For Finnis, territorial boundaries follow from distributive principles, in the sense that only those who have 
assumed the burdens of social cooperation can be entitled to benefit from it. As a result, active citizenship 
does not figure. See John Finnis, ‘Migration Rights’ in John Finnis, Human Rights and Common Good: 
Collected Essays, Volume III (OUP 2011) 119-120. For Murphy, political authority is based on the capacity 
of the community to direct their members to the common good, and thus, as in Finnis, active citizenship does 
not figure. See Murphy, Natural Law (n 191) 123. 
548 Exploring the political nature of indigenous peoples membership in CANZUS states (Canada, USA, New 
Zealand, and Australia), see Kirsty Gover, Tribal Constitutionalism: Stets, Tribes, and the Governance of 
Membership (OUP 2010). 
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As was shown earlier, active citizenship and passive citizenship have resulted historically 
from a combination of particular forms of cultural, social, and political organisation. These 
contexts for having meaning are not for free, but require a constant and dynamic 
reproduction/transformation. It appears, then, that passive citizenship and natural 
reasonability can, after all, be linked to active citizenship and, therefore, to the subject of 
social and political organisation, which endows social practices with self-determined 
political authority549. Thus, it is achieved the second step as well. Certainly, it now appears 
that the Court relies on the meanings of the Canadian WE to deny indigenous peoples self-
determination. These meanings are the outcome of a process of social construction, which 
active Canadian citizens regard as social and political achievements. That which has 
transformed indigenous peoples self-determination is a constitutional order, the Canadian 
WE. It appears, then, that the claims of indigenous peoples and their denial are both 
political. For it is the criminal law of a WE that was imposed on them, and it was not 
humanity, but the Canadian WE, that deprived them of self-determination. 
Observing indigenous peoples claims to access their practices and that oppose state 
criminal law leads to an important conclusion regarding the possibility of accommodation. 
As it was seen, the WE needs to integrate citizens. The meaning of active and passive 
citizenship depends on the intentional practical attitudes of members, for they are the 
building blocks on which social practices are constructed. These attitudes enable the 
meanings social practices generate, the meanings on which those intentional attitudes 
depend. A constitutional order aims at transforming/reproducing social practices so as to 
preserve the meanings on which their members depend. But this makes the constitutional 
order dependent on the meanings on which individuals depend, and thus requires that its 
members be integrated into its practices, for it is they, as participants, who construe their 
own active and passive citizenship. The need for integration thus entails the impossibility 
of accommodating another WE. The WE cannot provide the space that indigenous peoples 
require in order to have at least some degree of control over their socio-cultural practices, 
                                                
549  Kent McNeil thinks that the Court should have considered that indigenous peoples rights were 
constitutionalised, while common law rights were not, so the balance should have been struck in favour of 
the Coast Salish nation. See Kent McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Governments and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms’ (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 75-76. However, this overlooks that common law rights 
have also been constitutionalised, and thus the kind of balance that would have to be made, at least between 
rights of equal constitutional status. Seen in this way, the problem would be that constitutional rights figure 
in the balance, but the clash between two sovereign WE would remain invisible, which means that the 
framing is still in terms of individual rights. 
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for it cannot relinquish, as has been shown, its criminal law. Accordingly, the political 
question of accommodation needs to be rephrased as a question of collective political 
equality. Seen in this way, indigenous peoples must be assured the space to draw their own 
boundaries. This requires, at least, having control over their penal practices. In other 
words, to be treated as equals, they require the suspension of the constitutional order of the 
WE they inhabit550, for this seems to be the only way to enable an independent penal 
practice. 
5.4. Suspending Criminal Law 
It was illustrated with Hofer how penal practices contributed to set the boundaries of a 
community, the role they played for the reproduction/transformation of their socio-cultural 
practices, and how constitutional dialogue may interfere and suppress them. With Thomas, 
it was illustrated how a WE defined the boundaries of a minority through criminal law, and 
how it depoliticised their claims and the implicit denial of self-determination. Earlier it was 
examined the situation of Rapa-Nui, which were in no better position. It is possible to 
argue that the problem for Canadian indigenous peoples was that they became the object of 
a process of “under-criminalisation”551. Certainly, it could be argued that by being under-
criminalised, indigenous peoples were placed in a much more vulnerable position, for this 
would have removed the traditional protections provided for defendants during criminal 
proceedings. However, recall the case of Rapa-Nui, who ended up in the very same 
position within an institutional system far less responsive to the claims of indigenous 
peoples, as is the Chilean legal system. Recall that: their actions were institutionally 
structured by criminal law in terms of individual choices; institutional consequences were 
attached; they were prevented from being registered as a group; they needed to grasp the 
meanings and further the ends of the legal institutions they were forced to engage with; and 
finally they were regarded as part of that group participants who share the same values, as 
Chileans. It appears that even with the “protections” awarded by criminal law indigenous 
peoples remain inevitably in a situation of subordination and at risk of being assimilated. 
                                                
550 For a deontological argument that grounds self-determination on individual freedom of expression, see 
Christopher Wellman, ‘Freedom of Association and the Right To Exclude’, in Christopher Wellman and 
Phillip Cole, Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude? (OUP 2011) 13-155.  
551 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, ‘Preventive Orders: A Problem of Undercriminalization?’ in Duff et 
al (eds.), The Boundaries of Criminal Law (OUP 2010) 59-87. 
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The position of indigenous peoples amidst a domain of foreign institutions, meaning-
responsive and axiological-responsive to the WE of which they have been forced to be 
part, amidst a WE that seems justified in integrating its members to reproduce/transform its 
own social practices, is one in which it is impossible to be accommodated. Criminal law 
cannot be accommodated to provide space for indigenous peoples’ social practices to have 
the meaning they seek, and cultural defences are not real accommodations after all. 
Indigenous peoples, as self-determined collectives, need an independent penal practice; 
independent, that is, from the criminal law of the WE. It is here that Lindahl’s proposal 
comes into force. For indigenous peoples require a solution that courts cannot provide. 
Certainly, when they appear as strong a-legality, they require, as the WE itself requires, 
access to their own ways of drawing boundaries and enabling forms of citizenship. By 
suspending the constitutional order of the WE in which they find themselves, they can be 
protected from its criminal law and develop their own penal practices. 
Significantly, the proposal does not aim at the complete suspension of the constitutional 
order, but only the suspension of criminal law. In effect, while suspending the 
constitutional order involves suspending the application of criminal law, the suspension of 
criminal law does not entail the complete suspension of the constitutional order. This is the 
sense in which, while there are mutual relations between criminal law and the 
constitutional order, there are also hierarchical relations between both. Therefore, 
negotiating the exit of a group would not amount to a complete suspension of the 
constitutional order. This cannot be, for this would mean that the exit of a group would not 
be a political event, given the suspension of the constitutional order. True, if the 
constitutional order is the form of the political organisation of the WE, then suspending the 
constitutional order would entail suspending the political. However, secession or autonomy 
cannot but be political events, and the suspension of criminal law would indeed be a 
tremendously important political event for indigenous peoples, as well as for the WE.  
The constitutional order cannot suspend itself. Of course, there are cases when the 
constitutional order is superseded, as when raw power resets the organisation of political 
power, as is typical of military coups. But this is also a political event. In military coups, 
the constitutional order is not self-suspended, but externally suspended. In contrast, 
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suspending criminal law through the constitutional order is internal self-suspension552. One 
should also note that the suspension of criminal law is transitional. The real challenge is 
how to outline an institutional form that provides non-transitional autonomy, presumably 
through sub-state forms, which at the same time respects the boundaries of the larger WE. 
These are matters of constitutional design in what Sujit Choudhry designates divided 
societies, or societies in which cultural differences become politically salient553. Seen in 
this light, Lindahl’s proposal aims at securing a transitional space in which indigenous 
peoples can negotiate their position within the WE. This may lead to the fragmentation of 
the state, for secession remains a possibility. However, the fear of fragmentation is at odds 
with evidence that strongly suggests that devolving self-determination to minorities does 
not lead to external self-determination or independence from states554.  
From this perspective, it seems there can be space for a multicultural citizenship, insofar as 
self-determination falls short of secession. This would have to have consequences for the 
kind of criminal law that would be at play in the interactions between two WE. Once 
strong, internal-self-determination is granted, the situation would resemble the relations 
between member states within the EU. It has been stressed that self-determination needs to 
address the question of jurisdiction over the WE’s criminal law. A case in point seems to 
be the Navajo indigenous peoples who, while enjoying a considerable degree of internal 
self-determination, with their own systems of justice and jurisdiction to try many forms of 
                                                
552 Suspension does not amount to the suppression of the constitutional order, unless broader social practices 
are completely suppressed, as in cases of mass extermination of the population or genocide. 
553 Sujit Choudhry, ‘Bridging comparative politics and comparative constitutional law: Constitutional design 
in divided societies’ in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or 
Accommodation? (OUP 2008) 4-5. 
554 The social scientific debate to date has been largely framed by the ideas put forward by Arend Lijphart 
and Donald Horowitz. Both favoured accommodation over integration, depending on the social context 
meeting certain specific political and social conditions; see Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A 
Comparative Exploration (Yale University Press 1977) 24; Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 
(California University Press 1985) 588. Contemporary views, more or less along the same lines proposed by 
Lijphart and Horowitz, include the following: Yash Ghai, ‘Ethnicity And Autonomy: A Framework For 
Analysis’ in Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States (CUP 
2000) 23; John McGarry, ‘Asymmetry in Federations, Federacies and Unitary States’ (2007) 6 Ethnopolitics 
108; John McGarry et al, ‘Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict regulation’ in Sujit 
Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (OUP 2008) 
52; Markku Suksi, Sub-State Governance Through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in 
Constitutional Law of Powers, Procedures and Institutions (Springer 2011) 624. For a general overview, see 
Brendan O’Leary, ‘Governing Diversity’ in Steven Vertovec (ed.), Routledge International Handbook of 
Diversity Studies (Routledge 2015) 203-215. 
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offences555, find that federal USA law still encroaches upon their autonomy to try almost 
all serious offences556. It follows that there is a major space for interference in the Navajo 
constitutional order and their social practices, with the implications already examined. In 
contrast, strong self-determination would demand at least the kind of autonomy enjoyed by 
European member states in the EU, which involves understanding criminal law as part of 
the identity of the constitutional order. 
The case of the EU, even if unsatisfactory in many important respects, as an ideal-type 
illustrates the domains of criminal law in which a WE is typically not disposed to defer to 
another WE. From this point of view, the existence of a practice in which many self-
determined groups remain connected yet self-determined offers an important alternative to 
the apparently simple yet hard-to-achieve option of secession. The EU shows that there is 
no need to exit the constitutional WE in order to remain self-determined, notwithstanding 
the recent disagreement of the UK. The purpose of highlighting the EU as an alternative in 
terms of the WE’s relationship to criminal law is to open the mind to the distinct degrees of 
autonomy that groups can achieve, and while it is not part of this work to propose the 
multiple ways in which this could be effected, this may provide an interesting line of 
research for the future. Whatever this typology might offer, it would need to consider what 
might constitute an adequate balance in the interrelations of different penal practices from 
different WE, as a key for achieving autonomy. In other words, jurisdiction over penal 
practices needs to figure in any acceptable form of strong self-determination. For as it has 
been claimed, those practices occupies a central place in how the constitutional order 
understands its idem-identity and ipse-identity, and this cannot be plausibly denied without 
risking a self-defeating strategy for internal self-determination. In sum, without an 
independent penal practice, there cannot be true self-determination. 
 
 
                                                
555 It is seen by Navajo themselves as the emergence of their own common law; see Raymond Austin, Navajo 
Courts and Navajo Common Law: A Tradition of Tribal Self-Governance (Minnesota University Press 2009). 
556 The Major Crimes Act and the Public Law 280 restrict tribal jurisdiction in criminal law substantially, 
granting considerable jurisdiction to the USA Federal government and States governments to regulate 
jurisdiction of criminal law in Indian reserves. For an overview see Bryan Wildenthal, Native American 
Sovereignty on Trial: a Handbook With Cases, Laws, and Documents (ABC-Clio 2003) 69-71. 
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CONCLUSION 
Indigenous peoples, and minorities in general, are increasingly becoming more active in 
requiring from courts the protection of their cultural practices. While addressing these 
demands 30 years ago was exceptional, now they are becoming regularly part of judicial 
practice, at least in some multicultural states. Throughout this thesis I have sought to 
explain the challenges these claims represent for the constitutional order in general and for 
criminal law in particular. More specifically, I have sought to explore whether the claims 
of indigenous peoples to access their cultural practices could be accommodated within 
criminal law. The conclusion was they could not. At least in the terms through which 
criminal law framed accommodation, I argued that accommodation was not an appropriate 
response to the claims of indigenous peoples. In reflecting and exploring this argument and 
its conclusion I developed the literature on the constitutionalisation of criminal law, and 
elaborated the key contribution of my thesis: to understand criminal law as a part of the 
constitutional order. There were, however, two other important contributions: within 
political philosophy I contended that we should broaden our understanding of state 
neutrality, and within constitutionalism I defended the notion of constitutional order and 
constitutional identity. Let us start with the first and key contribution.  
I sought to understand criminal law as part of the constitutional order to explicate the 
significance of the claims of indigenous peoples to access their cultural practices, for both 
indigenous peoples themselves and the larger state within which they are located. The 
purpose was to challenge the standard response to the claims of indigenous peoples 
inspired by Will Kymlicka’s theory: the strategy of awarding individual rights and 
individuals defences within criminal law. I argued that this strategy that many 
‘multiculturalists’ advocated, overlooked how the response of criminal law as part of a 
constitutional order assimilated cultural differences. In other words, I claimed that 
understanding criminal law as part of the constitutional order meant that criminal law 
sought to assimilate the claims of indigenous peoples by framing them as claims made by 
individual human beings. In effect, I demonstrated how accommodation was achieved by 
framing indigenous peoples’ claims through the individualising language of rights and 
defences. As a consequence, indigenous peoples could not claim what they were after: 
access to their own practices of self-determination. 
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A second important contribution concerned the standard principle that grounds the claims 
to access cultural practices, the principle of state neutrality, and the means by which it 
promotes that access: special rights. I showed that these rights aimed at enhancing 
individual choice, a value that criminal law was committed to defend. The important point 
was to see that the principle of neutrality concealed that the social order, and its criminal 
law, were committed to endorse a conception of the good; a liberal one focused on the 
value of individual autonomy. The implication was that accommodation was a process that 
aimed at strengthening individual autonomy, and thus stopped where minorities departed 
from endorsing liberal values. In other words, because accommodation aimed at enhancing 
individual autonomy, within criminal law it operated as a process of assimilation into the 
values and practices of the liberal order. Against this strategy, I argued that we should 
broaden the question of whether the institutions of the liberal order are or not neutral, with 
the enquiry on how these institutions are responsive to certain way of understanding the 
world. That is, with the enquiry of how criminal law is responsive to a liberal 
understanding of the social world. 
Third, I developed the notions of constitutional order and constitutional identity, with 
which I explained that assimilation occurred within “a collective subject” of which 
criminal law was a part. The notion of constitutional order brought out the political 
components of the process of accommodation. This order, I claimed, aimed at organising 
political power within the state. My purpose was to show that criminal law, as a part of the 
constitutional order, was also a process that aimed to assimilate into the institutions of the 
constitutional order and thus contributed to organising its political power. To articulate the 
idea of inclusion more precisely I argued that the constitutional order developed a 
constitutional identity. I described this as an historical process that had a fundamental 
importance for indigenous peoples: at the time that the constitutional order developed his 
identity it included indigenous peoples within his territory. As a consequence indigenous 
peoples were regarded as existing within the boundaries of a single constitutional order. 
Indigenous peoples’ lack of access to their cultural practices and political institutions 
followed from this historical and institutional process of inclusion that deprived them from 
their self-determination. 
Now let us recall the beginning of the thesis. I began from the research question of whether 
the claims of indigenous peoples could be accommodated within criminal law, and initially 
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I found that there was a particular moderate response from criminal law to the claims of 
indigenous peoples in the form of cultural defences. After close scrutiny I demonstrated 
that this form of response involved the assimilation of indigenous peoples. What was 
fundamentally problematic of this response was that their assimilation and inclusion as 
collective political agent never registered. That is, their inclusion as a self-determined 
group never registered nor had any implications for the criminalisation of their practices. 
What it was clear was that within criminal law they were asked to assimilate into the 
values of the liberal society. Accordingly, I claimed that cultural defences were never 
designed to address the claims of indigenous peoples, but the problems that the 
constitutional order regarded as the object of criminal law. Self-determination in its 
different varieties was never part of the debate within criminal law, and accordingly, the 
claims of the indigenous peoples could never be heard. 
As it can be observed, the second and third contributions allowed me to arrive at the first, 
and thus allowed me to reach the conclusion that the claims of indigenous peoples could 
not be accommodated. In other words, the contributions were connected in allowing me to 
reach the conclusion. In aiming to answer the research question I first provided a theory to 
understand better the social and cultural components of criminal law and its critical 
function. Second, I identified what were the implications of the theory for thinking about 
special rights and neutrality in criminal law, all in order to specify better the process of 
social construction on which criminal law took part (second contribution). Third, the fact 
that criminal law contributed to this process provided support to the claim that 
accommodation was a part of a process of assimilation, which in chapter 3 I claimed that it 
was assimilation into the constitutional order of which criminal law is part (third 
contribution). Chapter 4 applied the theory so built to the claims of non-indigenous 
minorities and demonstrated that criminal law assimilated them to the constitutional order. 
And finally, chapter 5 applied the theory to the claims of indigenous minorities and 
demonstrated that criminal law assimilated them by treating them in certain ways and 
pursuing certain ends, all with the purpose to demonstrate that indigenous peoples claims 
could not be accommodated. Then I concluded with the suggestion that we should shift the 
focus from achieving accommodation to reaching collective political equality. 
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During the thesis I argued that the claims of indigenous peoples should not be reduced to 
claims to access only cultural practices or directed to solve problems of individual 
inequality. Their claims are political claims to access their practices of self-determination, 
and while these claims could not have room within criminal law, they nonetheless are 
claims that can be addressed by the constitutional order. From this point of view, the thesis 
has important implications for research concerned with the conditions for achieving self-
determination. Certainly, I argued that addressing indigenous peoples’ claims requires 
going beyond what the individualising language of individual rights and individual 
defences can provide. The response should be developed from within the constitutional 
order and would need to consider a fundamental component: constraining the use of 
criminal law. I argued that constraining the use of criminal law for specific groups 
implicated devolving them a fundamental power to shape their own forms of membership. 
The thesis suggests then to shift the question from how to achieve accommodation to how 
to achieve collective political equality. This of course, should be the object of further 
research. 
Although the focus of the thesis has been the situation of indigenous peoples’ claims 
within criminal law, the theory I have developed is general in character, and thus it is 
capable to be applied to many other related topics. That is, the theory’s focus on meaning 
(culture) and social structures (institutions) as components of a socially constructed world 
provides a suitable starting point for examining both general questions of legitimate 
authority and more specific questions concerning the authority of criminal law and 
practices of criminalisation. It appears that future research on the constitutionalisation of 
criminal law need to consider more closely the contribution that criminal law plays for the 
constitutional order. There is here an important first avenue for research: to enquire on how 
criminal law contributes to that order by criminalising certain market practices. Indeed, I 
have argued that there is a close connection between the expansion of political power and 
markets, and criminal law. Insofar as there is such a connection it appears a question 
concerning how criminal law contributes to the process of market expansion within state 
borders and even beyond them globally.  
A second avenue for research, also concerning criminal law yet more specifically criminal 
law theory, starts from considering that the theory I developed focuses, to understanding 
criminal law, on social practices. This framework provides a rather novel standpoint from 
 
211 
which to develop a theory of criminal law. Certainly, my approach focuses on how 
meaning is transformed and maintained independently of any pre-conceived end criminal 
law might pursue. Surely, the theory needs to be further developed for what I provided was 
only a broad understanding of criminal law. That is, I only provided the basic grounding 
for developing a theory of criminal law inspired in social theory and Wittgenstenian 
insights on meaning. The pending task then would be to develop a more substantive 
account of criminal law. Pursuant to the focus of my theory, the purpose would be neither 
determining the nature of criminal law nor its basic principles, but the key processes 
involved in maintaining social practices.  
A third avenue for research concerns, more generally, exploring the methodological 
implications of my theory for legal theory and legal philosophy. Certainly, the theory I 
developed can be seen as extending research that seek to develop an account of law based 
on the insights provided by the later Wittgenstein. However, in contrast with them my 
theory went further in seeking to connect Wittgenstein’s insights on meaning with 
Archer’s insights on the dynamics of the social world. Thus, I provided a richer account of 
the components and dynamics of social reality. This has implications for traditional 
questions concerning the function and role of the legal system more generally. True, I have 
explored these implications in relation to the claims of indigenous peoples. I have 
examined them in depth in cases concerning the practices of minorities, yet the same can 
be done in relation to the majority and their institutions. That is, the framework I have 
developed can potentially shed light on the role of the legal system in general and not only 
when it target the practices of minorities. These, I believe, can be fruitfully explored 
through the lens of the theory I have elaborated. 
In answering the research question, of which the critique of cultural defence was part, I 
developed a broader theoretical framework that is not only capable of understanding how 
the constitutional order and its criminal law relate each other. Certainly, I have provided 
not only a fruitful way to understand criminal law, but also a framework to understand 
social practices in general. This last point should be underlined: I have strived to develop a 
framework that takes into account the social practices on which criminal law takes part, its 
different components and its dynamics. Recognising them and its implications is necessary 
to understand how legal responses are developed and which might be their effects when 
they are directed to handle or minimise the conflicts that arise with the increasing 
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recognition of cultural diversity. Overlooking these dynamics imperils the capacity of the 
constitutional order to address with justice and to promote peaceful coexistence between 
different peoples.  
Certainly, as I have underlined, if it is adopted a reductive framework in order to 
understand the process of accommodation, then this would lead to overlooking those 
components and dynamics. Hence, it will appear inevitable or rather natural the 
disappearance of the collective claims of the Rapa-Nui when they aim to access a natural 
monument. I have argued at length against this strategy. It thus seems not only 
theoretically fruitful to adopt a framework that takes social practices and its dynamics into 
account, but also practically necessary in order to develop sensible constitutional and legal 
responses to the claims of indigenous peoples. For as I have argued, it is not only a matter 
justice to revert the injustices that have been committed against them; to respond to them 
in an appropriate manner seems the best way to cultivate a real inter-cultural dialogue and 
to avoid political and social fragmentation. 
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